Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. SF103495A
NICHOLSON, J.
A jury convicted defendant Miguel Rodriguez, Jr., of driving or taking a vehicle without consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 1) and receiving a stolen motor vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a); count 2). The trial court found that defendant had a prior juvenile adjudication of a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and a prior adult conviction of vehicle theft (§ 666.5) for which he had served a prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court dismissed count 2 in the interest of justice. Defendant’s motion to strike the juvenile adjudication was denied. He was sentenced to state prison for six years (double the midterm of three years), ordered to make restitution to the victim, and ordered to pay a $1,200 restitution fine plus a 10 percent surcharge (§ 1202.4) and a $1,200 restitution fine suspended unless parole is revoked (§ 1202.45).
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the prior juvenile adjudication cannot support a second-strike sentence, and (2) the abstract of judgment must be corrected in two respects; the Attorney General concedes the latter point. We modify the judgment and, as modified, affirm.
FACTS
In February 2007, Christine Smith and her son, Timothy Smith, resided in Stockton. Timothy owned a 1985 Ford Ranger, which Christine had permission to use. Timothy would sometimes leave the keys inside the truck. On February 13, Timothy noticed that the stereo and keys were missing from the truck. He went to an auto parts store and purchased an ignition cylinder and new keys; when he returned, the truck was missing. That afternoon, Christine noticed that the truck was missing from her driveway. Earlier that day, she had locked the driver’s side door after using the truck to go shopping.
Because both victims have the same surname, we refer to them by their first names.
Nick Welton was a detective for the Lodi Police Department assigned to the auto theft task force for San Joaquin County. Welton opined that in older cars, such as a 1985 Ford Ranger, the ignition switch becomes worn and the specific key is no longer needed to start the engine.
On February 14, 2007, Welton was driving in Stockton when he saw a Ford Ranger pickup truck that had been reported as stolen. Since Welton was in an unmarked car, he requested backup assistance. He followed the truck to a motel where it stopped. At Welton’s request, defendant came out of the truck.
Sidney Miller was a California Highway Patrol officer assigned to the San Joaquin County Sheriff’s abatement unit. On February 14, 2007, Miller was dispatched to Detective Welton’s location. When Miller arrived, defendant was being placed in custody. Miller investigated the 1985 Ford Ranger truck found at the scene. A key was in the ignition, but the truck had no paperwork for proof of insurance or ownership and its radio was missing. He advised the dispatch center of the vehicle’s license number and was informed that the truck belonged to Timothy Smith.
Defendant did not testify on his own behalf.
DISCUSSION
I
Defendant contends his prior juvenile adjudication was not a strike and cannot support his second-strike sentence. He acknowledges that this court, and other courts of appeal, have held that application of the Three Strikes law on the basis of a juvenile adjudication -- or other proceeding that does not provide the right to a jury trial -- does not violate the constitution. (People v. Palmer (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 724, 730; see People v. Superior Court (Andrades) (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 817, 830-834; People v. Lee (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1315-1316; People v. Smith (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1075-1079; People v. Bowden (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 387, 393-394.) The trial court recognized that it was bound by our decision in Palmer and denied defendant’s motion to strike his juvenile adjudication. As both parties recognize, this issue is currently pending before the California Supreme Court in several cases. (E.g., People v. Grayson, review granted Dec. 19, 2007, S157952; People v. Tu, review granted Dec. 12, 2007, S156995; People v. Nguyen, review granted Oct. 10, 2007, S154847.) Pending guidance from that court, we remain persuaded by our reasoning in Palmer and conclude that defendant’s motion to strike the juvenile adjudication was properly denied.
II
Defendant contends, and the Attorney General concedes, the abstract of judgment must be corrected in two respects. We accept the Attorney General’s concession.
The trial court orally ordered defendant to make restitution to the victim, Timothy Smith. However, the abstract of judgment incorrectly identifies the victim as “Timothy Walker.”
The trial court did not orally pronounce any fine pursuant to Vehicle Code section 23550, which is limited to offenses not at issue in this case. However, the abstract of judgment erroneously lists a $2,040 fine pursuant to Vehicle Code section 23550.
An appellate court may order correction of an abstract of judgment that does not accurately reflect the oral judgment of the sentencing court. (People v. High (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1200.) The abstract must be corrected to omit the Vehicle Code fine and to identify the victim as Timothy Smith.
We note that the abstract of judgment fails to conform to the oral pronouncement in a third respect: it includes a $20 court security fee (§ 1465.8) that was not orally pronounced. However, the remedy for this nonconformity is different. Because the court security fee is mandatory, we modify the judgment to add the fee. Because the abstract fortuitously includes the fee, no correction is necessary.
DISPOSITION
As discussed, the judgment is modified to add a $20 court security fee. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to correct the abstract of judgment to omit the Vehicle Code section 23550 fine and to identify the victim as Timothy Smith. A certified copy of the corrected abstract shall be forwarded to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
We concur: DAVIS, Acting P. J., ROBIE, J.