Opinion
May 15, 1989
Appeal from the County Court, Orange County (King, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant sought suppression of evidence seized from an apartment he occupied, on the ground that the search warrant was invalid. We decline to disturb the hearing court's determination that the absence of the issuing Magistrate's signature from the jurat on the police officer's affidavit did not render the warrant invalid. An application in writing for a search warrant must be "subscribed and sworn to by a public servant" (CPL 690.35). The hearing court accepted as credible the testimony by the police detective who applied for the warrant that the Magistrate had asked him if the statements in his affidavit were true. The detective's signature appears next to the jurat. Furthermore, although the Magistrate could not testify as to the particulars of his conversation with the detective, he stated that he would not have issued the warrant unless the detective had signed the affidavit in his presence. Under the circumstances, we agree with the hearing court that there was substantial compliance with CPL 690.35 (1) (see, People v Zimmer, 112 A.D.2d 500; but see, People v Coburn, 85 Misc.2d 673 ).
The application for the warrant was based on information provided by two confidential informants and on evidence seized during a warrantless search of a truck the defendant was driving. The hearing court determined that the evidence seized from the truck should be suppressed, but concluded that the information obtained from the informants established that the issuance of the warrant was based on probable cause.
Under the Aguilar-Spinelli rule (Aguilar v Texas, 378 U.S. 108; Spinelli v United States, 393 U.S. 410), when probable cause for the issuance of a warrant depends on hearsay statements, the police must establish that the informant was reliable and had some basis for the knowledge he transmitted to them (see, People v Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417; People v Burks, 134 A.D.2d 604). We agree with the finding by the hearing court that the police satisfied this test with respect to the informant referred to as "C-1" in the warrant application. The detective stated that this informant had furnished reliable information in the past (see, People v Brown, 40 N.Y.2d 183). The informant's "basis for knowledge" was established since the information he gave to the police was based on his personal observations of the defendant (see, People v Burks, supra; People v Griminger, 127 A.D.2d 74, affd 71 N.Y.2d 635).
We need not reach the issue of whether the police satisfied the Aguilar-Spinelli test with respect to a second informant, who essentially corroborated information provided by "C-1", since the information from "C-1" was sufficient to establish probable cause. Lawrence, J.P., Sullivan, Harwood and Balletta, JJ., concur.