Under the plain language of the statute, the prosecution must prove lack of consent. (See People v. Rodgers (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 531, 534 (Rodgers).) The statute also has an intent element, requiring the taking be done "with intent either to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner thereof of his or her title to or possession of the vehicle, whether with or without the intent to steal the vehicle...." (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).)
The language of the statute places the burden on the People to show by direct or circumstantial evidence the defendant lacked the consent of the owner. ( People v. Rodgers (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 531, 534 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 288].) Mere possession of a stolen car under suspicious circumstances is sufficient to sustain a conviction of unlawful taking.
Roberts argues that the evidence at trial did not conclusively establish who owned the property at issue in counts 1 and 8, and therefore no substantial evidence supports the finding that the property was actually stolen. He relies on People v. Rodgers (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 531 (Rodgers) and People v. Bailey (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 99 for the proposition that it is "virtually impossible" to prove that property is stolen without testimony from the owner of the property. In Rodgers, supra, 4 Cal.App.3d at page 532, the defendant was arrested while driving a car that did not belong to him.
(See, e.g., Clifton, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d 195.) From Kanishka's testimony, the jury could reasonably have concluded that the legal owner of the car was in Afghanistan and that he did not give appellant consent to drive the Acura, either directly or indirectly via his brother Kanishka, who did not even know appellant when the incident occurred. Appellant relies on People v. Rodgers (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 531 (Rodgers). In that case, the complaining witness testified that he parked and locked his wife's car in a garage on a Saturday and that it was gone when he returned the following Monday.
People v. Green (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 165, 180, CALJIC No. 14.36; Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (2006) CALCRIM No. 1820. People v. Lam (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1301; People v. Rodgers (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 531, 534 (Rodgers). Although there was no direct evidence, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer Zaragoza was driving the Denali without the owner’s consent.
Instead, the gravamen of Newman's appeal is that his plea was not knowing and voluntary, as required by due process, because the state record is silent on two critical elements of his offense, specific intent to deprive the owner of his automobile and the lack of the owner's consent. People v. Rodgers, 4 Cal.App.3d 531, 534, 84 Cal.Rptr. 288, 290 (Cal.Ct.App. 1970) (lack of owner's consent); People v. Brown, 1 Cal.App.3d 161, 164, 81 Cal.Rptr. 401, 403 (Cal.Ct.App. 1969) (intent). Cal.Veh. Code § 10851(a) (West Supp. 1990) provides in pertinent part:
Appellant’s use of the shaved key instead of the key manufactured for the vehicle supported an inference that he lacked the owner’s consent because he did not have the owner’s key. That fact also distinguishes this case from People v. Rodgers (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 531, in which the defendant testified that he borrowed the vehicle from a friend; the defendant had the keys to the car; and the court found the record lacked substantial evidence showing the owner did not consent to the defendant’s use of the car. (Id. at pp. 533-534.)
“[T]he language of Vehicle Code section 10851 places the burden on the People to show by direct or circumstantial evidence that the defendant lacked the consent of the owner.” (People v. Rodgers (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 531, 534.) The jury in this case was properly instructed that the People had the burden of proving “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the defendant “took or drove someone else’s vehicle without the owner’s consent” and with the intent to deprive the owner of possession or ownership of the vehicle for any period of time.
Her testimony, standing alone, was sufficient to prove ownership and lack of consent to Dawkins’s use of the car. People v. Rodgers (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 531, cited by Dawkins, is distinguishable. In Rodgers, the defendant was convicted of unlawfully taking or driving a Chevrolet.
His testimony, standing alone, was sufficient to prove ownership and lack of consent to Grajeda’s use of the car. People v. Rodgers (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 531, cited by Grajeda, is distinguishable. In Rodgers, the defendant was convicted of unlawfully taking or driving a Chevrolet.