Opinion
H045795
05-29-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAISY ROBLES, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. Nos. C1763043, C1778956)
Defendant Daisy Robles pleaded no contest to various crimes in two superior court cases. The trial court sentenced her to a split sentence of two years, with one year to be served in county jail and one year of mandatory supervision, as called for by her plea agreement. The trial court also ordered victim restitution and imposed a related administrative fee pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1, subdivision (l).
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
On appeal, defendant challenges the imposition of the administrative fee, arguing that section 1203.1, subdivision (l) does not apply to defendants placed on mandatory supervision. The Attorney General agrees and concedes that the administrative fee is unauthorized. We agree and will therefore modify the judgment to strike the administrative fee.
I. BACKGROUND
In May 2017, the Santa Clara County District Attorney charged defendant in case No. C1763043 with buying or receiving a stolen vehicle (§ 496d) and acquiring or retaining possession of personal identifying information with intent to defraud (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(1)). It was also alleged that defendant had served a prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).
In December 2017, the Santa Clara County District Attorney charged defendant in case No. C1778956 with felony driving or taking a vehicle without consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)); buying or receiving a stolen vehicle (§ 496d); resisting, delaying, or obstructing an officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)); and possession of burglar tools (§ 466). The complaint also alleged that defendant committed the charged offenses while she was released from custody on bail within the meaning of section 12022.1.
On January 12, 2018, defendant pleaded no contest to buying or receiving a stolen vehicle (§ 496d, case No. C1763043); acquiring or retaining possession of personal identifying information with intent to defraud (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(1), case No. C1763043); driving or taking a vehicle without consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a), case No. C1778956); and resisting, delaying, or obstructing an officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); case No. C1778956). In exchange for her plea, the prosecutor agreed to dismissal of the remaining charges and of the enhancement allegations and to a two-year split sentence.
The trial court imposed the agreed upon two-year split sentence at a sentencing hearing on March 29, 2018. The court imposed a midterm sentence of two years for buying or receiving a stolen vehicle (§ 496d, case No. C1763043); 120 days (concurrent) for misdemeanor acquiring or retaining possession of personal identifying information with intent to defraud (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(1), case No. C1763043); the low term of 16 months (concurrent) driving or taking a vehicle without consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a), case No. C1778956); and 60 days for misdemeanor resisting, delaying, or obstructing an officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); case No. C1778956), which was deemed served. The court ordered defendant to serve one year in county jail and one year on mandatory supervision pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (h). The court also ordered defendant to pay victim restitution "subject to administrative fee of no more than five percent." The administrative fee was imposed over defense counsel's objection that the statutory provision authorizing such a fee—section 1203.1—applies only to probationers.
The minute order inconsistently indicates that the administrative fee is not to exceed 15 percent. --------
Defendant timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that the court erred in imposing the administrative fee under section 1203.1, subdivision (l). The Attorney General concedes the error.
Section 1203.1 governs the imposition of probation conditions including the imposition of restitution as a condition of probation. Subdivision (l) of section 1203.1 provides: "If the court orders restitution to be made to the victim, the entity collecting the restitution may add a fee to cover the actual administrative cost of collection, but not to exceed 15 percent of the total amount ordered to be paid. . . ." While the subdivision does not explicitly mention probation, its placement in section 1203.1 indicates that it applies where victim restitution is ordered as a condition of probation. (See People v. Guarneros (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 42, 47.)
Defendant was not placed on probation. Nor are mandatory supervision and probation interchangeable. (People v. Martinez (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 759, 763; People v. Rahbari (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 185, 192.) "Indeed, section 1170, subdivision (h), comes into play only after probation has been denied." (People v. Fandinola (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1422.) Courts have concluded that a split sentence under section 1170, subdivision (h) "is akin to a state prison commitment" (Fandinola at p. 1422) and "mandatory supervision is more similar to parole than probation" (id. at p. 1423). Accordingly, section 1203.1, subdivision (l) did not apply and the administrative fee must be stricken as unauthorized.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to strike the section 1203.1, subdivision (l) administrative fee. As modified, the judgment is affirmed. The clerk of the superior court is directed to amend the abstract of judgment and forward a copy of the amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
/s/_________
ELIA, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
PREMO, Acting P.J. /s/_________
DANNER, J.