) We disagree. (6) Just as a claim of denial of the right to counsel is cognizable on appeal after a guilty plea ( People v. Holland (1978) 23 Cal.3d 77, 85 [ 151 Cal.Rptr. 625, 588 P.2d 765]), so too is a claim of Faretta error ( People v. Robinson (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 363, 370 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 406]). (7) We conclude, however, that defendant did not make an unequivocal request for self-representation.
When a defendant is erroneously denied the right to self-representation before entering a plea of guilty or no contest, the error implicates the right to counsel and permeates all subsequent proceedings. (People v. Robinson (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 363, 368, 370, fn. 2 (Robinson).)Further, "[j]ust as other issues relating to aspects of the right to counsel survive a guilty plea, a claimed Faretta violation may also properly be raised in an appeal from a guilty plea or plea of no contest.
Under section 1237.5, no appeal can be taken by a defendant from a judgment of conviction after a plea of guilty or no contest except where defendant has filed a written statement asserting enumerated grounds going to the legality of the proceedings and the court has filed a certificate of probable cause. (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 31(d).)" (People v. Robinson (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 363, 368.) The purpose of this section is to " discourage and weed out frivolous or vexatious appeals challenging convictions following guilty and nolo contendere pleas.
Citing to People v. Robinson (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 363 (Robinson) defendant asserts the absence of a certificate of probable cause "does not bar" this court from addressing his claim as "[i]t has long been recognized that denial of a Faretta motion is not waived by a no contest plea." The Attorney General agrees, also citing Robinson.
Because a guilty plea "admits every element of the crime and constitutes a conviction . . . , issues going to the determination of guilt or innocence are not cognizable on appeal . . . ." (Hoffard, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 1177-1178; accord, In re Chavez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 649 (Chavez).) Thus, since a guilty plea " ' "concedes that the prosecution possesses legally admissible evidence sufficient to prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" ' " (People v. Thurman (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 36, 43), the plea waives any " 'irregularity in the proceedings' " that would not, as a matter of law, preclude all subsequent proceedings to establish guilt (People v. Robinson (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 363, 369 (Robinson)). Accordingly, after a guilty plea, the range of cognizable issues on appeal is "limited to issues going to the jurisdiction of the court or the legality of the proceedings, including the constitutional validity of the plea."
Here, the alleged improper revocation of appellant's pro se status could have formed the basis of an appeal after the court entered judgment in October 2010. (See, e.g., People v. Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 131, 146-147 [contention on appeal that trial court erred in denying Faretta motion not forfeited by defendant's plea of guilty on advice of subsequently appointed counsel]; People v. Robinson (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 363, 370 ["[A] claimed Faretta violation may . . . properly be raised in an appeal from a guilty plea or plea of no contest."].) Appellant did not file a timely appeal of the judgment of conviction.
The merits of the bargain are irrelevant in any event; the issues as to the plea are whether it was involuntary, unintelligent, or the product of inappropriate advice from counsel ( People v. Lobaugh, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 786), and none of those problems are present here. (3) To the extent that appellant may be taken to argue that he felt coerced to enter his no contest plea because of the denial of his Marsden motions (see People v. Robinson (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 363, 376, fn. 1 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 406] (dis. opn. of Callahan, J.)), the argument fails on this record. A guilty plea represents a "`"break in the chain of events"'" in a criminal case that may preclude claims as to pre-plea rights ( People v. Turner (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 116, 126 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 572]), and appellant's no contest plea was a very pronounced "break in the chain of events" involving the attorney-client relationship in this case.
(3) It is clear that the denial of the right to self-representation under Faretta is prejudicial per se. ( People v. Joseph (1983) 34 Cal.3d 936, 939, 946-948 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 339, 671 P.2d 843]; People v. Robinson (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 363, 373 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 406].) However, there is some disagreement concerning the appropriate standard for reversal when a defendant represents himself at trial but the trial court has failed to properly advise the defendant of the dangers of self-representation, as Faretta requires.
. A number of California courts have reached the same result, see, e.g., People v. Marlow, 34 Cal.4th 131, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 825, 96 P.3d 126, 135 (2004); People v. Butler, No. B213049, 2010 WL 2000332, at *8 n. 7 (Cal.App.2d Dist. May 20, 2010); People v. Robinson, 56 Cal.App.4th 363, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 406, 409–10 (3d Dist.1997) (holding that defendant who obtained certificate of probable cause could challenge denial of right to self-representation after guilty plea), as did the Michigan Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion. People v. Hoffman, No. 266560, 2007 WL 397224, at *2 (Mich.Ct.App. Feb. 6) (citing Hernandez, 203 F.3d at 626–27),leave to appeal denied,480 Mich. 874, 737 N.W.2d 767 (2007)
However, under California law, a plea of no contest has the same legal effect as a guilty plea. P.C. § 1016(3); People v. Robinson, 56 Cal. App. 4th 363, 368 (1997). Therefore, the Court will not further explore this issue.