Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. NA069195 Richard Romero, Judge.
Jennifer A. Mannix, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ZELON, J.
Dalian Robinson appeals from the judgment entered following his negotiated plea to burglary of an inhabited dwelling house (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460) with an admission that a person, other than an accomplice, was present during the commission of the burglary (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (c)).
According to the transcript of the preliminary hearing, Charity Corpuz was awakened by the sound of forced entry through her bedroom window and saw Robinson and a confederate standing outside her house. Corpuz contacted police and identified the men to the responding officers.
Robinson was charged by information with one count of burglary of an inhabited dwelling house (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460). It was further alleged that a person, other than an accomplice, was present during the commission of the burglary (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (c)), and that Robinson had suffered two separate convictions for a felony (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).
Robinson appeared in court and was represented by counsel. He entered a negotiated plea of no contest to burglary of an inhabited dwelling house and admitted the special allegation that a person other than an accomplice was present during the burglary. Under the terms of the plea agreement, Robinson would receive the four-year middle term to be served concurrently to a previously imposed sentence for another burglary, and the prosecutor would dismiss the prior prison term enhancements.
Before accepting the plea, the trial court advised Robinson the charged burglary was a “violent” and “serious” felony and would constitute a “strike” under the “Three Strikes” law were he convicted in the future of another felony. The court further explained Robinson would serve 85 percent of his term before being eligible for parole and would receive 15 percent presentence credit (Pen. Code, § 2933.1). Robinson said that he understood these consequences of his plea.
The trial court found Robinson intelligently, voluntarily and knowingly waived his constitutional rights and there was a factual basis for the plea. The court sentenced Robinson under the terms of the plea agreement to four years in state prison, concurrent to his previously imposed sentence. Robinson received presentence custody credit of 118 days (103 actual days and 15 conduct days). The trial court ordered Robinson to pay a $20 security assessment and a $200 restitution fine. A parole revocation fine was imposed and suspended pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.45. The prior prison term enhancements were dismissed on the prosecutor’s motion.
Robinson filed a timely motion in properia persona to recall his sentence under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d), claiming he is entitled to serve 80 percent as opposed to the statutorily required 85 percent of his term before being eligible for parole. His motion was denied on July 16, 2007. On July 11, 2007, Robinson filed a timely notice of appeal that contested the validity of his sentence on the same ground.
We appointed counsel to represent Robinson on appeal. After examination of the record counsel filed an “Opening Brief” in which no issues were raised. On November 8, 2007, we advised Robinson he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues that he wished us to consider. We have received no response to date.
We have examined the entire record and are satisfied Robinson’s attorney has fully complied with the responsibilities of counsel and no arguable issues exist. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 277-284 [120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756]; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.) The record shows Robinson entered into the plea agreement knowingly and intelligently, and he knowingly and intelligently agreed to plead to a violent felony with the consequence of having to serve 85 percent of his four-year term before being eligible for parole.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur PERLUSS, P. J., WOODS, J.