Summary
In Robbins, supra, the arresting officers knew only that after exiting from the back seat of a livery cab that had been stopped for an equipment violation, the defendant grabbed his waistband and then fled, facts which provided them with no information regarding criminal activity.
Summary of this case from People v. IngramOpinion
September 9, 1993
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Edward J. Sheridan, J.).
Defendant's motion to suppress the cocaine was properly denied since his discarding of it during the chase was not precipitated by illegal police conduct (People v Leung, 68 N.Y.2d 734, 736). The stop of the cab in which defendant was a passenger was justified by the officers' observation that the cab's brake lights were not functioning (People v Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413), and pursuit of the defendant justified by his precipitate flight, hand motion grabbing at his waistband, and glances over his shoulder, all of which gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime (see, People v Martinez, 80 N.Y.2d 444). Accordingly, the pursuit by the officers was justified and defendant's abandonment of the contraband during the chase was not in response to unlawful police conduct (see, People v Matienzo, 81 N.Y.2d 778).
Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Kupferman, Ross and Asch, JJ.
I would reverse based on People v Grant ( 164 A.D.2d 170, appeal dismissed 77 N.Y.2d 926). The flight of the defendant, in and of itself, could not create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity (People v Martinez, 80 N.Y.2d 444, 448, citing People v May, 81 N.Y.2d 725). Here there were no facts beyond defendant passenger's flight upon the officers' approach to the cab on which to base a finding of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity on the part of defendant.