Opinion
December 21, 1987
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Heller, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends that the People did not prove the voluntariness of his oral and videotaped statements. The hearing court found that, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, as he was twice advised of his rights, stated he understood them, and then began freely answering questions (see, North Carolina v Butler, 441 U.S. 369; People v Harris, 79 A.D.2d 615; People v Baez, 79 A.D.2d 608). We find that the hearing court's determination was supported by the evidence (see, People v Prochilo, 41 N.Y.2d 759; People v Armstead, 98 A.D.2d 726).
The defendant's claim concerning the court's charge on reasonable doubt has not been preserved for appellate review. In any event, the court's charge on reasonable doubt was complete and accurate. It was not error for the court to instruct the jury that if they had a doubt upon which a reasonable person would hesitate to act, that was reasonable doubt (see, United States v Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 69, n 11; People v Quinones, 123 A.D.2d 793, lv denied 69 N.Y.2d 749). Overall, the effect of this statement, when considered with the rest of the charge on reasonable doubt, was to properly inform the jury that a reasonable doubt was not a doubt based on "`a whim, sympathy or some other vague reason'" but rather a doubt which was reasonably based on the evidence or lack of evidence (see, People v Malloy, 55 N.Y.2d 296, 303, cert denied 459 U.S. 847, quoting from People v Jones, 27 N.Y.2d 222, 227).
We have examined the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Mangano, J.P., Thompson, Bracken and Weinstein, JJ., concur.