Opinion
D057372
01-26-2012
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. AMBER ROSE RILEY, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super. Ct. No. FSB039547)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, Annemarie G. Pace, Judge. Affirmed.
Amber Rose Riley was convicted of premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189) for the stabbing death of Terry Taylor. The jury also found true the allegation Riley used a knife during the commission of the murder. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) Riley, who was 16 at the time of the stabbing, was sentenced to 25 years to life imprisonment for murder plus a consecutive one-year term for the weapon enhancement. Riley now appeals, claiming her confession to police was involuntary and should have been suppressed. Riley also claims her automatic trial as an adult violated her due process rights. For the reasons below, we disagree and affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Amber Riley, Jason Harris and Terry Taylor were neighbors in an apartment complex in San Bernardino. Harris was deeply in love with Riley. Riley had a recent romantic relationship with Taylor, but was growing tired of him. For his part, Taylor may have been bisexual and interested in Harris. This love triangle ended tragically.
Riley was intrigued by death, and had a fascination with personally seeing a dead body. She recruited Harris, who she knew had killed animals in Satanic rituals, to help achieve her morbid curiosities. The two chose Taylor as a victim, planning to lure Taylor to the top of nearby Perris Hill and stab him to death. Riley admitted Taylor was chosen because he was weak and an easy target.
Late on the night of March 22, 2003, the opportunity to murder Taylor presented itself. Taylor, unsuspecting, agreed to go "kick it" with the pair atop Perris Hill. Riley and Harris prepared themselves, each taking a large knife from Riley's kitchen. The three walked to the top of the hill and sat underneath a tree to talk. Taylor was seated facing Riley, with his back to Harris. Riley encouraged Harris to begin the killing, telling him to hurry up. Harris was hesitant, and took no action for 30 to 45 minutes. Riley again told Harris to hurry, and nodded at him to help his confidence. Harris then pulled his knife out and attacked Taylor. Taylor fought back, and the two struggled until Harris knocked Taylor down and stabbed him in the side. At that point, Riley unsheathed her own knife and stabbed Taylor several times.(!3 RT 570)! Finally, Harris sawed through Taylor's throat to ensure his demise. The two left Taylor's body and returned to the apartment complex, where they showered, changed clothing and disposed of the murder weapons.
The next morning, Harris and Riley admitted their involvement in detail to Elizabeth Jackson, Harris's mother. They had hoped Jackson would give them advice as to how to remove bloodstains from their clothing. Instead, Jackson called the police, who arrested both Harris and Riley. At trial, Jackson testified Riley was "carefree" and "nonchalant" as she recounted stabbing Taylor, and that Riley's main concern was that Taylor was dead.
Police investigation turned up additional evidence of the pair's guilt. Riley's apartment was searched, and the clothing Riley and Harris wore during the murder was seized. All the clothing tested positive for blood which matched Taylor's DNA profile. Taylor's DNA profile was very rare, occurring at random in less than one in seven billion Caucasian, African-American or Hispanic individuals. Meanwhile, an autopsy on Taylor's body revealed the cause of death to be multiple stab wounds to the torso, and determined each and every stab wound was ante-mortem and contributed to the death.
Both Harris and Riley were read and waived their Miranda rights. Each confessed to the murder. Harris claimed to have stabbed Taylor because Riley wanted him to, saying that his love for Riley meant he would do anything for her.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 .
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Riley, on the other hand, changed her story multiple times, first claiming she had no knowledge of the murder, then calling it a "joke" and blaming Harris before finally admitting her own involvement.
Riley was questioned by Detective Michael Vasilis for almost five hours. Riley was calm, understood Vasilis's questions, and seemed to the detective to be mature for her age. Early on, Vasilis falsely told her there was surveillance footage of Perris Hill showing Riley at the murder scene. Riley questioned the existence of the cameras, but admitted she had been present. Vasilis then impressed upon Riley the seriousness of the charge, telling her "[w]e're talking about . . . something that could . . . give you a, a sentence if you get to like youth authority till you're twenty-five or for life." Riley responded that she knew. Vasilis continued, "[i]t all depends on your . . . how you . . . cooperate with (unintelligible)." Riley continued to maintain her innocence, claiming Harris had brought both knives and stabbed Taylor alone. Vasilis then changed tacks slightly, counseling Riley about salvation and emotional burden. At this point, Riley announced she "can't live with it" and admitted stabbing Taylor.
During Riley's questioning, her father was summoned to the police station. Robert Riley arrived and spoke to Sergeant Brian Boom, who informed him of his daughter's charges. Riley's father asked to see his daughter, but Boom denied his request, telling him the best thing was to "go home and be with your wife."(1 RT 13-62) Riley was not told her father was present, nor did she ask to see a parent during her interview.
Riley moved to suppress her confession at a preliminary hearing. Riley relied on the fact Sergeant Boom refused to allow her father to speak with her. The trial court found the refusal did not infringe on Riley's constitutional rights, and denied Riley's motion. Although the trial court also briefly discussed the voluntariness of Riley's statement, finding it was covered by her Miranda waiver, Riley did not directly raise the issue of voluntariness prior to this appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
Confession
On appeal, Riley claims her confession was involuntary and should have been suppressed. Riley bases her argument on the totality of the circumstances surrounding her confession, including: (1) a statement from Vasilis she characterizes as a promise of leniency in exchange for confession; (2) Vasilis's lies to her about the existence of surveillance video; and (3) police refusal to allow her father to see her on his request. To the extent that her first two grounds were not brought up at the trial level and may thus be considered waived, Riley claims ineffective assistance of counsel. We find Riley's statements were voluntarily given and do not reach her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
We review whether a statement was voluntarily given de novo, determining independently whether the defendant's "will was overborne" by previous inducement, intimidation or threat. (Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 178 ; People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 835, overruled on other grounds by People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 836; People v. McClary (1977) 20 Cal.3d 218, 227, overruled on other grounds by People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 510, fn. 17; People v. Haydel (1974) 12 Cal.3d 190, 198; People v. Sanchez (1969) 70 Cal.2d 562, 571-572.) When, as here, the interview was taped and there is no other factual conflict, we are not bound by any factual determination made by the trial court. (People v. Vasila (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 865, 873.) The prosecution bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant's statements were voluntary. (People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 114, overruled on other grounds by People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.) For a statement to be involuntary, there must be coercive police conduct that causally induces the incriminating statement. (People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 778; Colorado v. Connelly, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 167.) When the defendant is a minor, the Court must look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether coercive police activity caused an involuntary confession. The totality of the circumstances include the minor's "age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and . . . whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights." (Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707, 725; see also People v. Nelson (2012) _ Cal.4th _ .)
a. Promise of Leniency
Riley contends she was coerced into confessing by Vasilis's promises of leniency in exchange for cooperation. Riley claims Vasilis's statement that they were discussing "something that could . . . give you a, a sentence if you get to like youth authority till you're twenty-five or for life" was a promise to treat her as a juvenile if she confessed, or as an adult if she refused.
Riley relies on cases holding that promises of leniency are coercive police activity which invalidate voluntary confessions, and specifically points to United States v. Lopez (10th Cir. 2006) 437 F.3d 1059 as an analogue. In Lopez, FBI agents investigating a murder held up pieces of paper, marked with the terms "mistake", "murder," "6" and "60" to coax the suspect to admit his involvement. (Id. at p. 1064.) The circuit court held the technique amounted to a promise of leniency for a confession. Riley argues Vasilis's statement was functionally identical, promising her incarceration for nine years in exchange for confession versus life imprisonment for noncooperation.
We acknowledge the weight of opinion condemning promises of leniency. (See People v. Hill (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536, 549; People v. Nelson (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 238, 250-251; People v. Cahill (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 296, 316.) However, we reject Riley's assertion that Vasilis's comment amounted to such a promise. There is no indication in the record that Vasilis implied Riley would receive a juvenile sentence instead of a life term for cooperating, and Riley's assertion to the contrary is a mischaracterization. Vasilis stated the possible sentences Riley might face for murder, including incarceration in the youth authority until the age of 25 or life imprisonment, but did not suggest her confession would be a factor in determining the outcome in her case. Unlike investigators in Lopez, Vasilis did not pressure Riley by directly basing a 10-fold increase in sentence on her cooperation. Rather, he simply outlined the maximum sentences possible for her crime depending on her age, a distinction he made no claim of control over. A bare mention of consequences, absent some promise or threat, cannot overbear a defendant's will.
The record also shows the circumstances of Riley's confession had little correlation with Vasilis's comment. Riley changed her story and admitted her presence at the murder scene before Vasilis mentioned possible punishment, and did not confess to stabbing Taylor until later, after Vasilis left and reentered the room, recommenced the interrogation, and spoke to Riley about spiritual salvation. Even after the comment in question, Riley chose to blame Harris for the murder, only electing to confess after admitting she had not been able to sleep the previous night and "[couldn't] live with it." The evidence thus shows Vasilis's statements, however characterized, did not have a coercive effect upon Riley. Rather, Riley's internal guilt led to her confession.
b. Police Deception
Riley next claims her statements were involuntarily because Vasilis lied to her about the existence of surveillance video. We disagree. While "police deception is a factor to be taken into consideration" when determining whether a confession is voluntary, deception alone will not invalidate a confession. (People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1241.) Our courts have allowed numerous instances of police mendacity, including those "far more intimidating and deceptive" than those employed here. (See People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 505; see also Frazier v. Cupp (1969) 394 U.S. 731, 739 ; People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 167; People v. Watkins (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 119.) Generally, deceptive interrogation techniques only cross the line when they are of a type "reasonably likely to procure an untrue statement." (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 182; see also In re Walker (1974) 10 Cal.3d 764, 777.) Put another way, deception only mandates reversible error when it overbears the will of the suspect to the extent that confession becomes preferable even to the truth.
Here, Riley's will was not overborne by police deception. Although she changed her story to admit her presence shortly after Vasilis told her there was surveillance footage, she initially maintained her own innocence in the killing. Further, Riley told Vasilis she did not believe the surveillance existed, and made another comment that indicated her disbelief. To hold a false statement from police overbore the will of a suspect who explicitly believed it to be untrue would be disingenuous, and we decline to do so here.
c. Refusal To Allow Riley's Father To See Her
Finally, Riley claims police refusal to allow her father to see her is evidence of a coerced confession. Riley raises a peace officer's statutory duty under Welfare and Institutions Code section 627, subdivisions (a) and (b) to advise a minor's parents the minor is in custody and give them the location, and to advise the minor of the right to contact both a parent and an attorney. However, as Riley concedes, California law does not allow suppression of the confession as a remedy for violation of these statutes. (People v. Lessie (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1152, 1169; People v. Castille (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 469, 489-490, vacated on other grounds in light of Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36.)
Furthermore, Riley's reliance on her father's request to see her is misplaced. Our courts declined to impose a requirement that minors be apprised of their parents' presence and allowed to speak with them, even when the parents request to do so. (In re John S. (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 441, 445-46, disapproving In re Patrick W. (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 615, 619; People v. Maestas (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1499; In re Jessie L. (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 202, 215.)
More crucially, the question of voluntariness hinges not on Riley's father's actions, but upon hers. Riley was unaware of her father's presence at the police station. She made no effort to speak to a parent, whether as a prophylactic mechanism against interrogation or otherwise. Nor did she invoke her rights to silence or counsel, although both had been explained to her. We thus find Riley's conduct more analogous to the circumstances in Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412 , where officers did not inform the defendant his attorney was attempting to reach him during interrogation. The court in Moran held the defendant's confession entirely voluntary, explaining that "[e]vents occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right." (Id. at p. 422.) Similarly, the presence of Riley's father, unknown to her, cannot logically be said to have affected her ability to voluntarily respond to police questioning.
Under the totality of the circumstances, therefore, Riley's confession was voluntary. Riley was 16 years old at the time of interrogation, lived on her own, was calm and collected during the questioning process, and appeared mature for her age. She held a job and claimed to receive straight A's in high school. She understood her Miranda rights, even admitting that they had been previously explained to her. Although a minor, Riley was clearly capable of independent decision-making, and cannot be considered so susceptible to police questioning to raise legitimate issues of coercion. The specific circumstances Riley relies upon were not egregious enough to overbear her will. Even combined with Riley's age, maturity, and experience, Vasilis's statement of punishment and false claims of surveillance video did not reach a level of coercive activity sufficient to destroy Riley's volition. Rather, the record shows she confessed in an effort to free herself from moral burden. That was Riley's choice.
II
Due Process
Riley next argues her automatic removal to adult court, without the possibility of trial as a juvenile, violated her federal due process rights. Riley acknowledges this argument has been previously rejected by our Supreme Court, and that we are required to reject it here. (Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 562-567.) However, Riley raises the issue to preserve it for federal appeal under Graham v. Florida (2010) _ U.S. _ (Graham).
Graham is inapposite. Graham holds that sentencing juvenile offenders to life without the possibility of parole is unconstitutional in non-homicide offenses, forbidding states from deciding "at the outset" that a juvenile offender will never be fit to reenter society. (Graham, supra, 130 S.Ct at p. 2029.) Riley, however, committed first degree murder. Hence, Graham does not apply here. Further, even if Graham were applicable to homicides, it would not cover Riley's case. Riley suggests "at the outset" to mean a ban on direct filing of criminal charges in adult court for juvenile offenders. However, a contextual reading of the phrase as it appears in Graham reveals the court meant "at the outset" to refer to the sentencing decision, taking the power of release away from the parole board during incarceration. (Ibid.) Riley did not face a sentencing decision contrary to Graham; she received an indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life. Riley was "provide[d]... with some realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of that term." (Id. at p. 2034.) Riley's sentence was thus acceptable under Graham's demands.
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
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BENKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
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McDONALD, J.
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IRION, J.