Opinion
2-21-0645
03-25-2022
In re K.E., C.B., and Z.P., Minors v. R.G., Respondent-Appellant. The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County, Nos. 19-JA-0365 19-JA-0506 19-JA-0507 Honorable Francis M. Martinez, Judge, Presiding.
BIRKETT, JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McLaren and Schostok concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
BIRKETT, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: Appellate counsel's motion for leave to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and In re Alexa J., 345 Ill.App.3d 985 (2003), was granted, and the circuit court's order terminating respondent's parental rights was affirmed, where the record contains no issue of arguable merit to challenge the judgment.
¶ 2 Respondent, R.G., appeals the circuit court's order terminating her parental rights as to her children, K.E., Z.P., and C.B. (collectively "minors"). Respondent's appointed appellate counsel has moved to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1968), and In re Alexa J., 345 Ill.App.3d 985 (2003), asserting that there are no issues on appeal of arguable merit that could be raised on respondent's behalf. For the following reasons, we grant the motion and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On September 16, 2019, the State filed a one-count neglect petition alleging that K.E., age 2 months, was neglected in that his environment was injurious to his welfare because his mother, respondent, allowed him to be transported unsecured in a vehicle with an intoxicated driver, the vehicle was involved in a crash and, following the crash, the minor was removed from the vehicle without medical clearance. On November 22, 2019, the State filed a second amended neglect petition, which repeated count I and included two additional counts of neglect, which were also based on K.E. 's injurious environment. Specifically, count II alleged that K.E. 's environment was injurious to his welfare because respondent whipped K.E.'s sibling with a belt, which left multiple injuries, as well as required the sibling to exercise as punishment for hours, which caused the minor's sibling pain. Count III alleged an injurious environment based on respondent's engagement of excessive corporal punishment toward the sibling.
¶ 5 Also on November 22, 2019, the State filed neglect petitions as to K.E.'s siblings, C.B., age 6, and Z.P., age 7. The State alleged that C.B.'s environment was injurious because (1) respondent allowed the minor's sibling to be transported unsecured in a vehicle with an intoxicated driver, the vehicle was involved in a crash, and the minor's sibling was removed from the crash without medical clearance; (2) respondent whipped the minor's sibling with a belt leaving multiple injuries and required the sibling to exercise as punishment for hours, causing the sibling pain; and (3) respondent engaged in excessive corporal punishment of the minor's sibling. The State alleged that Z.P.'s environment was injurious to her welfare because respondent allowed the minor's sibling to be transported in a vehicle with an intoxicated driver, the vehicle was involved in a crash, and the minor's sibling was removed from the crash without medical clearance, as well as that she was abused in that respondent whipped her with a belt leaving multiple injuries and required her to exercise as punishment for hours, which caused her pain. The State filed a first amended neglect petition as to Z.P. on January 6, 2020. It added a third count, alleging that Z.P. was an abused minor in that she was inflicted with or allowed to be inflicted with physical injury.
¶ 6 On November 22, 2019, respondent waived her right to a shelter care hearing. The circuit court found probable cause that the minors were neglected, that there was an urgent and immediate necessity that the minors be placed in shelter pending further proceedings, and that the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) made reasonable efforts to prevent the need to remove the minors from their home. DCFS was granted temporary guardianship and custody of the minors and was given discretion to place the minors with a responsible relative or in traditional foster care.
¶ 7 On February 27, 2020, at the adjudicatory hearing, respondent stipulated the State would have enough evidence to prove count III of the second amended neglect petition for K.E., count III of the neglect petition for C.B., and count II of the first amended neglect petition for Z.P. The circuit court found the minors neglected and scheduled a dispositional hearing.
¶ 8 The integrated assessment, dated March 3, 2020, noted "very serious concerns" regarding respondent's ability and willingness to meet the needs and act in the best interest of the minors, as well as significant concerns regarding her use of alcohol and marijuana, and her ability to provide a safe environment. Respondent admitted to forcing Z.P. to hold out her arms while holding cans of vegetables for an hour and requiring her to do pushups as punishment. It also noted that respondent used violence to cope with the stress of parenting and as a discipline strategy, and that her children were showing both physically and verbally aggressive behaviors as modeled by respondent. The integrated assessment recommended that respondent participate in parenting education services, individual psychotherapy, and substance abuse treatment services.
¶ 9 On July 6, 2020, respondent waived her right to a dispositional hearing, and the circuit court found that respondent was unfit, unwilling, or unable to care for the minors. It made them wards of the court and granted DCFS guardianship and custody. It also ordered respondent to remain drug, alcohol, and cannabis free, and to cooperate with all drug, alcohol, and psychological treatment services required by DCFS. The court admonished respondent to make reasonable efforts and reasonable progress to correct the conditions which led to the removal of the minors or risk termination of her parental rights. It explained that reasonable efforts meant "engaging in those services requested" and "reasonable progress" meant "internalizing it, learning and benefiting from those efforts."
¶ 10 The permanency hearing report, dated October 23, 2020, reported that although DCFS completed the appropriate referrals, it had not received any documentation from a service provider or respondent that she had engaged in or completed any recommended reunification services. It noted that respondent started a parenting education class at Youth Service Bureau of Illinois Valley (YSB) in January 2020 but was immediately discharged from it due to respondent's lack of follow through, poor attendance, and for not completing homework assignments. According to YSB, respondent would not be allowed to be referred to parenting classes again until she engaged in mental health treatment and substance abuse services. The report noted that respondent was referred for individual counseling at Family Counseling Service, and she indicated she began such counseling in June 2020. However, DCFS had not received documentation to substantiate engagement or completion of this service. It also noted that, between December 2019 and September 2020, respondent either failed to appear or tested positive for cannabis at every monthly drug screen. Respondent contacted Remedies for domestic violence services and was engaged in such services. DCFS opined that respondent had not made reasonable progress or reasonable efforts.
¶ 11 On November 5, 2020, the circuit court held a permanency review hearing. Respondent's counsel informed the court that, since October 2020, respondent was engaging in mental health services at Rosecrance with a counselor named Gail, that she was in individual counseling since June 2020 through Family Counseling Service and was "nearing a successful discharge," and that respondent was on a substance abuse waitlist at Rosecrance for intensive outpatient services. The guardian ad litem (GAL) noted that respondent was no longer on the waitlist, however, because respondent failed to stay in communication with Mary Ann Kelly, who was a senior addiction counselor at Rosecrance. Respondent's counsel also reported that respondent had been engaging in domestic violence services, but her counselor "transferred out" and respondent was "trying to get back in," but had not yet acquired a new counselor. The court noted that DCFS had not received any documentation to substantiate her engagement of individual counseling. The case worker reached out to the service provider but received no response.
¶ 12 The circuit court found respondent had not made reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that brought the minors into care during the review period. It stated it did not hold the lack of documentation against respondent because it had no reason to believe that she was at fault for that omission. It continued that there were some efforts that were "fairly easy to gauge." The easiest service to gauge respondent's efforts was her compliance with the required drug tests. It stated that there were "more failures to appear than there should [have been]," noting that respondent missed four drug tests in four months. The court commented that attending a drug test is "pretty easy," and respondent's failure to appear demonstrated a lack of effort on her part. The goal remained return home within 12 months, and the court admonished respondent of its expectations for the next review period. In particular, it stated its expectation that respondent remain on the waitlist for intensive outpatient services for substance abuse, attend all drug screenings, and continue engaging in counseling.
¶ 13 A second permanency review rehearing was held over the course of two days in June and July 2021. A permanency hearing report dated April 20, 2021, updated the court on respondent's progress toward her assigned services tasks. Concerning domestic violence services, the report noted that respondent began services with Remedies but had stopped attending, and DCFS had not received any documentation stating that she had either engaged in or completed domestic violence services with another provider. As for mental health treatment, the report noted respondent's assertion that she had engaged in individual counseling services at Rosecrance and Family Counseling Service, but that it had been two months since her last session because she was "a no show" at the prior session. DCFS had not received any documentation of continued service engagement or completion. Respondent was also required to take a parenting capacity assessment through Willow Creek Counseling, which she completed. However, a planned observational visit with the minors never materialized because respondent "was sporadic with visits." Concerning alcohol and other drug abuse, the report noted that respondent was in an intensive outpatient addiction treatment program at Rosecrance. An addiction counselor recommended that she engage in inpatient treatment twice during the review period for alcohol and cannabis use. Respondent checked herself out of inpatient treatment both times after only a few days and against medical advice. Although she reengaged in the intensive outpatient program, respondent "lied to the assessor," which necessitated the need for the addiction counselor to reassess respondent "when she makes herself available." DCFS referred respondent for random monthly drug screening from November 2020 through March 2021; she failed to appear at four of the drugs screenings and tested negative at one screen, on January 29, 2021. Respondent was sporadically employed but was unemployed at the time of the report. She also failed to inform DCFS that she had again become pregnant. The report further stated that, because respondent knew that her parental rights could be terminated, and because she was not actively involved in services, she had begun looking for neighbors in her housing unit to take placement of her children. Finally, regarding parenting instruction, the report noted respondent's discharge from YSB and her ineligibility for a subsequent referral until she engaged in mental health, alcohol, and other drug abuse services. DCFS again opined that respondent had failed to make either reasonable efforts or reasonable progress.
¶ 14 The circuit court found that, although respondent had "done certain things," she failed to make reasonable efforts or reasonable progress, namely in the areas of domestic violence services and substance abuse treatment. The court noted "multiple failures to appear for drug tests," and it stated that respondent was "not fully engaged in treatment throughout this period." It further found that continued placement of the children was appropriate, and that DCFS had made reasonable efforts in affording respondent the opportunity to engage in services. The court found that the prognosis for reunification was "slim," and it changed the permanency goal to substitute care pending the court's determination on termination of parental rights.
¶ 15 On August 9, 2021, the State filed petitions to terminate respondent's parental rights. The petitions contained identical counts. The State alleged that respondent (1) failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the minors during a nine-month period after adjudication (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (m) (i) (West 2020)); (2) failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors during a nine-month period after being adjudicated neglected (id. § 1 (D) (m) (ii)); and (3) failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minors' welfare (id. § 1 (D)(b)). The periods for which the State sought to prove counts I and II were "a (9) month period following the minor[s] being adjudicated neglected or abused, to wit 2/27/2020 to 7/2/2021."
¶ 16 At the unfitness hearing, Stephanie Sanders, a Child Welfare Specialist for DCFS, testified that she had been the caseworker in the instant matter since late 2019. After interviewing respondent, she prepared an integrated assessment, which she explained is a tool to identify threats and service needs for parents to help them reunite with their children. Using the integrated assessment, a service plan was formed, which recommended that respondent engage in the following services: mental health, substance abuse, parenting classes, and domestic violence education. Respondent was informed of these services during a child and family team meeting. Respondent identified several of the State's exhibits as being the service plans that she prepared, which were admitted into evidence. The initial service plan was dated December 20, 2019, and subsequent plans were prepared on May 18, 2020, and October 22, 2020.
¶ 17 Sanders tried to help respondent get those services outlined in the service plan. She met with respondent at her home during the beginning of the case, but after the COVID-19 pandemic, they conversed primarily over the phone. She had respondent sign releases, told her where to go for services, and encouraged her to complete the services in a timely manner. She told respondent that she could use DCFS service providers at no cost, or that she could use her insurance and use any service provider she wished. Respondent was referred to Rosecrance for a mental health assessment, as well as a drug and alcohol assessment. After the assessments, respondent was recommended for intensive outpatient services for drug and alcohol treatment. Respondent began those services but eventually stopped going and was discharged from the program. Sanders had several three-way phone calls with respondent and Kelly at Rosecrance in an attempt to reengage respondent in services, which respondent did at one point. Respondent was eventually hospitalized for drug and alcohol abuse. At a child-family team meeting in May or June 2021, respondent told Sanders that she and Kelly were forcing her to lie to get into treatment at Rosecrance for drug and alcohol treatment. Sanders testified that she did not understand these statements and requested a psychological evaluation for respondent to ensure she understood what treatment was expected of her. She attended those services "numerous times," but she would stop, re-engage, and then stop again. To Sanders' knowledge, responded did not complete substance abuse services at Rosecrance. Sanders also noted that respondent either failed to appear or tested positive for cannabis at numerous court ordered drug screenings, and she told respondent that she needed to maintain her sobriety, especially during her pregnancy, because she was ordered to be drug and alcohol free during the proceedings.
¶ 18 Respondent was referred to Family Counseling Service for mental health services. She attended counseling with Elizabeth Johnston, but respondent's attendance was sporadic. Sanders explained that respondent had difficulty with her phone, which she used for her video teletherapy, had made appointments but did not attend them, and she eventually "just stopped going." Sanders acknowledged that there were problems getting records from Family Counseling Service in a timely manner.
¶ 19 Respondent was referred for parenting education classes at YSB, from which she was unsuccessfully discharged due to lack of attendance, poor follow through, and a lack of drug screen exams. Sanders explained that, approximately three to four weeks into the classes, the parenting class coordinator, Elaine Gaither, informed her that if respondent missed a drug screening or tested positive, they would stop her service because YSB required parents to be substance abuse free. Sanders also spoke to respondent about her failure to complete all her homework assignments and her poor attendance. Respondent was never re-referred to YSB for the parenting classes because she had not progressed in her drug and alcohol treatment.
¶ 20 Sanders also testified that respondent reported engaging with Remedies for domestic violence services, but DCFS never received any documentation from Remedies. DCFS does not have a contract with Remedies and, as a result, parents must sign releases with both Remedies and DCFS to allow the two entities to communicate with one another. Sanders told respondent that it was her responsibility to obtain documentation regarding proof of engagement and completion of services, and that "no documentation [meant] it didn't happen." Sanders acknowledged that respondent signed all the releases necessary for DCFS to interact with the service providers, including Remedies. DCFS also attempted to get documentation from Remedies through DCFS' liaison, but the liaison was unable to get any documents. Sanders thought that perhaps respondent simply did not engage in those classes. On cross-examination, Sanders agreed that Remedies did not always cooperate with DCFS in providing information.
¶ 21 Sanders testified that visits with the minors were held in respondent's home, but Z.P. and C.B. would "act out" before and after the visits, and the visits eventually were put on hold. At that time, Z.P. and C.B. were in specialized care, and Sanders learned that respondent was promising them things that she could not deliver, such as that they would be coming home soon. Respondent's consistency with visits was also problematic, in that there were several instances she was not home during a scheduled visit, even though the visit was confirmed 24-hours in advance. To Sanders' knowledge, respondent did not complete any substance abuse treatment, parenting education classes, domestic violence services, and never completed individual counseling to the point where she was successfully discharged.
¶ 22 Respondent's counsel called Cathleen Varner as a witness. Varner testified that she worked as a therapist at Children's Home and Aid in its partner abuse intervention program (PAIP). In that role, she conducted assessments to determine whether someone should be in PAIP, which was tailored for people who experience domestic violence from an intimate partner. Respondent met with her on August 9, 2021, and they completed an assessment of respondent's history of domestic violence. The most recent domestic violence respondent reported was eight or nine years prior, from Z.P. 's father. Verner discussed the assessment with her supervisor and determined that respondent was not appropriate for PAIP.
We observe that this is the same day the petitions for termination of respondent's parental rights were filed.
¶ 23 Respondent also testified at the unfitness hearing. She engaged in individual counseling with Johnston at Family Counseling Service beginning in April or May 2020. She attended the sessions over the phone and via Zoom to accommodate her work schedule and because of the COVID-19 pandemic. The sessions would last from 30 to 90 minutes. Respondent began the individual counseling with the goals of working on anger and adapting to change. They worked on techniques such as breathing and listening to music. Johnston helped her through her anger and stress, and she learned to not worry or stress about things that were beyond her control. Respondent identified documents from Family Counseling Service tracking her progress in counseling. Johnston told respondent that she was making progress, and she gave respondent the option of reducing the frequency of their sessions from twice per week to once per week, which respondent agreed to because she "felt like [she] was doing good." Around May 2021, Johnston left Family Counseling Service, and she informed respondent to contact the office in order to connect with another counselor. In late July or early August 2021, respondent contacted Family Counseling Service, as Johnston suggested. Respondent was scheduled to begin counseling with another counselor, Theresa, on October 21, 2021. Respondent testified that she could not see another counselor sooner than five months after Johnston left because Family Counseling Service was "booked and they had to wait for someone that took Medicaid."
¶ 24 Concerning domestic violence counseling, respondent testified that she enrolled in services offered through Remedies. In early December 2020, respondent began individual counseling over Zoom with Vershon Allen. Respondent signed a release of information and provided it to DCFS. The first counseling session lasted about 90 minutes, during which they discussed the power and control wheel. Respondent testified that she learned she had anger problems that she was taking it out on her children and that she was repeating her own childhood trauma. She had a subsequent 90-minute counseling session on January 19, 2021. Respondent took notes at both sessions. Respondent also had group counseling sessions on March 24, 2021, and May 12, 2021. She testified that she joined the May 12 session late, but she remained engaged. Respondent testified that the entire time she was in domestic violence counseling, she wondered if she was in the correct class. She later found out that she needed to take the PAIP assessment instead of taking a domestic violence class. Respondent then took a PAIP assessment with Varner, but there were no recommendations for future services.
¶ 25 Respondent next testified as to her experience with parenting classes with Gaither at YSB. Her first class was in-person in April 2021, but most of the classes were over the phone and via Zoom. YSB would mail students their assignments to complete and mail back. She testified that she did not attend all of the classes because she did not have a phone due to lack of an income. She also did not turn in her last homework assignment. Respondent did not complete the class or receive a certificate of completion, but she felt that she still benefited from the nine classes she attended. Respondent testified that Sanders told her she needed to engage in therapy and substance abuse treatment in order to get another referral for the parenting classes.
¶ 26 Respondent further testified that she took a substance abuse evaluation in January 2020 and began Project SAFE at Rosecrance, which is an intensive outpatient addiction treatment program. She began treatment in the spring or summer of 2020 and was in the program for approximately four to six months before Kelly sent her for inpatient treatment. Respondent's understanding was that she was referred for inpatient services because she was accused of drinking alcohol while pregnant. Within two weeks, respondent discharged herself from inpatient services because she was "feeling like [she] wouldn't be able to see [her] children." She did not complete the substance abuse program. Respondent testified that she had since gone back to see Kelly and was "in the midst of taking [her] intake," but she needed a doctor's note to continue due to a medical condition. She explained that she had to wait to do another assessment because the prior referral had "timed out."
¶ 27 Visits with her children were initially held at a DCFS office but, beginning in March 2020, the visits occurred in respondent's home. Visits were held weekly for two hours. Respondent testified that, when a new caseworker was assigned to Z.P. and C.B., the visits with them became sporadic because they refused to attend. Respondent believed the new caseworker allowed them to decide whether to participate in the visits. When Sanders was the caseworker for all three children, respondent "never had a problem" with Z.P. or C.B. refusing to visit. Respondent testified that she was barely seeing her children because of this ongoing problem. At the time of the hearing, respondent had not seen her three children together for several months.
¶ 28 The GAL asked respondent if she understood what acts of abuse or neglect caused the children to come into DCFS' care. Respondent replied that it was "accusations," including the "physical accusation that [she] whooped [her] daughter for biting her teacher" at school. There were no further questions, and respondent was excused.
¶ 29 Allen testified that she had worked as a "walk-in advocate" at Remedies for the past year, and she was experienced in the field of counseling. In her current role, she provided domestic violence services for individuals who do not require shelter but who still need counseling support. Allen testified that Remedies is a voluntary program and is specific to intimate partner violence. People seeking services complete an intake form, and Remedies evaluates if the individual is appropriate for services. The program sessions are self-directed, and there is no official ending to the services because a person can decide the number of sessions to participate in. Remedies does not track the progress of participants through the program, and it is not a program that one can be either successfully or unsuccessfully discharged from. Respondent had her first appointment on December 8, 2020, and they discussed the power and control wheel of domestic violence, as well as the tactics of an abuser. The call lasted one hour. During the call, respondent asked questions, and Allen believed respondent was engaged and interested. Allen testified as to their subsequent counseling session on January 19, 2021, as well as the two group sessions respondent testified to from March 24 and May 12, 2021.
¶ 30 On November 2, 2021, the circuit court found that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was unfit as alleged by the State in all three counts of the petition, namely, that respondent failed to: (1) make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for removal (count I) (750 ILCS 50/1 (D)(m)(i) (West 2020)); (2) make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors (count II) (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)); and (3) maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minors' welfare (count III) (id. § 1(D)(b)). The court found as follows:
" [T] the first thing I would like to note is that [respondent] certainly made more efforts than either father. However, the Court finds that it does not appear that [respondent] reached a threshold where the Court can find that she made reasonable efforts or progress. *** [Respondent] was referred to [YSB] for parenting education classes in January of 2020 but was discharged almost immediately. She has been rated generally unsatisfactory during the life of the case in the *** service plans that were submitted to the court. The bottom line is that [respondent] may have made good faith attempts to engage, but she was not able to complete and, therefore, not able to progress in any services. *** [T]he State has proven counts 1 and 2 by clear and convincing evidence.
As to count 3, the failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, and responsibility, the statute *** has three factors: interest, concern, or responsibility. It is in the disjunctive. I believe it is clear that [respondent] has shown interest and concern. It's responsibility that [respondent] falls short. The Court finds responsibility to be diligently engaging in services prescribed by [DCFS] in order to effectuate reunification. And [respondent] falls short in this category. She did not complete services necessary to gain fitness. For example, nine out of 12 parenting classes does not demonstrate responsibility when she did not complete that service, *** and she did not complete substance abuse treatment. The State has proven count three by clear and convincing evidence."
¶ 31 The case immediately proceeded to the best interest hearing. Sanders testified that she was K.E.'s caseworker since his infancy. At the time of the hearing, K.E. was two years old and was in a traditional foster home with a five-year-old foster sister. Sanders visited K.E. in the foster home every month, and he was getting along "really well" with his foster family. He was learning how to walk and, whenever he falls or cries, he runs to his foster mother or father for comfort. "There's a bond between them because he * * * takes their hands when he wants to go do something or he wants something," and he also asks them for hugs and kisses. Sanders testified that K.E. was well integrated into the foster family, as well as the extended family. K.E. also has special needs and was receiving early intervention services through the school district for speech developmental therapy and occupational therapy. Sanders explained that the foster parents are both schoolteachers, and they advocated that K.E. receive those services and intended to continue to support K.E.'s therapy needs.
¶ 32 Sanders testified that, once the goal was changed to substitute care, respondent's visits were reduced to once per month. It became difficult to schedule visits because DCFS changed its transporting agency, and they also had to coordinate with Camelot Care Centers to supervise for Z.P. and C.B. because they were "not under DCFS." After the goal was changed, there were approximately two missed visits, but Sanders could not recall it was the fault of the transporting agency or respondent. Sanders observed a visit that respondent organized as a birthday party for Z.P. at the mall. Sanders did not have any concerns during the visit. She had reviewed the visitation notes prepared by the case aides, and she testified that, "for the most part," the children interacted with respondent during the visits, although there were several scheduled visits where Z.P. and C.B. refused to go. There were times that respondent called her during the visitation, and Sanders told her numerous times that she should not contact DCFS during the visitation because respondent would get "really agitated" and, when the minors saw that, it would affect them negatively.
¶ 33 Sanders further testified that the K.E.'s foster parents wished to adopt him. She had no concerns about his safety in the foster home, and the foster parents provided him with his basic necessities. Sanders did not have any concerns that, if adopted, the foster parents would support K.E. 's therapy needs. Sanders testified that it was important for K.E. to have permanence because children who are adopted early have a better chance of having a successful life. She explained that when a child lingers in the system, they often do not develop a sense of self and struggle to bond with others. In her opinion, it was in K.E.'s best interest to be made available for adoption and eventually adopted by the foster parents.
¶ 34 Kala Davis testified that she was as case supervisor at Camelot Care Centers. Since August 2020, she had been either the case worker or had supervised the case worker for Z.P. and C.B. Both minors came into care in November 2019 and were placed together in specialized foster placement. She testified that both minors have special needs. Specifically, Z.P., who was in fourth grade at the time of the hearing, has attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), mood disorder, attachment disorder, and trauma and stress disorder. Z.P. was in counseling and taking medication for her ADHD and mood disorder. Davis testified that Z.P. was "educationally behind" and has difficultly staying in the classroom and keeping her hands to herself. She has punched, bitten, and hit teachers. Davis explained that the foster parents advocated for Z.P. to be moved to a specialized school. After the transfer, Z.P. was doing "phenomenally better." Davis testified that this was the first school year where Z.P. was learning and making progress, rather than just having her behaviors managed. Davis attributed some of Z.P.'s behavioral improvement to the reduction in visits with respondent. Davis described Z.P. as a "very active, fun-loving girl."
¶ 35 C.B., who was in third grade at the time the hearing, likewise has special needs. He was diagnosed with mood disorder, ADHD, and trauma and stress disorder. He was in counseling and taking medication for his ADHD and mood disorder. Davis stated that C.B. was involved in karate and various community activities.
¶ 36 Davis observed Z.P. and C.B. approximately 12 times in their foster home. She testified that they were "very bonded with the foster family" and referred to the foster parents as "mom" and "dad." She observed the minors putting makeup on their foster father and styling his hair, as well as observed them cooking with their foster mom. They told Davis about a family trip they took to Florida over the summer, and they described various activities they did together on their trip. A 20-year-old female was in foster care who also lived in the home. Z.P. and C.B. considered her their foster sister, and both minors got along well with her. They all did each other's makeup and played videogames together. They also interacted with the parents of the foster parents, who they considered their grandparents.
¶ 37 Davis testified that Z.P. and C.B. visited with respondent monthly after the goal changed to substitute care. Respondent caused some visits to be missed, and some visits were missed due to the agency. Davis, as well as the caseworker, therapist, and foster family, would prepare them for the visits a few days beforehand, but "there were a lot" of visits where Z.P. and C.B. simply refused to attend. There were also occasions where they even refused to get into the case aide's vehicle. The few times that C.B. went for a visit with respondent, he stated that he went to see his brother, K.E. Davis testified that, after visits with respondent, Z.P. and C.B. frequently would have difficulty regulating their behavior. For example, Z.P. would get very aggressive toward her foster mom. Visits were often scheduled for Fridays so that Z.P.'s negative behavior at school could be minimized. Davis noted that their behavior improved when the number of visits with respondent was reduced.
¶ 38 Concerning permanency, Davis testified that the foster parents were committed to adopting both children and maintaining their sibling bond with K.E. Z.P. told Davis that she never wants to leave the foster home, and C.B. has said that the foster parents were "mom and dad," and that he did not want to leave them. Davis believed that permanency was important because it would provide them with a sense of belonging and certainty. In her opinion, it was in Z.P. and C.B.'s best interest for respondent's parental rights to be terminated and for them to be made available for adoption.
¶ 39 Respondent testified that, at most, six scheduled visits did not occur, and most of them were because Z.P. and C.B. refused to attend or there were problems transporting them. Respondent testified that she missed one visit because of her work schedule. She testified that her children loved her and that she loved them. She stated that the children were happy when they were with her and that, during the visits, they would play together on her cell phone or laptop, and they would watch television and eat meals together. Respondent further testified that the minors' behavior worsened over the course of the case. She believed the foster parents gave them "different options" and bribed them by giving them whatever they wanted so that they would not act out. Respondent recounted a conversation where Z.P. told her she did not have to call her "mom" because her foster mother said so. Respondent testified that after the case began, Z.P. told respondent that she did not have to listen to her, and she believed that Z.P. and C.B.'s foster parents were talking to them about adoption even before the goal was changed to substitute care.
¶ 40 The circuit court found that the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it was in the minors' best interest that respondent's parental rights be terminated. In announcing its ruling, the court emphasized that respondent was devoted to her children and loved them. It reiterated that, although she maintained interest and concern for her children, it was "responsibility [for the minors' welfare] and the ability to achieve fitness that was of concern." It continued that the minors were well integrated into their placements, felt safe there, and viewed their foster parents as their primary caregivers. It further observed that K.E. was a toddler who had been in care nearly his entire life. Z.P. and C.B. came into care later in their lives but were "psychologically damaged," had diagnoses, and had special needs that required "a level of care that could not be provided by [respondent] previously." It further stated that respondent would be unable to attain the necessary skills to address those needs in the foreseeable future. Conversely, Z.P. and C.B.'s special needs were being met by their foster parents. The order terminating respondent's parental rights was entered November 2, 2021, and respondent timely appealed.
¶ 41 Appellate counsel was appointed to represent respondent. On January 14, 2022, she moved to withdraw pursuant to Anders, 386 U.S. 738, and attached a memorandum of law in support. Counsel states that she carefully reviewed the record, including the findings of unfitness and the decision regarding the minors' best interests, as well as researched applicable statutes and case law, and concluded that there are no meritorious issues of procedure or substance to be raised on appeal which could warrant relief by this court. Counsel served respondent with a copy of the motion and supporting memorandum, and we advised respondent that she had 30 days to file a response as to why counsel's motion should not be granted and why the court should not, after a proper review of the record, affirm the judgment terminating her parental rights. More than 30 days have passed, and respondent has neither filed a response to the Anders motion nor filed a motion to substitute counsel. We accordingly address the merits of counsel's Anders motion.
¶ 42 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 43 Appellate counsel identifies a potential argument challenging the circuit court's finding of unfitness on count I, which alleged respondent failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the children from respondent during any 9-month period following the adjudication of neglect. 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (m) (i) (West 2020). However, counsel believes that the court's finding as to count II, regarding respondent's failure to make reasonable progress, as well as count III, concerning respondent's failure to maintain a reasonable degree of responsibility as to the minors' welfare, were proven by clear and convincing evidence. Because we may affirm if any one ground of unfitness is supported by the evidence, counsel maintains that it would be futile to argue on appeal that the court's finding on count I should be reversed in light of the court's other findings regarding unfitness. As to the court's best interest determination, counsel asserts the court's finding that it was in the minors' best interest that they be freed for adoption was supported by at least a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, counsel maintains that there is no justiciable issue on appeal to be presented on behalf of respondent, and she requests leave to withdraw.
¶ 44 Proceedings relating to the involuntary termination of parental rights are governed by the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 401/1-1 et seq. (West 2020)) and the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/0.01 et seq. (West 2020)). In re J.L., 236 Ill.2d 329, 337 (2010). Section 2-29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act outlines a bifurcated process to involuntarily terminate parental rights. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2020). First, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit under one or more of the grounds specified in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2020)). 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2), (4) (West 2020); In re D.T., 212 Ill.2d 347, 352 (2004). At this stage, only evidence bearing on parental unfitness may be considered, and the circuit court's focus is on the parent's past conduct. In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill.2d 255, 277 (1990). Section 1(D) of the Adoption Act contains numerous, independent grounds under which a parent may be deemed an "unfit person." Any one ground, if proven by clear and convincing evidence, is sufficient to enter a finding of unfitness, and we will affirm a court's finding where the evidence supports it. In re C. W., 199 Ill.2d 198, 210 (2002). If a parent is found unfit, his or her interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child's interest in a stable, loving home life. In re D.T., 212 Ill.2d at 364. At that point, the court must determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the minor. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2020)); See also Syck, 138 Ill.2d at 277.
¶ 45 On appeal, we will not disturb a circuit court's findings of parental unfitness or the child's best interest unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re J. C, 2020 IL App (2d) 200063, ¶ 27. A ruling is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or the determination is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence. Id. We afford great deference to the findings of the trial court because it occupies a superior position to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses. In re D.M., 298 Ill.App.3d 574, 579 (1998).
¶ 46 A. Unfitness
¶ 47 One of the bases upon which the circuit court found respondent unfit was her failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors during any 9-month period following the adjudication of neglect pursuant to section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act. The Adoption Act does not define "reasonable progress," but our supreme court has stated that the term means "demonstrable movement toward the goal of reunification." In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d 181, 211 (2001) (quoting In re J.A., 316 Ill.App.3d 553, 565 (2000)). The benchmark for measuring progress toward the goal of reunification is measured by the parent's compliance with the service plans and the court's directives, in light of both the conditions which caused the child's removal and the conditions that became known later and which would prevent the court from returning custody of the child to the parent. Id. at 216-27. Reasonable progress is made "if the trial court can objectively conclude that the parent's progress is sufficiently demonstrable and is of such quality that the child can be returned to the parent within the near future." In re E.M., 295 Ill.App.3d 220 (1998).
The period noted by the State in its petition is 16 months, which exceeds the 9-month period contemplated in section 1(D) (m) of the Adoption Act. However, the extended period does not present a potential issue that would warrant relief on appeal. See In re S.A.M., 2021 IL App (3d) 210066, ¶¶ 20-21 (holding petition to terminate parental rights was not deficient where it specified "any 9-month period (August 2019-July 2020)" because it complied with the statutory requirement that the notice specify the nine-month period or periods relied on"). See also In re S.L., 2014 IL 115424, ¶¶ 17, 20 (petition to terminate states a cause of action where the petition alleges unfitness and specifies the statutory subsection relied on, even if the State failed to identify a specific nine-month period). Here, respondent did not object or request specificity as to the precise 9-month period, the record does not suggest that she was surprised by the evidence or unable to prepare a defense, and the petition alleged she was unfit and specified the statutory subsections relied on.
¶ 48 Here, the circuit court's finding of unfitness was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Although respondent took the required assessments for mental health services and drug and alcohol abuse, as well as a parenting capacity assessment, the record contains no evidence that she completed any of those services. As observed by the circuit court, while respondent "may have made good faith attempts to engage" in required services outlined in the service plan, she was unable to demonstrate any measurable progress toward the return of the children, such as completing the assigned tasks or even regularly attending the classes in which she was enrolled. Moreover, respondent's efforts to reengage took so long that her referrals grew stale. See In re Jacorey, 2012 IL App (1st) 113427, ¶ 21 (explaining that "reasonable efforts" and "reasonable progress" are distinct grounds for unfitness. Reasonable progress is judged by an objective standard by the amount of progress measured from the conditions existing at the time the child was brought into care, whereas reasonable efforts are judged by a subjective standard based upon the amount of effort that is reasonable for that particular person).
¶ 49 Concerning parenting education services, respondent attended nine of the twelve required parenting classes but was involuntarily discharged from the course before completing it. Respondent's discharge was the result of her lack of follow through, poor attendance, failure to turn in homework assignments, and failure to attend the required drug screenings. YSB reported to DCFS that respondent would not be allowed to resume the class until she engaged in alcohol and drug abuse services. Due to her respondent's failure to progress in individual counseling or intensive outpatient services for her drug and alcohol use, she was never re-referred for the parenting classes.
¶ 50 Respondent likewise failed to complete any substance abuse services. After undergoing a drug and alcohol assessment, respondent was referred for intensive outpatient treatment program at Rosecrance, called Project SAFE, for her drug and alcohol abuse. Throughout the treatment, respondent exhibited a pattern of attendance followed by unexplained cessations of treatment, only to reengage in services after persuasion from DCFS and Rosecrance. Respondent eventually ceased altogether her intensive outpatient treatment and was unsuccessfully discharged from the program. At the required drug screen exams, respondent tested positive for cannabis on April 7, 2020, May 5, 2020, and June 19, 2020, and she subsequently failed to appear for drug screening on July 28, 2020, August 25, 2020, and September 29, 2020, notwithstanding the fact that she became pregnant during the proceedings and was ordered to be drug and alcohol free. Respondent was also sent for inpatient treatment for her drug and alcohol use in May 2021, but she discharged herself from said inpatient care after "no longer than two weeks," against the recommendations of both DCFS and Rosecrance. Although respondent testified that she had recently contacted Rosecrance in an attempt to reengage in substance abuse services, she had not even completed her intake because, as she explained in her testimony, she needed "a doctor's paper due to [her] blood pressure being too high," which she had not obtained at the time of the hearing.
¶ 51 Respondent likewise was unable to complete her required individual counseling services. The evidence was the respondent's attendance at those sessions with Johnston was sporadic. Although she had progressed in her individual therapy, she "just stopped going" after Johnston left Family Counseling Service in June of 2021. Respondent testified that she received a letter from Johnston at the end of May or beginning of June 2021 that Johnston could no longer be her counselor because she was leaving her employment. Johnston advised respondent to contact Family Counseling Service in order to connect with another counselor and continue her therapy. Respondent testified that she did not contact Family Counseling Service until either the end of July or beginning of August 2021 in response to the letter's request. She testified that, thereafter, she was put on a waiting list and was unable to see another counselor, although an upcoming session was eventually scheduled for October 21, 2021 (which was two days after respondent testified at the unfitness hearing).
¶ 52 Here, there was no demonstrable movement toward the return of the children given that respondent failed to complete any of the recommended services in the service plan and respondent had not even progressed to unsupervised visits. The evidence as to count II of the petition to terminate respondent's parental rights was sufficient to find her to be an "unfit person" under section 1(D) of the Adoption Act, and we agree with appellate counsel that no meritorious argument could be made that the basis for the circuit court's finding of unfitness was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 53 "When parental rights are terminated based upon clear and convincing evidence of a single ground of unfitness, the reviewing court need not consider additional grounds for unfitness cited by the trial court." In re Tiffany M., 353 Ill.App.3d 883, 891 (2004) (citing In re D.D., 196 Ill.2d 405, 422 (2001). Because any one ground, properly proven, under section 1 (D) of the Adoption Act, is sufficient to enter a finding of unfitness (In re C. W., 199 Ill.2d at 210), we need not consider whether the circuit court's finding that respondent was unfit for her failure to make reasonable efforts as alleged in count I (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (m) (i) (West 2020)) or her failure to maintain a reasonable degree of responsibility as to the children's welfare as alleged in count III (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (m) (ii) (West 2020)) was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Tiffany M., 353 Ill.App.3d at 891.
¶ 54 B. Best Interest
¶ 55 Appellate counsel similarly argues that respondent would be unable to raise an issue of arguable merit challenging the circuit court's finding that it was in the minors' best interest that respondent's parental rights be terminated. Counsel maintains that the court's finding is clearly supported by the evidence and respondent cannot show that the court's best interest determination was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We agree.
¶ 56 A court considers the following factors whenever a "best interest" determination is required: (1) the physical safety and welfare of the child; (2) the development of the child's identity; (3) the child's familial, cultural, and religious background and ties; (4) the child's sense of attachments; (5) the child's wishes and long-term goals; (6) the child's ties to the community, including church, school, and friends; (7) the child's need for permanence, including stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures, siblings, and other relatives; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks attendant to entering and being in substitute care; and (10) the preferences of those available to care for the child. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2020). The court may also consider the nature and length of the child's relationship with his present caretaker and the effect that a change in placement would have on his or her emotional and psychological well-being. In re Nevaeh R., 2017 IL App (2d) 170229, ¶ 27. The court need not articulate how it weighs each factor and, on appeal, the reviewing court need not rely on any basis used by the circuit court in affirming its decision. Id. As noted, we will not disturb the court's finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the minor unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re J.C., 2020 IL App (2d) 200063, ¶ 27.
¶ 57 In light of the above factors, we cannot say that the circuit court's best interest determination was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Here, the evidence demonstrated that K.E., who was two years old at the time of the best interest hearing, had resided with his current foster family since he was just two months old. He has lived with them for nearly his entire life. The court heard testimony that K.E. has bonded with his foster parents, who have committed to adopting him, and that he is integrated into the home and the extended family and looks to his foster parents as his primary caregivers. Sanders testified that K.E. asks his foster parents for hugs and kisses, and he grabs their hands whenever he wants something. The court also heard evidence that K.E.'s foster parents both are teachers, and they advocated for K.E. to receive speech developmental therapy and occupational therapy, which he requires because of his special needs. Sanders testified that she had no concerns about K.E.'s safety in the foster home, that he was well cared for, and that the foster parents would continue to support K.E.'s therapy needs.
¶ 58 The court further heard testimony concerning the placement of Z.P. and C.B, who were placed together. Their caseworker, Davis, testified that she observed them in their foster placement numerous times. She testified that they are well-bonded with the foster family and referred to the foster parents as "mom" and "dad," and they considered the parents of the foster parents their grandparents. They were also well bonded with a 20-year-old female who resided in the foster home, whom they considered their sister. Z.P. and C.B. also have special needs, and the caseworker opined that Z.P.'s behavioral improvement was in part due to the reduction in visits with respondent. The foster parents also advocated for and succeeded in having Z.P. placed in a specialized school where, in the caseworker's opinion, she was doing "phenomenally better." The caseworker testified that the foster parents were committed to adopting both children and maintaining their sibling bond with their younger sibling, K.E., as well as that Z.P. and C.B. both expressed their wish to stay with their foster family.
¶ 59 In contrast, the court heard evidence that respondent failed to complete any of the services required of her in the service plan, that all three children have special needs that require a level of care that respondent was unable to meet, and that her relationship with Z.P. and C.B. had broken down to the point where they refused to attend visits with respondent. It is well-settled that once a parent is found to be unfit, "the parent's interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child's interest in a stable, loving home life." In re D.T., 212 Ill.2d at 364.
¶ 60 After examining the record, appellate counsel's motion to withdraw, and the motion's accompanying memorandum of law, we agree with counsel that the case presents no viable grounds for appeal. We therefore grant counsel's motion to withdraw and affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County finding respondent unfit and terminating her parental rights.
¶ 61 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 62 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County.
¶ 63 Affirmed.