Opinion
H047147
12-30-2022
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LUIS JARA REYNA, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. C1775061
GROVER, J.
Defendant Luis Jara Reyna stabbed to death the mother of his child. A jury convicted him of first degree murder. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he committed the murder with premeditation or by lying in wait. He also contends the police took a statement from him in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) which was improperly admitted at trial. We conclude the record contains sufficient evidence to support the first degree murder conviction and police did not violate Miranda in taking defendant's statement. We explain our reasons for reaching those conclusions and will affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant drove to the victim's home on an October morning in 2017. The two were previously romantically involved and had a daughter together; the victim had just returned from taking the daughter to elementary school. Defendant parked around the corner. Security camera footage showed that at 7:59 a.m. defendant got out of the car and walked toward the victim's house. He was dressed in black and wearing a black hat and gloves. He brought a knife in his pants.
The victim's housemate, who rented the bedroom next to hers, heard dogs barking outside. The housemate heard footsteps like someone walking "very, very fast"; then a door slam and a scream. Police were called and when they kicked in the door of the victim's bedroom they found her body on the floor, bleeding from 27 stab wounds. She was already dead. Defendant, also bleeding from stab wounds, was lying with his head on her stomach. He was seriously injured but alive. A knife was on the floor next to his hand.
Police interviewed defendant at the hospital three days later. He admitted stabbing the victim and trying to take his own life. He also admitted going to the house dressed in black, wearing gloves, and bringing a knife. But he claimed he had no plan to kill the victim; he only wanted to talk to her about concerns over the way she was parenting their daughter. He said when the victim saw him and screamed, he got scared and "stuck the knife in her."
The district attorney charged defendant with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), and elected to prosecute him for first degree murder committed by acting with premeditation and lying in wait. (Pen. Code, § 189, subd. (a).) The information also alleged an enhancement for personally using a weapon. (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The jury convicted defendant of first degree murder and found the personal use allegation true. The trial court sentenced him to prison for 25 years to life consecutive to a one-year term for the enhancement.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant was prosecuted for first degree murder under two theories: that the murder was premeditated, and was committed by lying in wait. (See Pen. Code, § 189, subd. (a).) Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to prove either of those theories.
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presents a high bar. To decide if sufficient evidence supports a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment for evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find the elements of the crime established beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Tripp (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 951, 955.) We do not substitute our judgment for that of the jury-it is not our function to reweigh the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, or resolve factual conflicts. (Ibid.) We presume the existence of every fact in favor of conviction that the jury could reasonably infer from the evidence. (People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 919.) To overturn a conviction, "it must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support it." (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.)
To prove the crime of first degree murder by lying in wait, the prosecution must show the defendant accomplished the killing by concealing his purpose, watching and waiting for an opportune time to act, then launching a surprise attack on the unsuspecting victim. (People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 163.) It is not required that the defendant be literally concealed from view before attacking; it is enough that his true purpose was not apparent to the victim. (People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 432.)
We find sufficient evidence in the record to prove the theory of murder accomplished by lying in wait. It was reasonable for the jury to believe defendant's purpose was concealed from the victim because of the nature of their relationship: they had a child together, whom defendant sometimes visited at the victim's home. Given that context, the victim would not have suspected defendant was there to kill her, particularly if his knife remained in his pants out of view. The evidence is therefore sufficient to show concealment of purpose. (See People v. Jantz (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1290 [despite tension in relationship and history of domestic violence, wife would not have suspected risk of being killed by husband].) Further, there was evidence that defendant parked around the corner and walked to the victim's house after a period of waiting in the car; shortly afterward a witness heard rapid footsteps and a door slam, followed by a scream. It was reasonable for the jury to infer from the evidence that defendant waited for an opportune time and ambushed the victim in her bedroom, attacking her with a knife when she was" 'entirely unsuspecting.'" (People v. Woodruff (2018) 5 Cal.5th 697, 775.) The record sufficiently establishes the elements of lying in wait.
Defendant concedes that evidence sufficient to convict him of murder by lying in wait is enough to affirm his first degree murder conviction, regardless of whether there is evidence to support the premeditated murder theory. But the record contains sufficient evidence of premeditation, as well. Defendant went to the victim's house dressed in black and armed with a knife; he then immediately killed the victim, with no evidence of provocation, stabbing her more than two dozen times. According to testimony from the medical examiner who performed the autopsy, four of the wounds would have been fatal on their own, including a long cut across the victim's throat. The jury was not required to accept defendant's explanation that he only wanted to talk to the victim but stabbed her 27 times because he got scared. It was reasonable for the jury to infer instead that defendant engaged in the planning and deliberation required for premeditated murder. (People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 235 [premeditation can be inferred from evidence of planning and when the manner of killing suggests reasoned intent to kill]; see also People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1127 [stabbing victim 38 times indicative of premeditation].)
We acknowledge defendant's argument that the evidence could also be viewed as consistent with an impulsive killing not rising to the level of first degree murder. But that argument was presented at trial and rejected by the jury. Even when reasonable arguments may support a different outcome, we will not disturb the judgment on appeal as long as sufficient evidence supports the jury's decision.
B. Admissibility of Defendant's Statement to Police
Defendant contends the statement he gave to police from his hospital bed three days after the murder should not have been admitted because the detectives who interviewed him violated the rule of Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at page 444. Under Miranda, the prosecution cannot use statements obtained during a custodial interrogation unless the subject was first advised of the constitutional rights against self-incrimination and to the presence of an attorney. Once so advised, the individual can waive those rights and choose to speak with police, provided the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. (Ibid.) The questioning must stop, however, if the person at any time during questioning indicates "that he does not wish to be interrogated." (Id. at p. 445.) We review de novo the trial court's determination that the police questioning did not violate Miranda. (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 586.) But we also defer to all factual findings supported by substantial evidence the trial court made in reaching its conclusion. (People v. Shamblin (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1, 19.)
The statement at issue here was recorded by a police officer's body worn camera and a transcript of the interview was later created. (The interview was conducted in Spanish, which defendant indicated is his primary language. The transcript is an English translation.) After asking defendant for background information such as his address and phone number, the questioning officer said, "I'm going to read you your rights. Okay?" The officer then advised defendant of his relevant constitutional rights, and after explaining each right asked him, "Do you understand?" The trial court, after reviewing the video footage and transcript, found defendant responded affirmatively-either by saying yes or nodding his head-each time he was asked whether he understood his rights. After confirming that defendant understood his rights, the officer began asking questions about what happened the day of the murder. Defendant's responses included damaging admissions, most prominently that he went to the victim's house armed with a knife and stabbed her.
Defendant asserts police violated Miranda because although he was advised of his right not to speak with them, he did not waive that right. Defendant emphasizes that while police confirmed he understood the rights he had been read, they neglected to ask him whether he wanted to waive those rights. But an express waiver is not required. It is enough that a suspect's post advisement conduct indicates an intent to waive the rights and speak to police. (See People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 669 [defendant's responses indicating he understood each of the rights and subsequent willingness to answer questions sufficient for an implied waiver].) Here, defendant's conduct amounted to an implied waiver because he responded affirmatively when asked whether he understood his rights, then began answering the questions posed.
Having reviewed the interrogation video, we note that whether defendant was capable of understanding and did in fact understand his rights are close questions. When given the Miranda advisement, defendant was in a hospital bed following traumatic injury; he appears in the video to be heavily medicated, even drifting in and out of consciousness at times. But we are not using our independent judgment to decide this issue-as an appellate court we do not resolve factual disputes. Whether defendant understood the advisements is a factual issue and the trial court made several factual findings relevant to that point. We must defer to those findings so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. The court found that "[d]uring the interview, the defendant appeared comfortable in spite of his injuries. Nothing suggested he was in discomfort, having any physical difficulty being interviewed." The court also expressly found there was nothing "that would suggest the defendant was not mentally alert or did not understand the questions asked." Those findings are supported by substantial evidence: defendant responded affirmatively when asked whether he understood his rights, and was able to answer the questions posed. Indeed, defendant had acuity enough to devise a self-serving account of what happened (which the jury ultimately rejected), that he had only gone to the victim's house to talk with her and had no intent to do her harm. Because there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that defendant understood the rights he was waiving, it will not be disturbed on appeal.
Defendant alternatively argues that even if he initially waived his right to not speak with police, he later withdrew the waiver and invoked that right, at which point the questioning should have ceased. Defendant asserts he invoked his right to remain silent on two separate occasions: when the officer asked him how he was injured and he responded, "I don't want to talk about that right now"; and later in the interview when asked what happened when he entered the house and he responded, "I don't want to talk about this anymore."
A suspect's invocation of Miranda rights after an initial waiver must be unambiguous from the perspective of a reasonable police officer. (Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370, 381.)" 'If a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right,' then the officer need not cease all questioning immediately." (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 417.) A response is ambiguous if it is unclear whether the suspect is saying he does not want to talk about the case at all, or just does not want to talk about a particular aspect of it. (Id. at p. 419.)
Applying those principles here, it was not error for the trial court to determine that defendant's statements, "I don't want to talk about that right now," and "I don't want to talk about this anymore" are not clear enough to indicate that defendant wanted to immediately terminate the questioning, nor a clear indication that he was refusing to discuss the incident at issue. The trial court's determination is well-supported by authority. Many cases have found statements very similar to defendant's-and some that are even stronger-do not constitute a Miranda invocation. (People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 629 [" 'I really don't want to talk about that,'" was not a clear invocation]; see also People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1240, collecting the following cases: People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814, 823-824 [single statement by defendant during polygraph that he did not want to answer a question not an assertion of Miranda rights]; People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 977-978 [statement that" 'I'm not going to talk' . . . 'That's it. I shut up'" was not an invocation of right to remain silent]; In re Joe R. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 496, 516 [" 'That's all I got to say'" or" 'That's all I want to tell you,'" did not amount to assertion of right to remain silent].)
Defendant relies on People v. Case (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1, but that decision is distinguishable because there the defendant did not waive his Miranda rights. The questioning officer gave the advisement then asked the defendant whether he wanted to talk about a robbery and murder they were investigating; the defendant answered," 'No. Not about a robbery/murder.'" (Id. at p. 17.) The California Supreme Court explained that situation differs from the one presented here, where a suspect waived his Miranda rights then "later declined to talk about a particular topic." (Id. at p. 20.) Case found a Miranda violation because the particular topic the defendant indicated he did not want to talk about was the crime being investigated. But here defendant's assertions that "I don't want to talk about that right now," and "I don't want to talk about this anymore," came in response to specific questions about how he was injured and what happened upon his entry to the house; those assertions cannot be so broadly construed, as in Case, as a blanket refusal to discuss anything related to the crime being investigated. They are more in line with the assertions from the above-cited cases, which allowed for further verbal probing by the questioning officers.
Because defendant did not unambiguously communicate that he wanted to immediately end the questioning nor that he would not discuss anything related to the murder, we find no error in the trial court's determination that there was no invocation of Miranda rights.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
I CONCUR: Greenwood, P. J.
I CONCUR IN THE JUDGMENT ONLY Lie, J.