With respect to the argument that he was improperly charged with armed robbery by information although the preliminary complaint charged him only with murder, defendant argues that section 111-2(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 111-2(e)), which authorizes the State to add new charges beyond those brought in a complaint filed at the preliminary hearing, requires that evidence of the offense to be charged by information must have been adduced at the preliminary hearing before such new charges are brought. In People v. Redmond (1977), 67 Ill.2d 242, 367 N.E.2d 703, the supreme court held that an information setting forth offenses not charged at the preliminary hearing but arising from the same transaction as that involved at the preliminary hearing does not violate due process. The court in Redmond emphasized that the purpose of a preliminary hearing in Illinois is to insure against unduly detaining a person in custody.

The State does not dispute this. However, the parties disagree on how two cases, People v. Redmond, 67 Ill.2d 242, 10 Ill.Dec. 250, 367 N.E.2d 703 (1977), and People v. Kosyla, 129 Ill.App.3d 685, 84 Ill.Dec. 811, 472 N.E.2d 1207 (1984), interpret section 111–2 of the Code, and whether “every element” of each offense charged must be established by the evidence at the preliminary hearing. ¶ 8 This appeal presents an issue of statutory construction, which is a question of law and is reviewed de novo.

The State does not dispute this. However, the parties disagree on how two cases, People v. Redmond, 67 Ill. 2d 242, 367 N.E.2d 703 (1977), and People v. Kosyla, 129 Ill. App. 3d 685, 472 N.E.2d 1207 (1984), interpret section 111-2 of the Code, and whether "every element" of each offense charged must be established by the evidence at the preliminary hearing. ¶ 8 This appeal presents an issue of statutory construction, which is a question of law and is reviewed de novo. People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 172, 788 N.E.2d 707 (2003).

Section 111-2 of the Code represents the codification of the constitutional mandate in article I, section 7. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 111-2. The court in People v. Redmond (1977), 67 Ill.2d 242, cert. denied (1978), 434 U.S. 1078, 55 L.Ed.2d 785, 98 S.Ct. 1272, sustained the validity of the provision of section 111-2 which is at issue here, subsection (f). The Redmond court held that neither the Illinois Constitution nor the due process clause required a probable cause determination for each separate charge where the subsequently charged offense arose from the same transaction or conduct.

725 ILCS 5/111-2(f) (West 2018); Peoplev. Redmond, 67 Ill.2d 242, 245 (1977). This issue concerns a question of law, which is considered de novo.

In the present case, a previous, appropriately charged felony (second degree murder) had already been filed against the defendant and a preliminary hearing had been conducted in July 2013 before the trial court permitted the State to file the new first degree murder information. Thus, the rule declared by the Supreme Court of Illinois in People v. Redmond, 67 Ill.2d 242, 246, 10 Ill.Dec. 250, 367 N.E.2d 703, 705 (1977), applies to the present case, where the supreme court wrote the following:"The defendant repeats here his contention that section 111–2(e) [of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, ¶ 111–2(e) ) ] violates an accused's right to a prompt preliminary hearing to establish probable cause as declared in article I, section

The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to ensure that a criminal defendant is not held without a prompt showing of probable cause. ( People v. Redmond (1977), 67 Ill.2d 242, 246, 367 N.E.2d 703, 705.) A judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to an extended restraint of liberty following an arrest is required by the fourth amendment to the Federal Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. IV) and by article I, section 7 of our own constitution.

On April 17, 1979, the defendant made a motion for a prompt preliminary hearing regarding the two additional charges. The trial court, relying upon People v. Redmond (1977), 67 Ill.2d 242, denied the motion, finding the new information was not completely unrelated to the subject matter of the original preliminary hearing. On the same date a motion to produce was called for hearing concerning conversations that the State's Attorney of Montgomery County, Kelly Long, had had with a Grover Webb, who is employed by the Division of Criminal Investigations of the Department of Law Enforcement, Springfield.

(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 111-2(e); see generally People v. Johnson (1980), 82 Ill. App.3d 338, 341, 404 N.E.2d 531.) The rationale in support of this permitted "adding on" of offenses may be gleaned from language in People v. Redmond (1977), 67 Ill.2d 242, 367 N.E.2d 703, cert. denied (1978), 434 U.S. 1078, 55 L.Ed.2d 785, 98 S.Ct. 1272, where our supreme court states at 246: "[T]he first purpose of the [preliminary hearing requirement] provision is to insure that a defendant is not held without a prompt showing of probable cause." (See also Gerstein v. Pugh (1975), 420 U.S. 103, 114, 43 L.Ed.2d 54, 95 S.Ct. 854.) Redmond indicates that once probable cause has been found, and the accused properly detained, the underlying reason for a preliminary hearing has been satisfied.

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1978 Supp., ch. 38, par. 111-2(f). In People v. Redmond (1977), 67 Ill.2d 242, 367 N.E.2d 703, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of section 111-2(e) against challenges under article I, section 7 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 and due process clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const., amend. XIV. Defendant agrees that section 111-2 as construed in Redmond allows a prosecutor to file additional charges by information after a judge in a preliminary hearing has found probable cause to believe that defendant has committed some offense.