Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Bert L. Swift, Judge. (Retired judge of the San Bernardino Super. Ct. No. INF065833, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
Susan S. Bauguess, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Garrett Beaumont and Gil Gonzalez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RAMIREZ P.J.
A jury convicted Merle Ransom of assault with intent to commit oral copulation (count 1-Pen. Code, § 220, subd. (a)) and attempted false imprisonment by violence (count 2-§§ 664 & 236). After finding true two allegations of prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), the trial court sentenced him to eight years and four months in prison. In this appeal, Ransom contends: 1) the evidence is insufficient to support the assault conviction; 2) the trial court should have stayed the four-month sentence for count 2 under section 654; and 3) in the alternative, the court abused its discretion when it imposed a consecutive sentence for count 2. As discussed below, we reject each of Ransom’s claims.
All section references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
Facts and Procedure
On June 4, 2009, at about 7:00 p.m., the victim was at a bus stop waiting to catch a bus. Ransom approached her and began asking her questions, such as what was her name and what was she doing there. At one point during the conversation, Ransom offered to pay the victim $50 to see her naked. She declined. Ransom took something out of his sock and began to smoke it.
Ransom apologized and they continued their conversation. The victim said she needed to step away to the market so she could get change and make a telephone call. Ransom said, “No, no, no. I’ll lend you my phone” and said the phone was at his house.
As they walked toward his house, Ransom continued the conversation, telling the victim that he liked party girls because they like to do everything. He asked the victim what she liked to do and she told him about her hobbies-dancing, sports and exploring new things. As they arrived at a house, Ransom jumped over the fence to get to the house, saying, “Come on. I don’t have the key here with me. It is inside.” The victim became concerned that the home was not his and that “something may happen” if she followed Ransom. The victim told Ransom that she wanted to go back and she saw the bus she had missed passing by. She stated that she was leaving and was going to call her friend. Ransom indicated that it was his fault she had missed her bus, and that he was going to find her a ride with his friend. The victim waited and watched while Ransom went to his friend’s house. She could not hear the conversation, but saw Ransom give him money for gas. The friend, whom Ransom called Larry, handed the victim a cell phone so she could place her phone call. The victim went to get into the front passenger seat of the van, but Ransom told her to get in the back with him. Ransom was seated on a sofa in the back of the van facing the rear. As the van started to move, Ransom pulled a glass pipe out of his sock and began to smoke crack cocaine. Ransom grabbed the victim’s face and tried to pass the smoke on to her by mouth, but just blew it in her face. Ransom then handed the crack pipe to the victim, but it burned so she threw it down. Ransom’s right arm appeared to be stiff or paralyzed. Ransom appeared not to be able to talk.
Larry Shaw testified that he had seen Ransom around but did not know him. Ransom told Shaw that his girlfriend had missed the bus and said he would give Shaw $15 to drive them.
Ransom put his left hand on the back of the victim’s head and pulled her head toward his crotch. The victim moved away and said, “Hey, what’s going on with you?” Ransom did this several times and each time the victim pulled away. Larry told Ransom to stop and it appeared to the victim that Larry was going to stop the van. Ransom removed his hand from the back of the victim’s head and attempted to unbutton his pants, but was not completely successful. He did at some point get his zipper down. Ransom grabbed the victim’s hand and placed it on his erect penis over his pants. She removed her hand. When the victim started to move away, Ransom grabbed her breasts and crotch through her clothes. The victim told Ransom to stop and tried to push him away. She began to get “very, very nervous” and testified that this was because “once his body wasn’t stiff anymore he began to get very aggressive with me. [¶]... [¶] When I stood up he tried to grab me, and he followed me, and he wouldn’t let me go.” The victim stood up, pushed Ransom and jumped into the front seat. She told him she was going to “call the cops on you.” Ransom grabbed her by the knees as she was trying to get over the barrier between the rear of the van and the front. Ransom followed her and jumped into the front seat next to her, putting his right arm around her shoulders and holding her “very hard.” At that point the van had stopped for a traffic light. Larry told her not to get out at the intersection because there was too much traffic, and that he would pull over into the gas station. Once the van pulled into the gas station, the victim opened the door, pulled free of Ransom and tried to run. Ransom grabbed one of her hands as she was getting out, and she said “no.” The victim pulled away and ran toward the gas station store. Ransom followed her as she went into the store and went as far as opening the door and calling for her to come to him. Ransom may have entered the store. The store cashier and manager asked the victim what Ransom was doing because she was crying. The victim told Ransom, “Leave, don’t grab me” and told the people, “Call the police. He’s trying to grab me.” Ransom walked away when he saw the manager calling the police. The manager saw Ransom by the driver’s side door of a white pickup truck with a woman inside. It appeared to him that Ransom was talking to the woman and trying to get into the truck. At that point a police officer pulled up in a patrol car. The manager yelled at the police officer to go get Ransom because he had tried to kidnap a girl. The officer arrested Ransom.
On August 27, 2009, the People filed an information charging Ransom in count 1 with assault with the intent to commit oral copulation and in count 2 with false imprisonment by violence (§ 236). The People also alleged Ransom had served two prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). After a jury trial, the jury found Ransom guilty of count 1 and guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted false imprisonment in count 2. The trial court found both prior prison term allegations to be true. On December 31, 2009, the trial court sentenced Ransom to eight years and four months in prison as follows: the upper term of six years for count 1, a consecutive term of four months (one-third the midterm) for count 2, and two consecutive years for the two prison term priors. This appeal followed.
Discussion
1. Sufficiency of Evidence for Assault Conviction
Ransom argues the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for assault with intent to commit oral copulation. This is because, he contends “while there may have been a strong suspicion that [Ransom] intended to commit some form of sex-related act, the range of possible acts he may have intended was wide” and “[t]he inference that he specifically intended to commit oral copulation was a matter of speculation.” As explained below we conclude that the evidence is quite clear that Ransom assaulted the victim with the specific intent to commit oral copulation.
In applying the substantial evidence test, “the court ‘must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence -- that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value -- such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 260-261, italics omitted.) In making this determination, the reviewing court must presume every fact in support of the judgment that the jury could have reasonably deduced from the evidence. (People v. Rayford (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 23) “The uncorroborated testimony of a single witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable.” (People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284, 296.)
Here, the victim testified that Ransom repeatedly grabbed the victim’s head and forcibly moved it toward his crotch. When this did not work, Ransom unzipped his zipper, attempted to undo the buttons on his pants, and placed the victim’s hand on his erect penis. This evidence does not lead to mere speculation that Ransom may have intended a wide range of sexual acts, including possibly oral copulation. To the contrary, we fail to see what else his intent could have been when he forcibly and repeatedly pushed the victim’s head down toward his crotch. Especially given the evidence that Ransom’s penis was erect directly after this use of force, the jury could reasonably have deduced from Ransom’s actions that he assaulted the victim with the specific intent to force her to orally copulate him. Thus, Ransom’s argument that count 1 is not supported by sufficient evidence is without merit.
2. Attempted False Imprisonment and Section 654
Ransom also asserts the four-month term for count 2 should have been stayed pursuant to section 654 because the two crimes constituted an indivisible course of conduct. Again, we disagree.
Section 654 permits multiple punishments where substantial evidence supports a finding that the defendant had more than one objective in committing a crime. “If [a] defendant harbored ‘multiple criminal objectives, ’ which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for each statutory violation committed in pursuit of each objective, ‘even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335.) Single versus multiple objectives involves a factual question for the trial court to decide. (People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 162.) A trial court’s findings under section 654 must be upheld on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support them. (People v. Tarris (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 612, 626.)
Here, the assault had already been completed when Ransom grabbed the victim’s legs as she tried to reach the front seat, held her around the shoulders to prevent her from escaping out the front passenger door, and grabbed her hand and chased after her once she had already exited the van. The objective of the assault was to get the victim to orally copulate him. The objective of the attempted false imprisonment was to prevent her from getting away. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s sentencing decision under section 654, and we thus reject Ransom’s argument that the four-month sentence for the attempted false imprisonment should have been stayed.
3. Consecutive Term for Attempted False Imprisonment
In the alternative, Ransom argues, the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed a consecutive term for count 2 rather than a concurrent term. Specifically, Ransom asserts that the crimes and their objectives were not independent of each other and were committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior. Again, we disagree.
“[A] trial court has discretion to determine whether several sentences are to run concurrently or consecutively. [Citations.] In the absence of a clear showing of abuse, the trial court’s discretion in this respect is not to be disturbed on appeal. [Citation.] Discretion is abused when the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered. [Citations.]” (People v. Bradford (1976) 17 Cal.3d 8, 20; § 669.)
California Rules of Court, rule 4.425 lists factors the trial court may consider in determining whether to impose consecutive rather than concurrent sentences. These factors include whether: (1) The crimes and their objectives were predominately independent of each other; (2) The crimes involved separate acts of violence or threats of violence; or (3) The crimes were committed at different times or separate places rather than being committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior. “Only one criterion or factor in aggravation is necessary to support a consecutive sentence.” (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 552.) Consecutive sentences are warranted when the crimes were separated in space or time because such facts indicate a greater degree of culpability. (People v. Lawrence (2000) 24 Cal.4th 219, 240.)
As discussed above, the objectives of the two crimes were predominately independent of each other. In count 1, Ransom’s main objective was to force the victim to orally copulate him. In count 2, the main objective was to keep the victim from escaping. These involved separate acts of violence in that in count 1 Ransom repeatedly tried to force the victim’s head down to his crotch, using one or both hands, whereas in count 2, Ransom grabbed the victim’s legs to prevent her from getting to the front seat, then placed his right arm around her shoulders with great force to prevent her from leaving the van, and then grabbed her hand and chased her after she left the van. There was also some separation in time and space, although this was not great. We conclude that Ransom showed greater culpability when he attempted to imprison the victim after the assault, rather than just letting her go after the assault had been completed, because this indicates that he intended either to dissuade the victim from reporting the crime, or to prevent her escape so he could commit additional crimes. In any case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed the sentences consecutively.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RICHLI J., CODRINGTON J.