Opinion
100 KA 15–00207
03-20-2020
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Dante H. RANKIN, Defendant–Appellant.
TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (JAMES A. HOBBS OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT. SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (LISA GRAY OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (JAMES A. HOBBS OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT.
SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (LISA GRAY OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, DEJOSEPH, NEMOYER, AND CURRAN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously modified as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice by reducing the sentence imposed to an indeterminate term of incarceration of 18 years to life and as modified the judgment is affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of murder in the second degree ( Penal Law § 125.25[1] ). Contrary to defendant's contention, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 [1983] ), we conclude that it is legally sufficient to establish defendant's intent to kill inasmuch as such intent " ‘may be inferred from defendant's conduct as well as the circumstances surrounding the crime’ " ( People v. Badger, 90 A.D.3d 1531, 1532, 935 N.Y.S.2d 416 [4th Dept. 2011], lv denied 18 N.Y.3d 991, 945 N.Y.S.2d 646, 968 N.E.2d 1002 [2012] ). In addition to certain statements of defendant from which the jury could infer that he intended to kill the victim, the People presented evidence that he was identified as the shooter by several witnesses, that he and the victim were members of rival gangs, and that he had several prior altercations with the victim, some of which involved firearms (see People v. Chase, 158 A.D.3d 1233, 1235, 71 N.Y.S.3d 293 [4th Dept. 2018], lv denied 31 N.Y.3d 1080, 79 N.Y.S.3d 101, 103 N.E.3d 1248 [2018] ). Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the jury (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ), we further conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987] ). Contrary to defendant's further contention, County Court did not err in admitting in evidence a recorded jailhouse telephone call made by defendant. Inasmuch as he was informed of the monitoring and recording of his telephone calls while incarcerated, defendant had "no objectively reasonable constitutional expectation of privacy in the content of those calls" ( People v. Diaz, 33 N.Y.3d 92, 95, 98 N.Y.S.3d 544, 122 N.E.3d 61 [2019], cert. denied ––– US ––––, 140 S Ct 394, 205 L.Ed.2d 215 [2019] ). Thus, the correctional facility could "record and monitor [his] calls, as well as share the recordings with law enforcement officials and prosecutors, without violating the Fourth Amendment" ( id. ; cf. People v. Harrell, 87 A.D.2d 21, 26–27, 450 N.Y.S.2d 501 [2d Dept. 1982], affd 59 N.Y.2d 620, 463 N.Y.S.2d 185, 449 N.E.2d 1263 [1983] ).
We agree with defendant, however, that the sentence imposed, an indeterminate term of incarceration of 23 years to life, is unduly harsh and severe. Under the circumstances of this case, including that defendant was 18 years old at the time of the incident, we modify the judgment as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice by reducing the sentence to an indeterminate term of incarceration of 18 years to life (see generally CPL 470.15[6][b] ).