Opinion
May 18, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Starkey, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
As this Court determined upon the appeal of the defendant's codefendant, the trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in refusing to dismiss several jurors for "substantial misconduct" ( see, People v. Gonzalez, 246 A.D.2d 554). In addition, the defendant's contention that the counts of kidnapping in the second degree should be dismissed because they merged into the robbery counts is not preserved for appellate review ( see, People v. Sage, 204 A.D.2d 746; CPL 470.05). In any event, under the circumstances of this case, the defendant's conviction for second degree kidnapping was not barred under the merger doctrine ( see, People v. Cain, 76 N.Y.2d 119) inasmuch as the robbery offenses were fully consummated prior to the commission of kidnapping in the second degree ( see, People v. Smith, 47 N.Y.2d 83; People v. Chronis, 209 A.D.2d 712).
The sentence imposed was not excessive ( see, People v. Brooks, 209 A.D.2d 427; People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
The defendant's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit.
Bracken, J.P., Miller, O'Brien and Copertino, JJ., concur.