Summary
dismissing indictment because grand jury determination “hinged upon the definition” of a term and “the prosecutor's instructions to the Grand Jury ... did not provide it ‘with enough information to enable it intelligently to decide whether a crime has been committed and to determine whether there exists legally sufficient evidence to establish the material elements of the crime’ ” (quoting Calbud, Inc., 426 N.Y.S.2d 238, 402 N.E.2d at 1143)
Summary of this case from Clay v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of StateOpinion
January 30, 1996
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Phylis Skloot Bamberger, J.).
While determination of the charges herein by the Grand Jury hinged upon the definition of the term "residence", the prosecutor's instructions to the Grand Jury in that regard did not provide it "with enough information to enable it intelligently to decide whether a crime has been committed and to determine whether there exists legally sufficient evidence to establish the material elements of the crime" ( People v Calbud, Inc., 49 N.Y.2d 389, 394-395). Thus, the indictment was properly dismissed, with leave to re-present, on the ground that defendant was prejudiced by the impairment of the integrity of the Grand Jury proceedings (CPL 210.35; see, People v. Darby, 75 N.Y.2d 449, 455).
Concur — Rosenberger, J.P., Wallach, Nardelli, Williams and Tom, JJ.