Opinion
July 5, 1988
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Yoswein, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We find that the hearing court properly determined that testimony regarding the showup identification procedure was admissible in evidence at trial. The showup occurred approximately 15 to 20 minutes after the robbery and immediately subsequent to the apprehension of the defendant and his accomplice while they were observed by a security guard dispatcher rummaging through the complainant's purse and placing items in their pockets. It cannot be said that the showup was so "unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification, that the defendant was denied due process of law" (People v. Brnja, 70 A.D.2d 17, 23, affd 50 N.Y.2d 366; see, People v. Milza, 140 A.D.2d 718; People v. Molina, 140 A.D.2d 377). Any error attendant upon the trial court's having allowed the apprehending dispatcher to testify regarding the fact that the complainant had selected the defendant from the showup must be deemed harmless in view of the unequivocal identification testimony of the victim and because the dispatcher's testimony confirmed only the bald fact of the identification (see, People v. Johnson, 57 N.Y.2d 969, 970-971; People v. Young, 133 A.D.2d 656; People v. Russo, 133 A.D.2d 477, lv denied 70 N.Y.2d 877).
Viewing the evidence in light most favorable to the People, we find that it was legally sufficient to support the defendant's conviction (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15).
We have considered the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Brown, J.P., Lawrence, Weinstein and Balletta, JJ., concur.