Opinion
F073723
06-29-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ARMANDO QUINTERO, Defendant and Appellant.
Richard Jay Moller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kathleen A. Kenealy, Acting Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Catherine Chatman and Michael Dolida, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. BF158202A)
OPINION
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Eric J. Bradshaw and Colette M. Humphrey, Judges. Richard Jay Moller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kathleen A. Kenealy, Acting Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Catherine Chatman and Michael Dolida, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
Following the execution of a search warrant by the Bakersfield Police Department, defendant Armando Quintero was arrested and charged with one felony count of possessing marijuana/concentrated cannabis for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359) (count 1), one felony count of manufacturing a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.6, subd. (a)) (count 2), one misdemeanor count of possessing concentrated cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (a)) (count 3), and one misdemeanor count of resisting arrest (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)) (count 4). Defendant was convicted by jury of all four counts. The trial court sentenced him on count 2 to the middle term of five years in jail, with two years to be served in custody and three years to be served on supervised release. (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (h)(5).) On count 1, he was sentenced to the middle term of two years in jail, to be served concurrently with the sentence on count 2. On counts 3 and 4, he was sentenced on each to a concurrent term of 90 days in jail.
On appeal, defendant advances three claims. He argues the trial court abused its discretion when, without affording him the benefit of an in camera hearing in accordance with People v. Luttenberger (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1 (Luttenberger), it denied his motion for disclosure of the confidential informant (CI) who provided information to the search warrant affiant. He also argues the trial court erred when it denied his motion for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of material omissions in the search warrant affidavit, pursuant to Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154 (Franks). Finally, defendant requests we conduct an independent review of the trial court's determination that Officer Brent Thomas's personnel file contained no discoverable information. (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).)
Although defendant's briefs contain language indicating a challenge also based on the inclusion of false statements, our review of defendant's specific arguments reveals only challenges to alleged omissions of fact.
The People do not object to our independent review of the Pitchess proceedings, but otherwise dispute defendant's entitlement to any relief.
We conclude the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for disclosure of the CI without holding an in camera hearing or in denying defendant a Franks hearing. Following independent review of the Pitchess motion proceedings and Officer Thomas's personnel file, we also conclude the trial court followed the proper procedures and did not withhold any discoverable information. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
DISCUSSION
I. Entitlement to In Camera Hearing on Motion for Disclosure of CI
A. Background
On November 1, 2014, the Bakersfield Police Department executed a search warrant at a residential address on Oswell Street in Bakersfield. The warrant authorized a search of the main residence, the surrounding grounds, and any attached or unattached outbuildings; of defendant; and of any vehicles on the premises, including a specifically identified Cadillac. The warrant was supported by the affidavit of Officer Thomas, who relied in part on information provided by a CI. Prior to trial, defendant brought a motion seeking the disclosure of the CI who supplied information to Officer Thomas (Luttenberger, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 21-22), and a separate, concurrently filed motion to traverse and quash the warrant based on material omissions of fact in Officer Thomas's affidavit, discussed in part II. (Franks, supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 171-172).
Defendant filed duplicate motions on September 3, 2015, and September 28, 2015. After defendant first filed the motions on September 3, 2015, the trial court declared a mistrial based on late discovery. After the motions were filed a second time on September 28, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on the motions on October 6, 2015.
Turning first to the disclosure motion, defendant requested an in camera hearing to show "that the information known to the CI is reasonably related to his defense." Relying on People v. Estrada (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 783 (Estrada), defendant contended in the motion that the CI's information "in no way corresponded to the realities of the commando assault on three homes located on [the] lot" searched. Believing the CI to be N.Z., defendant contended N.Z. had a personal grudge against him and his brother, which motivated him to lie. Defendant argued, "The identity of The [CI] is critical to the defense of this case, since the motive and bias of The [CI], would [shed] light to the true owner of the items seized. [¶] The defense has shown misrepresentations and the materiality of this witness which could only be shown to the jury if the identity of The [CI] is revealed."
The prosecutor opposed the motion for disclosure, but requested an in camera hearing should the trial court determine defendant made an adequate showing for disclosure. (Evid. Code, § 1042, subd. (d).) The trial court held a hearing and denied the motion for disclosure. (Ibid.) The court stated: "In order to disclose the informant, I would have to determine if the informant is a material witness and I would have to look to see if there's a reasonable possibility the informant could give evidence on the issue of guilt which might result in a defendant's exoneration. I do not believe that has been established in this case. So the motion to disclose the confidential informant is denied."
All further statutory references are to the Evidence Code unless otherwise stated.
On appeal, defendant argues that although the trial court held a hearing on his motion, it erred in denying the motion for disclosure without holding an in camera hearing. Defendant contends the court failed to apply the correct legal standard under Luttenberger, supra, 50 Cal.3d 1, and he was entitled to an in camera hearing because he alleged "'evidence casting some reasonable doubt on the veracity of material statements made by the [CI].'" (Estrada, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 791, quoting Luttenberger, supra, at p. 21.)
The People respond that even if the court's language failed to track Luttenberger verbatim, the standard relied on by the court was substantially similar and, regardless, the denial was proper because defendant's motion was unsupported by any facts.
B. Standard of Review
We review the trial court's ruling on a motion for disclosure for abuse of discretion. (People v. Hobbs (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948, 971 (Hobbs); Luttenberger, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 24-25; People v. Bradley (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 607, 621.) "Under traditional principles of appellate review, if the action of the trial court in denying the motion to suppress was right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be sustained regardless of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to its conclusion. A correct decision of the trial court must be affirmed on appeal even if it is based on erroneous reasons." (People v. Hobbs (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 959, 963; accord, People v. Lujano (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 175, 182; People v. Avalos (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1580; People v. Thompson (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 923, 940, fn. 4.)
C. Analysis
1. Relevant Procedures Relating to Disclosure
a. Codification of Privilege Against Disclosure
As the California Supreme Court has explained, "[a] criminal defendant's right to discovery ... 'is based on the "fundamental proposition that [an accused] is entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information."'" (Luttenberger, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 17.) However, the right to discovery is not absolute and with respect to the disclosure of a CI's identity, the defendant's interests must be balanced against "[t]he 'strong and legitimate interest in protecting the informant's identity' [citation,] [which] derives from the need to protect the safety of the informant and the informant's family, the need to preserve the informant's usefulness in current and future investigations, and the need to assure others who are contemplating cooperation with law enforcement of their safety as well." (People v. Galland (2008) 45 Cal.4th 354, 365.) Thus, "'[i]t is well settled that defendant has no right to discover an informant's identity solely to attack a facially valid search warrant affidavit. That right arises only where defendant shows a reasonable possibility that informant is a witness to guilt or innocence.'" (Luttenberger, supra, at p. 13; accord, People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 159.)
The common law privilege against disclosure of the identity of a CI is codified in section 1041. (People v. Galland, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 364; Hobbs, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 960.) Where the privilege is invoked, section 1042 "sets forth the consequences ...." (Hobbs at p. 960.) Relevant here, subdivision (d) of section 1042 provides:
"When, in any such criminal proceeding, a party demands disclosure of the identity of the informant on the ground the informant is a material witness on the issue of guilt, the court shall conduct a hearing at which all parties may present evidence on the issue of disclosure. Such hearing shall be conducted outside the presence of the jury, if any. During the hearing, if the privilege provided for in Section 1041 is claimed by a person authorized to do so or if a person who is authorized to claim such privilege refuses to answer any question on the ground that the answer would tend to disclose the identity of the informant, the prosecuting attorney may request that the court hold an in camera hearing. If such a request is made, the court shall hold such a hearing outside the presence of the defendant and his counsel. At the in camera hearing, the prosecution may offer evidence which would tend to disclose or which discloses the identity of the informant to aid the court in its determination whether there is a reasonable possibility that nondisclosure might deprive the defendant of a fair trial. A reporter shall be present at the in camera hearing. Any transcription of the proceedings at the in camera hearing, as well as any physical evidence presented at the hearing, shall be ordered sealed by the court, and only a court may have access to its contents. The court shall not order disclosure, nor strike the testimony of the witness who invokes the privilege, nor dismiss the criminal proceeding, if the party offering the witness refuses to disclose the identity of the informant, unless, based upon the evidence presented at the hearing held in the presence of the defendant and his counsel and the evidence presented at the in camera hearing, the court concludes that there is a reasonable possibility that nondisclosure might deprive the defendant of a fair trial."
b. Franks and Luttenberger Decisions
Prior to the decision in Luttenberger, the United States Supreme Court recognized in Franks that pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, criminal defendants have a limited right "to challenge the truthfulness of factual statements made in an affidavit supporting [a search] warrant." (Franks, supra, 438 U.S. at p. 155.) The court held, "[W]here the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request. In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit's false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit." (Id. at pp. 155-156.)
Subsequently, in Luttenberger, the California Supreme Court considered the challenge faced by criminal defendants who, based on law enforcement's reliance on CI's, are at the outset without sufficient information to make the requisite showing to obtain a Franks hearing. (Luttenberger, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 18.) Emphasizing that the warrant affidavit is presumed truthful, the court concluded that "[t]o justify in camera review and discovery, preliminary to a subfacial challenge to a search warrant, a defendant must offer evidence casting some reasonable doubt on the veracity of material statements made by the affiant." (Id. at p. 21.) This requires the defendant to "raise some reasonable doubt regarding either the existence of the informant or the truthfulness of the affiant's report concerning the informant's prior reliability or the information he furnished." (Id. at p. 22.)
2. No Entitlement to In Camera Hearing
In the trial court, defendant sought the disclosure of the CI's identity and an in camera hearing. He relied on Estrada for support. On appeal, he focuses on the trial court's failure to hold an in camera hearing before denying his motion. Here, he relies on Estrada and Davis v. Superior Court (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1272 (Davis) for support, the latter he describes as controlling. As explained, we find Estrada distinguishable and do not agree Davis stands for the proposition advanced by defendant; that is, that he was entitled to an in camera hearing as an initial matter.
The issue raised in Estrada was whether the trial court erred in failing to hold an in camera hearing pursuant to Luttenberger regarding the defendant's request for disclosure of the CI. The defendant claimed the drug transaction described in the search warrant affidavit was entirely fabricated, and he supported his motion with a declaration directly contradicting both the CI's allegations and the search warrant affiant's allegations. The prosecution presented no evidence in response and, therefore, the defendant's declaration comprised the only evidence before the court on the issue. The appellate court concluded the trial court erred, explaining, "If [the] defendant's declaration is correct, then he has, in the words of Luttenberger, offered 'evidence casting some reasonable doubt on the veracity of material statements' appearing in the search warrant affidavit" and "[u]nder these circumstances, the trial court did not have the discretion to deny the discovery motion on the ground that [the] defendant had presented an inadequate challenge to the presumptively true allegations of the search warrant affidavit." (Estrada, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at pp. 792-793.)
In this case, in contrast, defendant's motion for disclosure of the CI and for an in camera hearing was not supported by a declaration or any other evidence. When the identity of an informant is demanded by a party, section 1042 speaks to a hearing at which the parties may present evidence on the issue. The trial court fulfilled its duty under section 1042 when it conducted a hearing on defendant's motion for disclosure. However, because defendant's motion was not accompanied by any evidence and he presented no evidence at the hearing, he failed to make the required showing under Luttenberger to justify an in camera hearing. (Luttenberger, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 21.)
Defendant contends that he "alleged 'evidence casting some reasonable doubt on the veracity of material statements made by the [CI],'" and that counsel "repeatedly averred, as an officer of the court, that he believed the CI was a percipient witness, and had lied." This contention lacks merit, however, because an attorney's unsworn argument is not evidence. (People v. Kiney (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 807, 814-815, citing In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413, fn. 11; see People v. Oppel (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1146, 1153 [holding that attorney's declaration for a party, made on information and belief, and submitted in support of motion for disclosure of CI is not, as a matter of law, evidence].) He also claims "[n]either the court nor the prosecutor faulted [him] for failing to provide sworn declarations, but accepted [defendant's] offer of proof[, so] [i]t is too late for the state to claim that [he] should have provided declarations." We note the absence of any authority for this proposition and to the contrary, as we have stated, we review the trial court's decision, not its reasoning. (E.g., People v. Lujano, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 182; People v. Hobbs, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 963.)
Defendant's reliance on Davis is similarly unavailing. The petitioner in Davis argued, in relevant part, that disclosure of the CI's identity was mandatory where the CI was a percipient witness. (Davis, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1276.) The Court of Appeal disagreed, stating disclosure is mandatory only if a CI is a material witness. (Ibid.) Defendant cites Davis for the proposition that he was entitled to an in camera hearing, but the appellate court in Davis stated a defendant may be entitled to an in camera hearing to make a showing on whether the CI can give exculpatory evidence. (Id. at p. 1277.) The court then outlined the procedure set forth in section 1042, explaining that "[w]hen a party demands disclosure of an informant's identity, the court shall conduct a hearing at which parties may present evidence on the issue of disclosure." (Davis, supra, at p. 1277, citing § 1042.) Further, "'[d]uring the hearing, if the privilege provided for in ... [s]ection 1041 is claimed by a person authorized to do so or if a person who is authorized to claim such privilege refuses to answer any question on the ground that the answer would tend to disclose the identity of the informant, the prosecuting attorney may request that the court hold an in camera hearing. If such a request is made, the court shall hold such a hearing outside the presence of the defendant and his counsel. At the in camera hearing, the prosecution may offer evidence which would tend to disclose or which discloses the identity of the informant to aid the court in its determination whether there is a reasonable possibility that nondisclosure might deprive the defendant of a fair trial.'" (Ibid., quoting § 1042, subd. (d).)
We do not disagree, but the trial court in this case followed the statutory procedure by holding a hearing at which the parties were able to present evidence. (§ 1042, subd. (d).) Although the court did not thereafter hold an in camera hearing, the prosecutor did not request one and defendant presented no evidence in support of his request for disclosure. By its plain terms, section 1042 did not entitle defendant to an in camera review and Davis does not hold otherwise.
Defendant also cites Hobbs in support of his argument that an in camera hearing was mandatory, but Hobbs considered the situation in which the defendant lacks sufficient information to make the requisite showing under Luttenberger due to sealed warrant affidavits. (Hobbs, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 971-972.) The court stated, "Where, as here, due to the sealing of any portion or all of the search warrant affidavit, the defendant cannot reasonably be expected to make the preliminary showing required under Luttenberger, supra, 50 Cal.3d 1, to initiate a subfacial challenge (by moving to traverse the warrant), or otherwise make an informed determination whether sufficient probable cause existed for the search (in consideration of a motion to quash the warrant), certain procedures should be followed in order to strike a fair balance between the People's right to assert the informant's privilege and the defendant's discovery rights. [¶] On a properly noticed motion by the defense seeking to quash or traverse the search warrant, the lower court should conduct an in camera hearing pursuant to the guidelines set forth in section 915, subdivision (b), and this court's opinion in Luttenberger, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pages 20-24." (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
Defendant makes no claim that due to a sealed affidavit, he lacked sufficient information to initiate a request for relief under Luttenberger, and our review of the search warrant affidavit, which he attached to his first motion for a Franks hearing filed in the trial court, confirms he did not lack sufficient information to seek relief under Luttenberger. Thus, the procedure set forth in Hobbs does not apply in this circumstance.
In sum, the law does not permit mere fishing expeditions, and the bare desire to unmask a CI is an insufficient ground upon which to obtain relief. (Luttenberger, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 13, 20-21; accord, Estrada, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at pp. 790-792.) Absent the inability to make a preliminary showing due to a sealed affidavit (Hobbs, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 971-972), which does not apply here, the moving party must make a preliminary showing to justify an in camera review (Luttenberger, supra, at pp. 21-22). As we have stated, under Luttenberger, defendant was required to offer evidence raising "some reasonable doubt regarding either the existence of the informant or the truthfulness of the affiant's report concerning the informant's prior reliability or the information he furnished." (Id. at p. 22.) He did not do so.
Even if the court erred in articulating the Luttenberger standard, as defendant maintains, and the standard as articulated conflated the showing necessary to obtain an in camera hearing on a disclosure motion (Luttenberger, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 22), with the showing of materiality necessary to prevail on a disclosure motion (§ 1042, subd. (d); People v. Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 159-160; Hobbs, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 958-959), the fact remains that defendant failed to support his motion with any evidence. That failure of proof was fatal to the motion. Because the court's decision was correct, the ruling must be upheld on appeal notwithstanding any deficiencies in its reasoning. (People v. Lujano, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 182; People v. Hobbs, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 963.) Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for disclosure without holding an in camera hearing and we reject defendant's claim to the contrary. II. Entitlement to Franks Hearing
As well, we reject defendant's claim the trial court erred in denying him a Franks hearing. As previously explained, a Franks hearing provides an avenue by which a defendant may challenge the factual statements made in an affidavit supporting a warrant. (Franks, supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 155-156.) A Franks hearing may be sought on the grounds "the affidavit contains statements that are deliberately false or were made in reckless disregard of the truth" (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 473), or "'that the affiant deliberately or recklessly omitted material facts that negate probable cause when added to the affidavit'" (People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 409). "[F]acts are 'material' and hence must be disclosed if their omission would make the affidavit substantially misleading." (People v. Kurland (1980) 28 Cal.3d 376, 385; accord, People v. Sandoval, at p. 410; People v. Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 136.)
We review the trial court's denial of a Franks hearing de novo. (People v. Sandoval, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 410; People v. Panah, supra 35 Cal.4th at p. 457.)
In this case, concurrent with his motion seeking disclosure of the CI, defendant filed a motion to traverse and quash the search warrant on the ground that the affiant, Officer Thomas, withheld material information. In seeking the warrant, Thomas relied on a CI who had been at the Oswell Street address and seen defendant with firearms within the past 10 days. The CI stated defendant kept a specific firearm (Glock handgun) in the trunk of a specific Cadillac. The CI also stated defendant was selling methamphetamine from that address, and the CI had seen him packaging, transporting and selling it. Officer Thomas conducted a records check and verified defendant was the registered owner of the Cadillac in question and listed the Oswell Street address as his residence. He also showed the CI a photograph of defendant and the CI positively identified defendant as the person in possession of weapons and illegal narcotics at the Oswell Street location. The location was placed under surveillance and defendant was seen coming and going from the residence.
In his motion, defendant contended Officer Thomas left out the following information from his affidavit: during the time the property was under surveillance, the person arrested following a suspected drug transaction possessed marijuana rather than methamphetamine; the house and vehicle had been searched previously and no methamphetamine or weapons were located; a few days prior to the search, the probation department searched defendant and his vehicle, but found no methamphetamine or weapons; and defendant lived in a shack on the property rather than in the main residence. The trial court, however, found "no showing that the officer deliberately lied or omitted material facts" and denied the motion.
Defendant also argues the CI had motive to lie because he was paid by the Bakersfield Police Department. This information was disclosed in the affidavit, however.
On appeal, defendant's challenge is limited to the trial court's failure to hold a Franks hearing. He claims the "facts and allegations [set forth in his motion] were more than enough to warrant a Franks hearing." His motion, however, suffered from the same deficiency as his disclosure motion: the absence of any evidence.
Defendant does not argue on appeal that the warrant was not, on its face, supported by probable cause, but we note that in determining whether probable cause exists to issue a search warrant, the court applies a totality of the circumstances analysis. (Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238; People v. Eubanks, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 136.) "The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." (Illinois v. Gates, supra, at p. 238; accord, People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 483.)
The requisite showing to obtain a Franks hearing to challenge the search warrant affiant's statements or omissions is even more demanding than the standard under Luttenberger. Conclusory, unsupported allegations do not suffice. (People v. Sandoval, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 410; People v. Panah, supra 35 Cal.4th at p. 457.) Defendant's failure to support his motion with any evidence unequivocally foreclosed his entitlement to the relief sought. (Franks, supra, 438 U.S. at p. 171; People v. Lee, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 171.) We therefore reject his claim the trial court erred in failing to hold a Franks hearing. III. Independent Review of Pitchess Proceedings
As with his first claim for relief, defendant asserts that because there was no objection below, it is too late now to object to the form of his offer of proof. We already rejected that argument as lacking merit. (People v. Lujano, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 182; People v. Hobbs, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 963.) We observe that as with his first claim, defendant fails to cite any authority in support of the proposition he advances. Moreover, this argument entirely overlooks the principle that a warrant is presumed valid and the requirement that to mandate a hearing under Franks, it is defendant who bears the burden of making an offer of proof supported by evidence. (Franks, supra, 438 U.S. at p. 171.) Given defendant's failure to make the requisite showing, it would have been error for the trial court to grant the motion for a Franks hearing. (People v. Lee (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 161, 171.)
Finally, defendant requests we conduct an independent review of the Pitchess proceedings to ensure that the trial court complied with the procedural requirements set forth in People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1228-1229 (Mooc), and that it did not abuse its discretion in refusing to disclose any information from Thomas's personnel file. The People do not oppose the request.
The procedure for obtaining discoverable information from law enforcement personnel files is well established. Pursuant to section 1043, subdivision (b), "on a showing of good cause, a criminal defendant is entitled to discovery of relevant documents or information in the confidential personnel records of a peace officer accused of misconduct against the defendant. [Citation.] Good cause for discovery exists when the defendant shows both '"materiality" to the subject matter of the pending litigation and a "reasonable belief" that the agency has the type of information sought.' [Citation.] A showing of good cause is measured by 'relatively relaxed standards' that serve to 'insure the production' for trial court review of 'all potentially relevant documents.' [Citation.] If the defendant establishes good cause, the court must review the requested records in camera to determine what information, if any, should be disclosed. [Citation.] Subject to certain statutory exceptions and limitations [citation], 'the trial court should then disclose to the defendant "such information [that] is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation."'" (People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 179.)
On appeal, a defendant may request we conduct an independent review of the proceedings and the trial court's determination regarding the presence or absence of discoverable information. (People v. Townsel (2016) 63 Cal.4th 25, 67-68; People v. Yearwood (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 161, 179-180.) "A trial court is afforded wide discretion in ruling on a motion for access to law enforcement personnel records. The decision will be reversed only on a showing of abuse of discretion." (People v. Yearwood, supra, at p. 180, citing People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 330.)
The trial court found good cause to review Thomas's personnel file in camera but determined there were no relevant documents subject to disclosure. We have conducted an independent review both of the in camera proceedings and of Thomas's sealed personnel file. We find the trial court complied with the proper procedural requirements set forth in Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pages 1228-1230, and our review of the files reveals no relevant documents or information. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to disclose any information from the file.
The process is effectuated by having a custodian of records collect all potentially relevant documents from identified personnel files and present them to the trial court. The custodian "should be prepared to state in chambers and for the record what other documents (or category of documents) not presented to the court were included in the complete personnel record, and why those were deemed irrelevant or otherwise nonresponsive to the defendant's Pitchess motion." (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1229.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
MEEHAN, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
HILL, P.J. /s/_________
POOCHIGIAN, J.