Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Monterey County Super. Ct. No. SS080958
Mihara, J.
Defendant Fabio Ramon Banuelos Quezada pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) in exchange for a grant of felony probation and dismissal of a possession for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378) count. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on three years’ formal probation. He appeals from the denial of his suppression motion, arguing that he did not freely and voluntarily consent to police officers’ entry into his apartment. We affirm.
I. Factual Background
Seaside Police Sergeant Bruno Dias was on patrol around 2:30 a.m. on February 22, 2008, when he noticed a red Nissan Frontier traveling in front of him in the 1000 block of Sonoma Avenue. As he watched the driver pull over and park in front of an apartment building in the next block, Dias recalled hearing from two reliable informants that a Hispanic male with a red Nissan Frontier pickup was selling methamphetamine from an apartment on the west side of that particular building. Stopping his patrol car across the street about 50 feet away, Dias casually walked toward defendant, who had gotten out of his truck. Dias asked him how he was doing. Defendant walked closer, smiled, and replied that he was fine. Dias then asked defendant if he had his driver’s license with him. When defendant admitted that he did not, Dias asked for his name and date of birth, which defendant provided.
Dias ran a license check, which took no more than a minute, and discovered that defendant had no driver’s license record. When he conveyed that information to defendant, who had until then been conversing in English, defendant said he did not understand English. Dias speaks conversational Spanish, but Officer Perez, who had just arrived, is fluent. Dias asked her to act as interpreter and to ask defendant “if he was aware of any type of drug activity going on at [the apartment building].” Defendant “said he didn’t know anything about it.”
Defendant then told Dias that his license was in his apartment in the building. Dias testified, “I advised him I was going to search his vehicle for some form of ID.” Defendant responded, “[T]hat’s fine. You can search the car. You can search me. I don’t have anything.” After Dias finished searching the truck, defendant volunteered that he would be glad to retrieve his license from his apartment. Dias testified, “I said that would be fine, and I asked if I could follow him to his apartment, so that he could do so.” “He said that’s fine.” On the way, defendant told the officers his license was from Mexico. As defendant started to unlock the door to his apartment, Dias asked Perez “to translate and ask him if we could go inside with him.” She did so, and “[h]e said yes.”
Dias followed defendant into the small one-bedroom apartment and stood in the living room while defendant picked up a pair of pants on a chair to the right of the doorway. Waiting for defendant to retrieve his identification, Dias noticed a wooden tray in plain view on the floor about 16 inches in front of him, easily visible under a high, open table. “I didn’t have to pull it out. It was right there....” On the tray was a plastic baggie containing a large amount of a crystalline substance that Dias suspected (and later confirmed) was methamphetamine. Also on the tray were dozens of smaller, coin-sized unused baggies, a digital scale, a spoon with a crystalline residue that later tested positive for methamphetamine, and a paper receipt with mathematical calculations, which Dias suspected was a pay-owe sheet. Defendant “said the methamphetamine was his, and he stated it was for personal use.”
Dias arrested defendant, then performed a search incident to the arrest. Under a twin-sized inflatable mattress in the small living room, he found $600, mostly in $20 bills. In shoeboxes on the floor next to the inflatable mattress, he found more unused baggies. In the bottom drawer of a dresser within lunge distance in the living room, he found still more unused baggies, a baggie containing a crystalline-like substance, and a plastic container with several ounces of a white powdery substance that he suspected was MSM, a cutting agent.
Dias did not find any drug paraphernalia in the apartment. He “looked around” the small kitchen area, which was “right there in the living room,” and looked into open cabinets but did not open closed cabinets. He encountered defendant’s brother in the apartment’s bedroom and, after obtaining his consent, spent “about eight minutes” searching some of the dresser drawers and some of the pockets of some of the coats in the “very packed” closet. During a booking search at the police station, Dias inspected defendant’s cell phone for text messages and found one received the previous day. Perez translated it, “ ‘I got money.’ ”
II. Procedural Background
At his preliminary examination, defendant moved to suppress all evidence, contending he was illegally detained when Dias questioned him about “his address, his license, his name and date of birth,” and that he did not consent to the warrantless searches of his truck or apartment. After requesting supplemental briefing and hearing additional testimony, the magistrate granted the motion in part, concluding “that the activity and the conduct and the search by the officer up to the closed shoe box and the drawer were reasonable and logical and legitimate under the circumstances and totality of the circumstances at the time,” but the search of the dresser drawer and the closed shoebox went beyond the scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest. The magistrate ruled that “[a]ll other items, however, are admissible.”
Defendant was charged by information with two felony counts, possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378) and possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). He moved to set aside the information (Pen. Code, § 995) and concurrently renewed his motion to suppress (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (i)), arguing that the magistrate erred in impliedly concluding that the search of his truck and apartment were reasonable and legitimate up to the search of the closed shoe box and the dresser drawer. The trial court denied both motions. The court ruled that there was “a basis for [the magistrate] to conclude that the conduct... of the officers... was reasonable in terms of the inquiry as to identification, and then the ensuing investigation, which arose out of that” and “there doesn’t appear to be any coercion or invalidity to the later events leading up to the discovery of the wooden tray in plain view.”
Defendant then pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine in exchange for a grant of felony probation and dismissal of the possession for sale count. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on three years’ formal probation subject to various fines, fees, and conditions. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
III. Discussion
Defendant contends the prosecution failed to satisfy its “heavy burden” of proving that he freely and voluntarily consented to the officers’ entry into his apartment. Although he concedes he “acquiesced to the officers’ requests to follow him inside,” he claims he did so under duress, in an “intimidating” and “coercive environment.” He argues that his consent was involuntary because the officers (1) illegally detained him, (2) questioned him about drug activity and impliedly threatened to arrest him, and (3) failed to inform him of his constitutional right to refuse consent. We disagree.
A warrantless entry into a person’s home presumptively violates the constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 586.) The presumption can be overcome, however, by a showing that police entered with the defendant’s consent. (People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 106.) “The prosecution bears the burden of showing that the consent to a search is voluntary and unaffected by duress or coercion. [Citations.] In every case, the voluntariness of a consent is a factual question to be decided in light of all the circumstances. [Citation.] The trial court’s finding, on the issue of consent, whether express or implied, will be upheld on appeal if supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Aguilar (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 632, 639.)
Here, the parties agree that we review the determination of the magistrate who ruled on the motion to suppress. (People v. Snead (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 380, 384.)
The circumstances a magistrate should consider in determining whether consent was voluntary include “(1) whether the person was in custody; (2) whether the arresting officers have their guns drawn; (3) whether Miranda warnings have been given; (4) whether the person was told she has a right not to consent; and (5) whether the person was told a search warrant could be obtained. [Citation.]” (United States v. Carbajal (9th Cir. 1992) 956 F.2d 924, 930, fn. 3.)
In arguing that his consent was involuntary, defendant relies heavily on Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777 (Wilson). In Wilson, the California Supreme Court resolved the defendant’s claim that evidence officers seized from him should have been suppressed as the fruit of an illegal detention. (Wilson, at p. 785.) The court held that because Wilson had been detained without reasonable suspicion, the evidence had to be suppressed. (Wilson, at pp. 785, 791 & fn. 12.) To the extent defendant contends that he, like Wilson, was illegally detained, his contention fails.
Defendant’s encounter with Dias indisputably began as a consensual one. “There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets....” (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 34.) An officer’s request to see identification, without more, does not amount to an intrusion upon any constitutionally protected interest. (United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 555.) Dias’s initial questions to defendant, about “his address, his license, his name and date of birth,” did not create a detention. His consensual encounter with defendant ripened into a detention only after he discovered that defendant had no driver’s license. Vehicle Code section 12500 makes it unlawful to drive without a valid driver’s license. Dias had observed defendant driving. Defendant admitted he did not have his license with him, and a license check revealed that he had no license. This furnished sufficient ground to detain him temporarily. (Whren, supra,517 U.S. at p. 819.) Here, unlike in Wilson, defendant’s detention was lawful, so his reliance on Wilson is misplaced, and his claim of illegal detention fails.
Defendant insists his detention was more than an ordinary traffic stop. He points to Dias’s testimony that he initially approached defendant to see if he had any connection to the informants’ tip. It is settled, however, that an officer’s subjective motivation will not invalidate a detention based on an objectively reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred. (Whren v. United States (1996)517 U.S. 806, 809 813 (Whren).) “Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” (Whren, at p. 813.)
Defendant contends his consent was involuntary because the officers questioned him about drug activity and impliedly threatened to arrest him for driving without a license and “potentially narcotics allegations as well.” The average motorist stopped for a traffic violation expects that he will “spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license and registration, [and] that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way.” (Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 437.) Nothing in the record suggests defendant was ever threatened with arrest. Instead, the officers gave him every opportunity to prove he had a valid license. The record reflects that defendant volunteered the information that his license was in his apartment and volunteered to retrieve it for the officers. Dias then sought his consent to accompany him and defendant readily assented. On the doorstep, Dias again sought defendant’s consent to enter and again, defendant readily assented. While defendant was not expressly informed that he had the right to refuse consent, the very wording of the requests communicated that alternative. Both requests, made in defendant’s native language, were clear and simple, and his affirmative responses to both were unequivocal.
Defendant contends his consent was involuntary because the officers failed to inform him of his constitutional right to withhold his consent. He argues that a reasonable person would interpret the officers’ requests for consent as “merely perfunctory” given Dias’s failure to request consent before searching defendant’s truck. Arguing that he simply acquiesced to a claim of authority, defendant claims a reasonable person in his position would understand that Dias would assert the same authority to search his home, regardless of defendant’s approval or refusal. We disagree. In our view, a reasonable person would note the stark contrast between being informed that an officer was going to search the truck and being asked if officers could accompany him to the apartment and asked again if they could enter the apartment.
Dias was not required to seek defendant’s consent before searching the truck. A limited warrantless search for auto registration or a driver’s license or other identification does not violate the Fourth Amendment when a traffic offender fails to provide that documentation to the citing officer upon demand. (In re Arturo D. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 60, 65.)
Our review of the record reveals a decidedly low-key encounter from the moment Dias first engaged defendant in conversation. He did not pull defendant over with siren blaring and lights flashing. Instead he stopped his vehicle 50 feet away as defendant parked his truck, and he “casually walked up to [him].” Nothing in the record suggests that any weapons were ever displayed. The evidence is uncontradicted that defendant “was friendly. He smiled and told me that he was doing fine.” When defendant suddenly announced that he did not understand English, the officers immediately switched to Spanish, with Perez interpreting. Nothing in the record suggests that defendant was even slightly cowed when Dias informed him he was going to search his truck for some form of identification. Quite the opposite: defendant confidently announced that Dias could search his person as well. Defendant waited until the search was completed before declaring “that he would be glad to retrieve his license” for the officers. He unhesitatingly and unambiguously agreed that they could accompany him and enter the apartment with him. In short, the record shows not acquiescence to a show of authority but rather, affirmative words and conduct manifesting a freely given consent. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the magistrate’s finding that defendant freely and voluntarily consented to the officers’ entry into his apartment.
IV. Disposition
The order of probation is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P. J., Duffy, J.