Opinion
May 15, 1989
Appeal from the County Court, Westchester County (Nicolai, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence adduced at the trial in the light most favorable to the People (see, People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The complainant had the opportunity to observe the defendant at close range under a street lamp during the robbery and was able to recognize him spontaneously two weeks later. The fact that his identification was not corroborated by other witnesses does not mean that it did not constitute legally sufficient evidence of the defendant's guilt (see, People v Danza, 127 A.D.2d 781).
It is obvious that the jury believed the complainant, despite minor inconsistencies in his testimony (see, People v Schreiber, 139 A.D.2d 608). Resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the jury, which saw and heard the witnesses (see, People v Gaimari, 176 N.Y. 84, 94). Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see, People v Garafolo, 44 A.D.2d 86, 88). Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the trial court's denial, without a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony was a proper exercise of discretion and did not deprive the defendant of his constitutional rights. It is clear that the complainant's identification of the defendant was spontaneous and was not the product of a police-arranged procedure (see, People v Blackman, 110 A.D.2d 596, 597-598; People v Fiorvante, 108 A.D.2d 925; People v Dukes, 97 A.D.2d 445). Bracken, J.P., Lawrence, Kunzeman and Kooper, JJ., concur.