Opinion
Docket No. 15494.
Decided May 2, 1974.
Appeal from Menominee, Ernest W. Brown, J. Submitted Division 3 March 5, 1974, at Grand Rapids. (Docket No. 15494.) Decided May 2, 1974.
Robert D. Powell was convicted of second-degree murder. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Edward J. Soronen, Prosecuting Attorney (Prosecuting Attorneys Appellate Service, Donald Ubell, Director, and William P. Weiner, Staff Attorney, of counsel), for the people.
Steven Schwartz, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for defendant.
Before: T.M. BURNS, P.J., and V.J. BRENNAN and BASHARA, JJ.
Defendant appeals as of right from his July 25, 1972, conviction by the trial court, sitting without a jury, of second-degree murder. MCLA 750.317; MSA 28.549.
Defendant first claims that the trial court erroneously concluded that defendant's confession to a police officer was voluntary.
A careful review of the record shows that defendant was read a clear and comprehensive summary of his Miranda rights at the commencement of the interrogation and that he waived his rights in this regard and voluntarily answered questions posed to him by Detective Steeno.
Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
We conclude that the challenged statement of Detective Steeno did not constitute a type of subterfuge which would render defendant's confession involuntary and inadmissible. Therefore, the trial court's finding of voluntariness was not clearly erroneous.
In defendant's second appeal issue, he contends that the trial court erred reversibly presiding over both a Walker hearing and a nonjury trial in this case.
People v Walker, 374 Mich. 331; 132 N.W.2d 87 (On Rehearing, 1965).
Defendant did not object to the fact that the trial judge presided over both the Walker hearing and the trial-in-chief. Furthermore, the confession which was the subject of the litigation at the Walker hearing was deemed voluntary and admissible. Thus, the trial court was not in the position of having heard at the Walker hearing a confession which it later ruled inadmissible at trial. Under these circumstances, we find no error in the fact that the trial court presided over both the Walker hearing and the trial. See People v Yacks, 38 Mich. App. 437; 196 N.W.2d 827 (1972); People v Boyd, 49 Mich. App. 388; 212 N.W.2d 333 (1973).
Affirmed.