Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 08F2370
BLEASE, J.
Defendant Brian Allen Platt entered a negotiated guilty plea to attempting to burn a structure (Pen. Code, § 455) after officers found the interior of his former girlfriend’s home soaked in gasoline. The trial court sentenced defendant to two years in prison, and imposed other orders.
Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court lacked the authority to impose an order prohibiting contact between defendant and the victim. The People concede the error and we agree.
Section 136.2 authorizes the imposition of no-contact orders in criminal cases in general. In People v. Stone (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 153 (Stone), however, the court found a three-year restraining order “transcended the authorization of section 136.2” because it was not limited to the pendency of the criminal proceeding or imposed as a probation condition. (Id. at p. 160.) Relying on Stone, defendant asserts the no-contact order imposed here must be stricken as unauthorized under section 136.2 because it was not limited to the pendency of the criminal proceedings and was not imposed as a probation condition. No-contact orders may also be authorized in connection with certain convictions and victims not applicable here. (See e.g., §§ 1203.1, subd. (i)(2), 1202.05.)
Section 136.2, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part: “[U]pon a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim... has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur, any court with jurisdiction over a criminal matter may issue orders... [¶]... [¶] (4)... that any person described in this section shall have no communication whatsoever with... any victim, except through an attorney under any reasonable restrictions that the court may impose.”
Defendant’s failure to object below does not preclude his raising the issue on appeal. (People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 381-382; People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 554, fn. 6.)
Defendant correctly states that the court cannot extend no-contact orders issued pursuant to section 136.2 beyond the duration of the criminal proceedings. Section 136.2 authorizes protective restraining orders when the trial court has good cause belief that harm, intimidation, or dissuasion is likely to occur to a victim or a witness. (§ 136.2, subd. (a).) By its very nature, this type of protective order applies only during the pendency of a criminal proceeding. (People v. Selga (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 113, 118; Stone, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at pp. 159-160.) The purpose of orders under section 136.2 “‘is to protect victims and witnesses’” during criminal proceedings so they can participate without “‘fear of reprisal.’” (Selga, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 118.) Of course, if any issues of contact arise, the victim may seek a restraining order.
DISPOSITION
The no-contact order is stricken from the judgment. As modified, the judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect the modification, and to send a certified copy of the amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
We concur: RAYE, P. J., MAURO, J.