Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. KA088009, Gilbert M. Lopez, Judge.
Sunnie L. Daniels, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Mary Sanchez and Shira B. Seigle, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ALDRICH, J.
INTRODUCTION
A jury found defendant and appellant Robert Bobby Perez guilty of four counts of indecent exposure. While being interrogated by detectives, defendant confessed to indecently exposing himself, and the confession, over his objection, was introduced at trial. Defendant contends on appeal that his confession was involuntary, the result of impermissible threats and coercion, and it therefore was inadmissible. We hold that his confession was voluntary, and we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Factual background.
In an El Monte neighborhood near Banister Avenue in July and August 2009, several women reported seeing a man indecently expose himself. One woman, Felicia Felix-Olivas, was jogging around Banister in July when at different times she saw three different vehicles (an older burgundy Honda; an older powder blueish-gray “Cadillac type of car”; and a truck) all driven by the same man. Felix-Olivas told Detective Gabriel Santana that the driver had a dark complexion and short haircut, was tall and heavyset, and was in his late 30’s. She thought she saw tattoos around his neck area. She identified defendant from a photographic lineup.
Another woman, Marguerite Bermann, was taking her morning walk in El Monte on July 10, 2009. Near Cedar and Emery, a man in a reddish car that was a Honda or like a Honda wore no clothes below the waist, and he was masturbating.
That same early morning, Liezel Gatliff, who also lived near Banister, was running in the neighborhood. She passed a parked red Honda. The driver, a man, was talking on a cell phone, but he looked up and down at Gatliff as she ran by. At trial, Gatliff identified defendant as the driver. Gatliff continued with her run, and defendant approached her from behind, near Durfee and Mulhall. She said, “good morning, ” and he replied, “ ‘exercise this, ’ ” and pulled down his sweatpants. Sexually offended, she called him a “pig” and kept running. A few weeks later, Gatliff was in front of her house, getting ready for her morning run. A gray Bravada sport utility vehicle with dark tinted windows was trying to park in front of a neighbor’s house, but when the driver noticed Gatliff, he drove past. Gatliff wrote down the vehicle’s license plate number and gave it to Detective Santana. In late July or early August between 10:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m., Liezel’s husband, Arthur, saw a red Honda driven by a man. Arthur followed the Honda and got a look at the driver: defendant. Arthur gave the Honda’s license plate number to Detective Santana.
In mid-July 2009, Janet Phongsathron was outside her house on Mulhall Street, near Banister. A truck was parked across the street. A tall, big man with a dark complexion and long curly hair and tattoos on his left arm got out of the car and pulled down his pants. At trial, Phongsathron looked at defendant’s tattoos, but she didn’t recognize them.
On the morning of August 16, 2009, Joyce Tay, who lived near Banister, was walking with four other women, including Suong Young. As the group walked on Maxson, they passed a red Toyota Camry, and the driver exposed his penis to them. The man was dark, in his 40’s, and had a medium build. Tay could not identify defendant as the man at trial. Young testified that the man was playing with himself, and she described him as dark, heavyset, and between 40 and 50.
Detectives traced one of the license plate numbers to defendant, who was already under surveillance in connection with child endangerment allegations. On August 28, 2009, the detective interviewed defendant, who was then 38 years old. Defendant was given and waived his Miranda rights. Defendant said he had access to a red Honda Accord, a light blue Cadillac, a burgundy or maroon Toyota, and a black pickup truck. At first, defendant denied that he masturbated or exposed his penis in public, suggesting that perhaps he scratched his leg at Maxson and Lambert. Then he admitted exposing himself at Mulhall and Durfee and at Cedar and Emery, but denied masturbating or exposing himself on Mason and Lambert. At the end of the interview, defendant wanted to apologize to the women to whom he’d exposed himself.
II. Procedural background.
On February 10, 2010, a jury found defendant guilty of four counts of indecent exposure (Pen. Code, § 314, subd. (1)); against Gatliff, Bermann, Tay, and Suong (counts 1, 3, 4, and 5). The jury found him not guilty of indecent exposure against Phongsathron, count 2.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The day after the verdict, the trial court sentenced defendant, on counts 1, 3, and 4 to consecutive 180-day terms in county jail but “merge[d]” a 180-day term on count 5 with count 4 under section 654.
DISCUSSION
III. Under the totality of circumstances, defendant’s confession was voluntary.
Defendant contends that detectives coerced his confession by promising him leniency and by exploiting his children; and therefore his confession was involuntary and inadmissible. We disagree.
A. Additional facts.
1. Defendant moves to exclude his confession.
Before trial, the defense moved to exclude defendant’s statements to the police on the ground they were coerced. The trial court held an Evidence Code section 402 hearing at which Detective Santana testified that he and Detective Eric Walterscheid interviewed defendant. During it, their guns were not drawn or otherwise in the open, and defendant was not handcuffed. The interview lasted about three hours, with a 15-minute break during which defendant was given a drink. Detective Santana had previously interviewed defendant in connection with a similar incident.
The recording was not transcribed.
The parties stipulated that the trial court could watch the video recording of the interview out of their presence, which the court did, and the parties submitted based on the recording.
2. The video recording of the interrogation.
We have reviewed the video recording.
At the time the detectives interrogated defendant, he was being charged with two counts of child endangerment, but the People later dismissed them. Defendant had two special needs children and was raising them by himself.
At the beginning of the approximately three-hour interview, Detective Santana mentioned that he and defendant knew each other from another case and were “cool” with each other. (2:45.) Defendant waived his Miranda rights. (3:36.) The detectives and defendant discussed then pending charges of child endangerment arising out of allegations defendant drove erratically with his children in the car, which defendant denied doing.
The detectives switched to the indecent exposure incidents, asking why defendant left his home at 7:00 a.m. Defendant explained he was getting the paper. (29:00.) When asked why in July he drove around and pulled down his pants and started masturbating, defendant denied doing it. (42:00.) Detective Santana said he wasn’t calling defendant a child molester, rather they were talking about misdemeanors, but the detective told defendant he needed to get help with his urges. (42:49.)
When asked about the incident on Maxson and Lambert, defendant said he was just talking on his cell phone when a woman came by, and he told her to fuck off. (44:44.) Defendant said he got up early that morning and went to a tire shop and came back by Maxson and Lambert. The detectives expressed disbelief that defendant got up around 6:00 a.m. on a Sunday to go to a tire shop. Detective Walterscheid told defendant it was “time to wake up.” Detective Santana said: “Masturbation in public, big fucking deal. Okay? Don’t compound it with lying and doing the rest of it. If you’re lying here, then when you tell me that you’re a good father and take care of your children, are you lying? Because that’s what the judge is going to see. ‘Cause if you’re lying about this that I have proof (unintelligible) she’s fucking going what the fuck is this guy doing? Okay? Then you’re lying about everything else.... Don’t lie about a misdemeanor.... Please don’t do that to yourself.” (49:30.) (Italics added.) Detective Santana, after talking about defendant’s girlfriend’s probation, said: “They’ve entrusted you with your two children that I know that you love a whole bunch. Okay? They’ve entrusted you with them, and don’t shit on that, Robert. Because if you’re lying about one thing, then you’re lying about another.” (50:29.)(Italics added.)
The detective told defendant it was okay to masturbate, but, “[w]hat you need to do is, you need to say, you know what, ‘I’m fucking sorry. I had a little problem. I was stressed out. I[’m] [a] fucking little jerk here and there. But you know what, I want to go to counseling .... All I want is my children to be at home with me and live a good life, and I’ll talk to whoever it is to clear this mess up because I fucked up.’ That’s it. That’s what you need to do. You do not need to sit here in front of us and fucking lie to us when we know it to be true.” (51.29.) (Italics added.) Defendant still denied doing it.
Detective Santana told defendant he shouldn’t make this more than it was, which was a misdemeanor. Detective Walterscheid added: “Don’t screw yourself because we can take it out to Pomona D.A.’s office, and right now they have a new head D.A. out there and they’ll hammer you.... They’ll roll you up and ship you off to the joint for a long time, dude.... They’ll roll you up real hard because they’re gonna sit there and they’ll look at all our reports and all of our victims and eyewitnesses, and all the stuff that you have been positively identified and all the shit.... They’re gonna go ‘he didn’t cop to this?... Fuck him.... The public defenders... are going to go [picking up file] what do you want to give him?... He’s got no affirmative defense.” (1:00:20.) Detective Walterscheid told defendant they were trying to “minimize your damage.” He knew defendant did it and “[i]t’s a misdemeanor. Don’t compound it and turn it into a big mess, when five to seven years from now you’re going to be sitting there going ‘what a fucking idiot. Why didn’t I tell Walterscheid and Santana exactly why I did that....” (1:06.)
Detective Santana told defendant not to “make this fucking worse, because with you, with you and your situation, like I said, you have your kids here, and you have this bullshit case here. Don’t let this fucking bullshit case cross over and fuck with your family.” (1:10.) Santana said he knew and liked defendant’s kids, who were “good kids, ” and Walterscheid advised defendant not to “force the D.A.’s hand.” (1:11.)
Defendant asked how many victims and charges there were (1:13), but he continued to say that if someone got a picture of him he might have been scratching his leg, but he wasn’t masturbating. (1:13-14.) When defendant asked if he would only be charged with one incident if he admitted his guilt, Detective Santana told him he wasn’t sure but he thought defendant would be charged with all three, although he was fairly certain they were misdemeanors, not felonies. (1:15.) He told defendant he was a smart guy but he needed to “read the fucking between the lines. I’m telling you, if you lie here, what’s... this dude [who] doesn’t know you that sits up in a black robe to think, ‘Oh yeah, he’s lying about being a good dad and being the rest of it.’ ” (1:16.) Defendant asked if he could say he was scratching his leg but admit one incident (1:17). He denied dropping his pants in front of a woman and telling her to “exercise this.” (1:18-20.) Then, when going over the incident at Cedar and Emery, defendant said he didn’t recall exposing himself and telling a woman to “exercise this, ” but admitted that he probably did it at one time in El Monte. (1:23.)
The detective was confused about how many charges there might be.
Defendant was concerned about his children, who had special needs. (1:24-25.) Detective Santana said he didn’t know what was happening in terms of placing them, and defendant said that if he went to jail, everything would go down the drain. (1:25:30.) He repeated that he probably did expose himself once, but he didn’t expose himself to the woman who took a picture of his car, although he did tell her to “fuck off.” (1:26:50.)
In the context of telling defendant that he had good family ties and wasn’t like other hardened criminals, Detective Walterscheid said: “Do you understand how the whole filing system and everything works when we take it over there? The prosecutors sit down with the detectives and we talk about the case and they want to know the whole ball of wax, they want to know what’s going on with you. What did he tell you? Okay? We did a case on a guy that was sending pictures of his penis to, how old was that girl? Fifteen, fourteen, fifteen or something, some high school girl that he had some infatuation with, and he had no clue she had called us and reported he was sending her dirty text messages and pictures of that, this and that. And, for god sakes, we had sat down with him, and he had a good job and a wonderful wife and a beautiful home and everything. And we sit down and he did the same thing and it took fucking five or six hours and he finally said, ‘You know what, I can’t sit here and say that I didn’t do that, you guys have all the proof and this is why I did it. And he goes, ‘I was fucking horny and she was, she was smoking hot, fifteen year old girl, go to El Monte High School.’ He goes, ‘Yeah, I’d like to have sex with her and I really wanted to and I thought I could like get her to have sex with me if she looked at pictures of my penis and everything.’ But then the district attorney and the judge they looked at all that and they go, ‘Well, the guy didn’t fucking lie, and this is like a first offense and, you know, ...’ and... that’s what he got. He didn’t get fucking joint, jail time. I think he got a little bit of tree farm and some counseling. Because they look, every case is looked at individually... and DCFS understands that too, ...” (1:29.) Detective Walterscheid added: “Our whole objective is to keep families together just as their objective is. But it’s a two-way street, Junior.... You can’t sit there and go, I probably did that or I never said that or, when we have proof....” (1:31-32.) Detective Santana told defendant it was “time to hold up.” Defendant then said he probably did expose himself once. (1:32.)
Detective Walterscheid then gave another “classic example” of a construction worker who stopped his car alongside a bus and masturbated, but later denied doing so, instead saying he was sanding the handle of his hammer, despite witnesses who identified him at a field showup. (1:32:45.) “[H]is stupid excuse pissed off the judge and the D.A., the filing D.A., and they go, ‘You know what, that’s his excuse?’ and they go, ‘fuck him.’ That’s what they did, they fucked him for something stupid.” (1:34.)
Walterscheid advised defendant: “Your best course of action is to tell us why you did this. There’s other incidents out there. Your best course of action is to say, ‘Let’s jump in a car and I’ll show you where else I did it.’ Because I’m telling you right now, you’ve done more than what’s been documented.... What’s gonna happen is that the D.A. is going to go back and go, ‘Okay, purge all your fucking radio calls and all your reports, ’ if you sit there and blow smoke up our ass. Was he cooperative? Did he take you out and show you all the other places he thinks he was at?... Okay, we’ll just bunch it all together. We don’t give a fuck. It’s a stupid misdemeanor.... When they start rearing their ugly head later on down the road, the judge who handles your first case is going to go, ‘march his ass back into my courtroom and we’re going to open up new charges on him.’ ” (1:35:30.)
When Detective Santana went over the incidents, beginning with the one at Cedar and Emery, defendant said he “did it” and said “yeah” with respect to the incident at Cypress and McGirk. He said he didn’t recall any incident at Durfee and Mulhall, but that he probably did. (1:38-42.)
3. The trial court finds that defendant’s confession was voluntary.
Defense counsel argued that defendant’s confession was involuntary because it was obtained through threats and promises of leniency. The trial court ruled: “Both of you left out a lot of factual issues that led up to that, and there was a lot of confrontation at the first half of the video about surveillance by the police, helicopter above, all these issues about stop signs and so forth that––that primarily Detective Santana was engaging in discussion, and one can say arguments at some point, regarding surveillance of [defendant]. [¶] The other substantial part that was dealt with that neither one of you mentioned was that for the most part Detective Santana was confronting [defendant] with factual statements that he represented were made by the complaining witnesses and that was the context for placing the discussion on the locations and so forth. [¶] So, having reviewed the tape very carefully and sometimes replaying portions of it for myself, the [c]ourt finds the confessions and statements of the defendant due to the totality of the circumstances do not rise to a violation of the defendant’s due process rights. And, therefore, the motion to exclude based upon this––based on this basis is denied.”
B. Applicable legal principles.
An involuntary confession—one that is not free because the defendant’s will was overborne—is inadmissible at trial under the due process guarantees of the United States and California Constitutions. (People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576; People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 79; People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 501.) A confession is involuntary when elicited by a promise of some benefit or leniency, whether express or implied, and the wrongful inducement and the defendant’s statement are causally linked. (People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 115; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 404-405; Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 164, fn. 2.) Mere advice or exhortation by the police, however, that it would be better for the accused to tell the truth, when unaccompanied by a promise of some benefit or leniency, does not render a subsequent confession involuntary, but when the defendant is given to understand that he or she might reasonably expect more lenient treatment at the hands of the police, prosecution, or the courts, in consideration of making a statement, even a truthful one, the inducement may render any ensuing statement by the defendant involuntary and, thus, inadmissible. (Holloway, at p. 115.) There can be a fine line between permissibly urging a suspect to tell the truth by outlining the benefits that may flow from confessing and impermissibly making an implied promise of lenient treatment in exchange for a confession. (Id. at p. 117.)
Also relevant to evaluating the voluntariness of a statement are “ ‘the crucial element of police coercion [citation]; the length of the interrogation [citation]; its location [citation]; its continuity’ as well as ‘the defendant’s maturity [citation]; education [citation]; physical condition [citation]; and mental health.’ ” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 660.) Questioning by the police may include exchanges of information, summaries of evidence, an outline of theories of events, confrontation with contradictory facts, debate, and even exaggerated statements implying that the police have more knowledge about a crime than they actually possess. (People v. Holloway, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 115; see also People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 299.) Only those “psychological ploys which, under all the circumstances, are so coercive that they tend to produce a statement that is both involuntary and unreliable” are inadmissible. (People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 340.) We employ the “ ‘totality of [the] circumstances’ ” test to determine the voluntariness of a defendant’s confession under both federal and state law. (People v. Massie, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 576.) No single factor is dispositive. “On appeal, a reviewing court looks at the evidence independently to determine whether a defendant’s confession was voluntary, but will uphold the trial court’s findings of the circumstances surrounding the confession if supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.]” (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 383-384.)
Defendant’s first argument why his confession was involuntary is the detectives implied that custody of his children would be jeopardized if he didn’t confess, but if he confessed he would be more likely to retain custody of them. Interrogations in which the police exploited a defendant’s fear of losing his family to coerce a confession have been condemned. (See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois (1963) 372 U.S. 528 [oral confession made only after the police told the defendant that state financial aid for her infant children would be cut off, and her children taken from her if she didn’t cooperate was involuntary]; United States v. Tingle (9th Cir. 1981) 658 F.2d 1332, 1334 [where the object of the interrogation was “to cause Tingle to fear that, if she failed to cooperate, she would not see her young child for a long time, ” confession was coerced]; compare, People v. Kelly (1990) 51 Cal.3d 931, 952 [officer’s statement, “ ‘I think it’s... going to be a foregone conclusion you’re going to be in prison for a lot of years. I don’t know if your wife is going to stick around and wait for you. Okay. That’s something you’re going to have to work out with her” was not coercive].) Also, a confession made due to threats to arrest a relative is inadmissible. (People v. Mellus (1933) 134 Cal.App. 219, 224-225; People v. Rand (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 668 [officer’s statement that if defendant did not know to whom marijuana belonged, they would have to take the defendant and his wife to jail and the children would go “to juvenile” rendered defendant’s subsequent confession involuntary]; In re Shawn D. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 200, 214-215 [suggestion that the defendant’s girlfriend would benefit if the defendant confessed was a part of the totality of circumstances rendering the confession involuntary].)
Any statement about a suspect’s children during interrogation will certainly cause stress and worry to the suspect-parent, given the “primordial” relationship between parent and child. (United States v. Tingle, supra, 658 F.2d at p. 1336.) Bringing the issue of children into an interrogation is therefore to be done with caution and care, if attempted at all. But we must ask here, based on the totality of circumstances, whether the statements exploited defendant’s fear of losing his children to the extent the defendant’s will was overcome.
We cannot say they did. At the time defendant was interrogated, he was being charged with and questioned about charges he endangered his children by driving erratically with them in the car, in addition to the indecent exposure charges. In fact, it appears that the Department of Children and Family Services was already involved, as there was some discussion about where the children would be placed, including with their grandmother. Thus, the detective’s statements—for example, “If you’re lying here, then when you tell me that you’re a good father and take care of your children, are you lying? Because that’s what the judge is going to see” and “[t]hey’ve entrusted you with your two children that I know that you love a whole bunch. Okay? They’ve entrusted you with them, and don’t shit on that, Robert. Because if you’re lying about one thing, then you’re lying about another”—must be placed in that context as part of the totality of circumstances.
Viewed in that context, the detective was asking if defendant was lying about the indecent exposure charges, and, if so, was he also lying about caring for his children. These and the other challenged statements certainly implied that there was a consequence to lying, but the detectives did not imply that a failure to confess would result in defendant losing custody of his children. “No constitutional principle forbids the suggestion by authorities that it is worse for a defendant to lie in light of overwhelming incriminating evidence. ‘ “[M]ere advice or exhortation by the police that it would be better for the accused to tell the truth when unaccompanied by either a threat or a promise does not render a subsequent confession involuntary.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 174.) Detectives Santana and Walterscheid never told defendant his children would be taken away from him unless he confessed to the charges, unlike the officers in Lynumn and Tingle.
The second way in which defendant’s confession was allegedly coerced was the detectives impermissibly threatened punishment and promised leniency. Although detectives may not lead a suspect to believe he might get the benefit of more lenient treatment if a statement is made, detectives may point out the benefit that flows naturally from a truthful and honest course of conduct. (People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 611-612, overruled on other grounds in People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 509-510, fn. 17; see also People v. Hill (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536, 549.)
Here, the detectives certainly exhorted defendant to tell the truth and implied it would be better for him if he did, that is, he would receive some unspecified benefit. This is what Detective Walterscheid did when he advised defendant not to “screw yourself” because the district attorney would “ ‘hammer you’ ” and “they’re gonna go ‘he didn’t cop to this? Fuck him.’ ” It was permissible to tell defendant it was worse for him to lie in light of the evidence. (People v. Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 174; see also People v. Vasila (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 865, 874 [encouraging the suspect to tell the truth and saying that doing so would be to his advantage is permissible].) In fact, the detectives were clear that even if defendant confessed they could not tell him he would get some kind of leniency; specifically, defendant asked if he admitted one of the indecent exposure charges whether he would be charged with just one misdemeanor. Detective Santana told him he would probably be charged with all three incidents.
Closer, however, to the fine line were Detective Walterscheid’s hypotheticals. (See, e.g., In re Shawn D., supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at pp. 213-216 [repeated promises of leniency, including implying to 16-year-old suspect he would go to jail if he continued to lie but could see his girlfriend if he stopped lying].) Detective Walterscheid told defendant about a suspect who sent pictures of his penis to a young girl but, after initially denying doing it, admitted it: “But then the district attorney and the judge they looked at all that and they go, ‘Well, the guy didn’t fucking lie, and this is like a first offense and, you know, ...’ and... that’s what he got. He didn’t get fucking joint, jail time. I think he got a little bit of tree farm and some counseling. Because they look, every case is looked at individually... and DCFS understands that too, ...” After some additional discussion, defendant said he probably did expose himself once. Detective Walterscheid then gave a second hypothetical about the construction worker who masturbated while alongside a bus full of people, and “his stupid excuse pissed off the judge and the D.A., the filing D.A., and they go, ‘You know what, that’s his excuse?’ and they go, ‘fuck him.’ That’s what they did, they fucked him for something stupid.” Walterscheid added that defendant’s best course of action was to tell them why he did it, because the district attorney would ask, “Was he cooperative? Did he take you out and show you all the other places he thinks he was at?... Okay, we’ll just bunch it all together. We don’t give a fuck. It’s a stupid misdemeanor.... When they start rearing their ugly head later on down the road, the judge who handles your first case is going to go, ‘march his ass back into my courtroom and we’re going to open up new charges on him.” Juxtaposed, these stories advised defendant that the suspect who confessed was treated leniently with counseling and “tree farm, ” while the suspect who denied the charges was “fucked.” An implication of these stories was that perhaps defendant would receive lenient treatment such as counseling if he confessed.
But in determining whether this rendered the confession involuntary, the question is whether, “given all the circumstances, the promise was a motivating factor in the giving of the statement.” (People v. Vasila, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 874.) Given all the circumstances here, Detective Walterscheid’s statements were not a motivating factor in defendant’s confession. First, defendant had already twice said that he probably did expose himself once. Defendant made these admissions before Detective Walterscheid told the stories. Second, the detective also told defendant that each case was looked at “individually, ” implying that defendant might not receive the lenient treatment. Third, nothing about the surrounding circumstances indicate that the confession was involuntary. Defendant was 38 years old and not inexperienced in police matters, having been questioned by Detective Santana previously. Defendant also had a criminal record for carjacking, for which he was on parole. The overall tone of the interview was cordial, and at the outset Detective Santana said he was “cool” with defendant. The detectives did not yell or raise their voices. The interrogation was not unduly long, lasting almost three hours with a break after two hours during which defendant was left alone. Defendant was also offered drinks at various times. Moreover, defendant never admitted all of the incidents, maintaining that he couldn’t remember the Gatliff incident at Durfee and Mulhall. We therefore conclude that defendant’s will was not “overborne” by any implied promises of leniency or threats of punishment if he confessed.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: KLEIN, P.J., CROSKEY, J.