Opinion
F076524
10-24-2019
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RYAN LEE PARKER, Defendant and Appellant.
Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Lewis A. Martinez and Ian Whitney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 14504)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Mariposa County. F. Dana Walton, Judge. Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Lewis A. Martinez and Ian Whitney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Levy, Acting P.J., Franson, J. and Meehan, J.
-ooOoo-
After a bench trial, the court convicted appellant Ryan Lee Parker of the continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288.5, subd. (a)).
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
On appeal, Parker contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for probation and sentencing him to the upper term. We affirm.
FACTS
The Trial
The prosecution evidence established that Thomas Belcher was married to Cheryl Gibbs and had two daughters with her. In the summer of 2015, after they divorced, Belcher moved into an apartment in Mariposa. Pursuant to a custody arrangement with Gibbs, from the summer of 2015 through June 2016, Belcher's daughters stayed with him almost every weekend.
Parker had been friends with Belcher since sixth grade and lived with him at the Mariposa apartment. Belcher had to work most weekends and Parker would babysit his daughters.
In June 2016, while Gibbs was camping with her younger daughter (Y.D.), who was then 8 years old, Y.D. put the tip of a marshmallow roaster in the ground and rode back and forth on the wooden part of the handle rubbing her vagina on the handle. Gibbs asked Y.D. why she did that and Y.D. began to cry. Eventually, Y.D. told Gibbs that Parker "was touching her leg and also touching her bottom." Y.D. used Gibbs's purse to demonstrate how Parker touched her. She ran the purse from the side of one of Gibbs's buttocks to the other buttock, back across, down toward her vagina and back up. As Gibbs moved away from her, Y.D. pinched Gibbs's buttocks. Y.D. also told Gibbs that Parker had been touching her "for a while." Gibbs was not able to continue talking to Y.D. because she was upset and crying. However, during the camping trip, when she again spoke with her about the touching, Y.D. said it happened multiple times and that she was scared because Parker told her if she told anyone she would get in trouble and people would get mad at her, and she did not want Parker, her father, or herself to get in trouble. The next day, Gibbs filed a report with Mariposa County Sheriff's Sergeant Wes Smith.
On June 30, 2016, Y.D. was interviewed by a victim witness coordinator. Y.D. told the coordinator she and her sister would see Parker every weekend and that he would take care of them when their father was gone. Parker would watch a movie with Y.D. and her sister and then sleep with them, which scared Y.D. because Parker would rub her "privates," i.e., her "butt" and "pee-pee," over her nightgown with his hand. Sometimes he would also rub her privates in the morning. Other times Parker would ask Y.D. if she wanted him to touch her and even though she would tell him no, he would touch her privates anyway. Y.D. further stated that Parker began touching her about a year earlier, the touching occurred on weekends, and he always touched her over her clothes. Parker would tell Y.D. not to tell anybody or he would get in big trouble.
On May 14, 2017, during an interview by Smith, Y.D. stated that Parker touched her almost every weekend, that the touching occurred for about a school year, and she reiterated that Parker always touched her over her clothes. When asked to describe how Parker touched her, Y.D. demonstrated by moving her hand with an open palm over the vaginal area of "an image."
During the trial, Y.D. testified that on most weekends when Parker babysat her and her sister, he would touch her "butt" and "pee-pee" with his hand and move it up and down. The touching began in September or October 2015 and continued until sometime in May 2016. Parker did not touch Y.D. after she spoke with her mother in June 2016.
Parker testified and denied molesting Y.D. He considered Y.D. an honest and honorable child, but he could not explain why she accused him of molesting her. Parker's Probation Report and Sentencing
On October 10, 2017, the probation department filed an amended probation report that appears to be identical to the original report it prepared, except that the amended report corrected an error in the calculation of Parker's entitlement to presentence custody credit. For the sake of simplicity, we refer to the amended probation report as the "probation report."
Parker's probation report indicated that he began using drugs at age 12, he was under the influence of methamphetamine and alcohol when he committed the underlying offense, and when he was arrested on May 9, 2017, he was using those drugs almost daily and marijuana sporadically.
During the trial, Belcher testified that, after finding a methamphetamine pipe in Parker's bag on multiple occasions, he told Parker he did not want drugs in his home around his children.
Parker's probation report also indicated that Parker had several misdemeanor convictions. In 2011, Parker was convicted of driving with a blood-alcohol content of 0.08 percent or greater (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)) and placed on five years' probation. In 2012, while on probation, Parker was convicted of driving while his driving privilege was suspended (Veh. Code, §14601.5, subd. (a)) and violating a promise to appear in court (§ 853.7). In 2015, while still on probation, Parker was convicted of trespass with a vehicle (§ 602, subd. (n)) and possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364) and placed on three years' probation in those two cases. The report indicated Parker did not successfully complete his probation for the 2015 cases and he violated his probation in those cases four times.
The report noted that Parker was eligible for probation under special circumstances (§ 1203.067, subd. (a)). However, it concluded there were no circumstances under the California Rules of Court that supported a grant of probation and it cited the following circumstances in recommending the court deny Parker probation: (1) The victim was particularly vulnerable (rule 4.414 (a)(3)); (2) Parker was an active participant in the offense (rule 4.414(a)(6)); (3) the manner in which the crime was carried out demonstrated criminal sophistication or professionalism (rule 4.414(a)(8)); (4) Parker took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the crime (rule 4.414(a)(9)); (5) his prior record of criminal conduct as an adult, including the recency and frequency of prior crimes indicated a pattern of regular or increasingly serious criminal conduct (rule 4.414(b)(1)); (6) Parker's prior performance on probation or parole was unsatisfactory and he was on misdemeanor probation when he committed the underlying offense (rule 4.414(b)(2)); and (7) due to his history of alcohol and substance abuse and past performance on probation he did not have the ability to comply with the reasonable terms of probation (rule 4.414(b)(4)).
All references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
The probation report did not find any mitigating circumstances under rule 4.423, which lists mitigating circumstances the court may consider in deciding what term to impose. It cited the following aggravating circumstances under rule 4.421 in recommending the court impose the aggravated term: (1) the victim was particularly vulnerable (rule 4.421(a)(3)); (2) the manner in which the crime was carried out indicated planning, sophistication, or professionalism (rule 4.421(a)(8)); (3) Parker took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the offense (rule 4.421(a)(11)); (4) his prior convictions as an adult were numerous or of increasing seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)); (5) Parker was on probation when the crime was committed (rule 4.421(b)(4)); and (6) Parker's prior performance on probation was unsatisfactory (rule 4.421(b)(5)).
On September 18, 2017, defense counsel filed a sentencing memorandum that purported to correct errors in the probation report, discussed mitigating factors, and had attached to it numerous letters in support of Parker.
On October 10, 2017, prior to sentencing Parker, the court noted that it had read the probation report, the defense's sentencing memorandum, and a statement in aggravation filed by the prosecutor. The court then stated,
"I would agree with the People in—this was a very sophisticated and ongoing criminal injury, in that Mr. Parker would indicate to the victim, 'Don't tell anybody.' [¶] It seemed to be an ongoing type of process whenever he would take the actions that he was taking. He took advantage of a position that he had been placed in, a position of trust by the victim's father, and frankly, he betrayed his best friend. And that has affected the relationship between the victim and her father. It's going to have to be rebuilt. But the bottom line is that the defendant took this child's innocence. [¶] It doesn't make any difference, frankly, when it comes to the bottom line of what the action was. Frankly, it's what the results of the action are. I find this to be an extremely serious situation, ...."
Without any further discussion or mention of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the court adopted the probation department's findings and recommendations and sentenced Parker to the aggravated prison term of 16 years.
DISCUSSION
The Sufficiency of the Evidence
Section 288.5, subdivision (a) provides:
"Any person who either resides in the same home with the minor child or has recurring access to the child, who over a period of time, not less than three months in duration, engages in three or more acts of substantial sexual conduct with a child under the age of 14 years at the time of the commission of the offense, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1203 .066, or three or more acts of lewd or lascivious conduct, as defined in Section 288, with a child under the age of 14 years at the time of the commission of the offense is guilty of the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 6, 12, or 16 years." (Italics added.)
Section 1203.066, subdivision (b) provides:
" 'Substantial sexual conduct' means penetration of the vagina or rectum of either the victim or the offender by the penis of the other or by any foreign object, oral copulation, or masturbation of either the victim or the offender." (Italics added.)
Parker contends the evidence failed to prove he engaged in masturbation or any other substantial sexual conduct with the victim because it showed only that he rubbed the face of his palms on her vagina over her clothes. He further contends the evidence failed to establish he committed the acts in violation of section 288 because there was no substantial evidence that when he touched Y.D. he had the specific intent to sexually arouse himself or the victim. Thus, according to Parker, the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for the continuous sexual abuse of a child. We disagree.
" ' "In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the question we ask is 'whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' " [Citation.] We apply an identical standard under the California Constitution. [Citation.] "In determining whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellate court 'must view the evidence in a light most favorable to respondent and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.' " [Citation.] The same standard also applies in cases in which the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.]' [Citation.]
"We therefore review the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether the challenged convictions are supported by substantial evidence, meaning 'evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value.' [Citation.] In contrast, 'mere speculation cannot support a conviction. [Citations.]' [Citation.] 'In deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court resolves neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts. [Citation.] Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact. [Citation.] Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction. [Citation.]' " (People v. Mejia (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 86, 93.)
"Masturbation encompasses any touching or contact, however slight, of the genitals of the victim or the offender done with the intent to arouse the sexual desires of the victim or the offender." (People v. Dunn (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1086, 1098, fn. 8.) "Whether the genital touching occurs over clothing is not determinative. Masturbation as ... is commonly understood can occur under clothing and over clothing. (People v. Whitlock (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 456, 463.)
"To determine whether a defendant acted with sexual intent, all the circumstances are examined. Relevant factors include the nature and manner of the touching, the defendant's extrajudicial statements, the relationship of the parties and 'any coercion, bribery or deceit used to obtain the victim's cooperation or avoid detection.' [Citation.] The requisite intent 'must be inferred from all the circumstances .... A touching which might appear sexual in context because of the identity of the perpetrator, the nature of the touching, or the absence of an innocent explanation, is more likely to produce a finding that the act was indeed committed for a sexual purpose and constituted a violation of the statute.' " (In re R.C. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 741, 750.)
Over the course of approximately nine months, Parker would regularly rub his hand on Y.D.'s buttocks and vagina for no apparent reason other than personal self-gratification. Sometimes he would ask Y.D. if she wanted him to touch her, but even if she said no, he would touch her anyway. Parker only touched Y.D. while he was babysitting her and her sister and their father was not home, and he exhibited a consciousness of guilt when he repeatedly warned Y.D. not to tell anyone. Parker did not provide an explanation for his conduct, opting instead to deny it occurred. Even though the touching occurred over her clothing, the court could reasonably find from these circumstances that Parker engaged in substantial sexual conduct, i.e., masturbating the victim, over a period longer than three months with the requisite intent. Accordingly, we reject Parker's contention that the record does not support his conviction for the continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14.
The Denial of Probation and Imposition of the Aggravated Term
Legal Principles
Parker contends remand for resentencing is required because in denying him probation and imposing the aggravated term the court relied on erroneous aggravating circumstances and failed to consider or give sufficient weight to mitigating circumstances. We disagree and consider the circumstances at issue seriatim.
"Probation is not a matter of right but an act of clemency, the granting and revocation of which are entirely within the sound discretion of the trial court." (People v. Pinon (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 120, 123.) Rule 4.414 sets out some of the criteria the trial court may consider in exercising its discretion. But the trial court is not limited to those factors, and it may consider others not enumerated in the rules so long as the court states any additional criteria on the record. (Rule 4.408(a).) The criteria enumerated in the rules will be deemed to have been considered by the trial court "unless the record affirmatively reflects otherwise." (Rule 4.409.) "A defendant who is denied probation bears a heavy burden to show the trial court has abused its discretion." (People v. Mehserle (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1157.)
A trial court's exercise of its discretion in selecting a lower, middle, or upper term sentence under section 1170.1 is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) To determine the appropriate sentence, the trial court weighs the factors in aggravation, found in rule 4.421, against those in mitigation, found in rule 4.423. (See rule 4.420(b) [trial court may consider circumstances in aggravation and mitigation "and any other factor reasonably related to the sentencing decision"].) The relevant rules also permit the trial court to consider factors not specifically enumerated in rules 4.421 and 4.423. (Rules 4.408 & 4.420(b).) A single factor may be determinative in the sentencing decision. (People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 813 ["Under California's determinate sentencing system, the existence of a single aggravating circumstance is legally sufficient to make the defendant eligible for the upper term."]; People v. Forster (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1746, 1758 [a single factor is sufficient to justify the court's sentencing choice].)
As a reviewing court, we may not reweigh the sentencing factors or substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 355.) Instead, we limit our review to a single issue—"whether the sentencing court abused its statutory discretion." (People v. Jordan (1986) 42 Cal.3d 308, 317.) In the absence of a showing by Parker that the trial court's sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary, we must presume the trial court acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination will not be set aside on review. (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977-978.) The Sophistication and Professionalism of Parker's Offense
Parker contends the record does not support the court's reliance on the sophistication or professionalism of his offense (rules 4.414(a)(8) & 4.421(a)(8)) to deny probation and impose the aggravated term because his offense was a crime of opportunity. However, Parker consistently sexually abused the victim for almost a year. He facilitated the abuse by ingratiating himself with the victim and her sister by showing them movies, which led to him sleeping with the girls, and placed him in a position where he could stealthily touch the victim. He also molested the victim only when her father was not home. Thus, the record supports the court's reliance on the professionalism and sophistication, as well as the planning (rule 4.421(a)(8)) of Parker's offense to deny probation and impose the aggravated term. (Cf. People v. Dancer (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1677, 1695, disapproved on other grounds by People v. Hammon (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1117 [defendant cultivating a trusting relationship with victim and repetition of abuse indicate planning and sophistication].) Comparison to Other Instances of the Same Crime
In People v. Charron (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 981, the court "observed that '[the] essence of "aggravation" relates to the effect of a particular fact in making the offense distinctively worse than the ordinary.' " (Id. at p. 994.) Parker cites Charron to contend the court erred in imposing the aggravated term because " '[t]here are more egregious fact patterns in these types of cases.' " There is no merit to this contention.
Rule 4.421 allows the court to consider certain specified, aggravating circumstances in its decision of which term to impose. (Rule 4.420(b).) The presence of an aggravating circumstance is what makes a case distinctively worse than one in which the circumstance is not present. Further, the court's reliance on an aggravating circumstance to impose the aggravated term will be upheld on appeal if the circumstance is supported by substantial evidence (cf. People v. Searle (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1091, 1096) and, as noted above, only one aggravating circumstance is necessary to justify the aggravated term.
In the previous section, we determined that substantial evidence supports the court's reliance on at least one aggravating circumstance. Thus, just because Parker's offense did not involve more heinous conduct does not mean the court erred in imposing the aggravated term. The Ongoing Injury to Y.D.
Rule 4.414(a)(4) allows the court to consider in its decision to grant or deny probation, "[w]hether the defendant inflicted physical or emotional injury[.]" Parker contends the court improperly relied on this criteria to deny probation and/or impose the aggravated term because there was no evidence he inflicted physical or emotional injury on Y.D. Parker is wrong.
Parker's contention is based on the court's statement during sentencing that it agreed with the prosecutor that Parker's offense "was a very sophisticated and ongoing criminal injury, in that ... Parker would indicate to the victim, 'Don't tell anybody.' " The court's statement referred to the ongoing incidents of sexual abuse of the victim by Parker and the emotional impact those incidents and his implied threats had on her. The court could reasonably surmise from the nature of the abuse and the victim's statements and testimony that each act of abuse caused her substantial psychological trauma that was exacerbated by the fear engendered by Parker telling her that bad things would happen if she disclosed the abuse. The court could also consider the additional psychological trauma Y.D. must have endured having to recount and relive the abuse during her interviews and through her testimony. Thus, we reject Parker's contention that the court erred in relying on the criteria in rule 4.414(a)(4) in denying him probation and imposing the aggravated term. Parker's Criminal History , Probationary Status and Unsatisfactory Performance on Probation
Parker had five prior convictions, he was on probation when he committed the underlying offense, and he violated his probation on numerous occasions. Nevertheless, Parker contends the court improperly relied on his criminal history (rules 4.414(b)(1) & 4.421(b)(2)), prior unsatisfactory performance on probation (rules 4.414(b)(2) & 4.421(b)(5)), and probationary status (rules 4.414(b)(2) & 4.421(b)(4)) in sentencing him because all his prior convictions were misdemeanors and he successfully completed three grants of probation.
The rules cited above do not limit their application to felony convictions. Thus, the court did not err in finding aggravating circumstances based on Parker's misdemeanor convictions or his probationary status for those convictions. Further, Parker's five prior misdemeanor convictions were numerous and of increasing seriousness within the meaning of rules 4.414(b)(1)) and 4.421(b)(2). (People v. Searle, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 1098 [trial court did not err in finding defendant's prior convictions were numerous and of increasing seriousness within the meaning of rule 4.421(b)(2) based on defendant's three prior convictions for driving while intoxicated and current conviction for sale of cocaine].) Moreover, the record negates Parker's claim that he successfully completed three grants of probation because his probation report shows that of three such grants, he completed only one grant without reoffending and he violated grants of probation on several occasions. The Vulnerability of the Victim
Parker contends the court improperly relied on the vulnerability of the victim (rule 4.421(a)(3)) to impose the aggravated term because the court relied on the victim's age, which is an element of the offense, to find her vulnerable.
"As used in the context of rule 4.421(a)(3), a 'particularly vulnerable' victim is one who is vulnerable 'in a special or unusual degree, to an extent greater than in other cases. Vulnerability means defenseless, unguarded, unprotected, accessible, assailable, one who is susceptible to the defendant's criminal act ....' " (People v. Bloom (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 310, 321.)
The court did not indicate what facts it relied on to conclude the victim was particularly vulnerable. However, it could reasonably have found she was particularly vulnerable when Parker sexually abused her because the abuse occurred when the victim and her sister were alone at home with Parker and it generally occurred at night when any protestations by the victim were less likely to be heard by someone who could assist her. (Cf. People v. Hawk (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 938, 941 [court found victim of sexual assault was particularly vulnerable based, in part, on victim being alone in apartment when assault occurred].) Thus, the court's reliance on this circumstance in its sentencing decision is also supported by the record. Violation of a Position of Trust
Rule 4.414(a)(9) allows the court to consider in its decision to grant or deny probation whether defendant took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the underlying offense. Parker contends the statutory scheme contemplates that adults living in the household are presumed to have held a position of trust in committing the offense of the continuous sexual abuse of a child. Thus, according to Parker, the court erred when it relied on the "violation of a position of trust" criteria of rule 4.414(a)(9) because that criteria cannot be used to deny probation when a person living in the household stands convicted of violating section 288.5, subdivision (a).
Parker cites no authority in support of this contention. However, even if Parker's assertion regarding the statutory scheme were a correct statement of law, it would not preclude the court here from relying on rule 4.414(a)(9) to deny him probation. Parker was more than an adult living in the same household as the victim. He also was entrusted to babysit the victim and her sister while their father worked, and he violated that position of trust when he sexually abused the victim. Thus, even without considering Parker's status as a resident in the victim's household, the record supports the court's reliance on Parker having violated a position of trust to deny him probation and impose the aggravated term. The Alleged Failure to Consider Mitigating Circumstances
Parker contends that the court failed to properly consider the following mitigating circumstances: (1) he had strong ties to the community; (2) he had two children, a disabled father, and an elderly grandmother who depended on him; (3) his offense did not involve violence or a weapon; (4) his victim did not suffer any injuries; (5) he had substance abuse issues that potentially contributed to his commission of the underlying offense; (6) he did not have any mental or physical issues; (7) he had employment and family support to assist him in rehabilitating himself, and; (8) he was willing to comply with the supervision conditions of probation. Parker is wrong.
"Sentencing courts have wide discretion in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors. [Citation.] Indeed, a trial court may 'minimize or even entirely disregard mitigating factors without stating its reasons.' " (People v. Lai (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1227, 1258.) The court is not required to review in detail each of the mitigating factors upon which the defendant relies. It can reject all mitigating factors without explanation. (See People v. Avalos (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1583 [court need not explain its reasons for rejecting mitigating factors].) " 'Further, unless the record affirmatively indicates otherwise, the trial court is deemed to have considered all relevant criteria, including any mitigating factors.' " (People v. King (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1322, fn. omitted.) Thus, the court's failure to discuss or mention the above circumstances when it sentenced Parker does not mean that it failed to consider them in its sentencing decision. In any case, it is clear the court considered the circumstances noted above because they were included in the probation report and/or the defense's sentencing memorandum and attached letters the court read and considered before sentencing Parker.
Moreover, some of the circumstances Parker cites as mitigating clearly are not supported by the evidence. For example, Parker's claim that he was willing to comply with the supervision conditions of probation is belied by his previous unsatisfactory performance on probation. And, although the victim did not suffer physical injury, she suffered substantial psychological injury. Further, none of the above circumstances are so compelling that they mandate a conclusion that the court abused its discretion by its failure to find they were mitigating under the circumstances of Parker's offense. Conclusion
The court adopted the findings and conclusions of the probation report, which found seven circumstances that favored a denial of probation and none that favored a grant. The report also found six aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances. Parker has not demonstrated that the court erred by relying on any of these circumstances in its sentencing decision. Thus, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Parker probation and sentenced him to the aggravated term.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.