Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. 209049.
Kline, P.J.
Appellant Jean Louis Ouattara appeals from a judgment entered on his plea of guilty to the felony charge of transporting cocaine. His court-appointed attorney has filed a brief raising no issues and asking this court to independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.)
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
On March 3, 2008, appellant sold $40 of suspected crack cocaine to an undercover officer in a “buy bust” operation in the Mission District of San Francisco. Two days later, the district attorney filed a complaint charging appellant with one felony count of transporting cocaine in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11352, subdivision (a). The complaint also alleged appellant was ineligible for probation. (Pen. Code, § 1203.073, subd. (b)(7).)
These facts are from the presentence report, which the parties stipulated could be used as the factual basis for appellant’s guilty plea.
On April 25, 2008, as part of a negotiated disposition, appellant entered a guilty plea to the charge with the understanding that entry of judgment would be deferred pending appellant’s completion of the Back on Track program, the San Francisco District Attorney’s program for first time drug offenders. The terms of the plea agreement provided that, if appellant were to successfully complete the Back on Track program, the case against him would be dismissed. If he did not successfully complete the program, however, imposition of sentence would be suspended and appellant would be placed on three years’ supervised probation. Before accepting the plea, the court accepted appellant’s oral waiver of his Boykin/Tahl rights, and confirmed that he understood and voluntarily accepted the terms and conditions of his plea.
Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122.
On August 25, 2009-at which time appellant had been participating in the Back on Track program for about 14 months-the program suspended services to him, and the district attorney subsequently filed a report requesting that he be terminated.
The facts relating to the termination emerged at a contested hearing on the request to terminate: On the morning of August 18, 2009, appellant had a 10:00 a.m. appointment with Rosalinda De la Rosa, an employment specialist at the Back on Track program. Ms. De la Rosa asked an intern to tell appellant she was running late due to another meeting. When the intern returned and told Ms. De la Rosa appellant was anxious, she left a meeting to tell appellant herself that she was behind her schedule. Appellant told her he had another appointment, but did not say with whom. Because she felt appellant was becoming combative, Ms. De la Rosa sought the assistance of her supervisor, Joanna Hernandez. When Ms. Hernandez attempted to calm appellant down, he called her a “Ghetto ass chick” and “fucking bitch.” As a result of this incident, Ms. Hernandez and Ms. De la Rosa felt unable to work with appellant.
Appellant described a different version of the encounter. He arrived about five minutes late for his appointment and asked the intern at the desk whether Ms. De la Rosa was available and the intern left to see. Ms. De la Rosa then appeared, seeming irritated about appellant’s inquiry about her availability. Because it was then 10:30 a.m., and he had another appointment, he asked how long it would take Ms. De la Rosa to see him, so he could reschedule his other appointment. He refused to tell her about the nature of his other appointment because it was a personal matter. At that point, Ms. Hernandez appeared. When appellant asked her when Ms. De la Rosa’s other meeting would end, Ms. Hernandez answered: “that’s not the point. You are going to have to wait or just leave.” She also threatened to call security. Surprised by this response, appellant called her a “Ghetto ass chick” and expressed that he believed she was being “unprofessional.” Appellant acknowledged that under the terms of his contract with the Back on Track program, he was required to be respectful to Back on Track staff.
At the conclusion of the hearing, on the district attorney’s request to terminate appellant from the Back on Track program, the court terminated appellant. The court also denied appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
At the December 3, 2009 sentencing hearing, the court adhered to the terms of the plea agreement and the recommendations of the probation department. The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed appellant on three years’ supervised probation. As a condition of probation, appellant was ordered to serve four days in county jail (with four days of credit for time served). The court also imposed a fine of $500, assessments in the total amount of $1,400 (Pen. Code, § 672), a $200 restitution fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.4), a $30 court security fee (Pen. Code, § 1465.8), a $30 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373), a probation supervision fee of up to $50 per month (Pen. Code, § 1203.1b), up to $50 per month in probation costs (ibid.), a $150 presentence probation report fee (ibid.), a $135 booking fee (Gov. Code, § 29550.3), a $50 drug lab fee and related assessments (Health & Saf. Code, § 11372.5), and an own recognizance administrative screening fee of $25 (Pen. Code, § 1463.07). The court suspended imposition of a $200 probation revocation fine. (Pen. Code, § 1202.44).
Appellant filed timely notice of this appeal on December 17, 2009.
DISCUSSION
Appellant’s notice of appeal seeks to raise issues challenging the validity of the plea, as well as issues arising after the plea that do not challenge the plea’s validity. However, the trial court denied appellant’s request for a certificate of probable cause. For that reason, and also because the appeal is not based on the denial of a motion to suppress under Penal Code section 1538.5, we may not consider any issue affecting the validity of appellant’s plea; the only issues we may consider are those that would not require a certificate of probable cause. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b).)
Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that there are no such issues.
Nothing in the record suggests appellant may not be competent to stand trial.
Appellant was at all times represented by competent counsel who protected his rights and interests.
The sentence imposed is authorized by law and conforms to that specified in the plea agreement.
Accordingly, our independent review discloses no arguable issue requiring further briefing.
DISPOSITION
The judgment and sentence imposed are affirmed.
We concur: Haerle, J., Lambden, J.