Opinion
A099090.
7-11-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GREGORY JOSEPH OTT, Defendant and Appellant.
On December 6, 2001, the Napa County District Attorneys Office filed a criminal complaint charging Gregory Joseph Ott with grand theft auto and the unlawful taking of a vehicle and alleging three prior felony convictions (two of which were strike felonies). The complaint alleged Ott was convicted in September 1993 of distributing a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379) and was convicted in November 1995 of attempted arson (Pen. Code, § 455). Ott was arrested on December 24, 2001 and released on his own recognizance two days later.
On December 31, 2001, the Napa County District Attorney filed two more criminal complaints against Ott alleging he had had failed to register as a narcotics offender (Health & Saf. Code, § 11594) and failed to register as an arsonist (Pen. Code, § 457.1). The complaints each alleged: "On or about October 11, 2001 in the County of Napa, State of California, it was discovered that, on or about October 30, 200 [sic], the crimes of [failure to register as a narcotics offender and failure to register as an arsonist were] committed by GREGORY JOSEPH OTT, who did unlawfully provide false information, to wit, an address that was not his, upon a form he was required to file pursuant to [Health and Safety Code section 11590 and Penal Code section 457.1]." Warrants were issued for Otts arrest.
On January 18, 2002, Ott came to court for a preliminary hearing in the auto theft case. Napa Police Officer Richard Pharo was present at the courthouse and learned from another officer that warrants had been issued for Otts arrest. Officer Pharo called the police dispatcher and confirmed the existence of the warrants, and he placed Ott under arrest at the conclusion of Otts preliminary hearing. Officers searched Ott during the arrest and found methamphetamine in his wallet, folded inside a dollar bill. The district attorney then charged Ott with possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), with allegations of prior convictions and an on-bail enhancement.
Ott filed a motion to suppress evidence of the drugs found during his arrest. He argued the arrest warrants were defective because they were issued on complaints alleging charges that were barred by applicable statutes of limitation. Although a typographical error made it unclear when the crimes were allegedly committed-i.e., the complaints stated that a false address was given "on or about October 30, 200 [sic]"-Ott argued this date could logically be read only as October 30, 2000. Because the district attorney did not file the complaints until after December 31, 2001, Ott argued the cases were barred by the one-year statute of limitation applicable to misdemeanor offenses. (Pen. Code, § 802, subd. (a).) While acknowledging the complaints contained a typographical mistake, the prosecution argued the mistake did not invalidate the arrest warrants because, had Ott demurred, the district attorney could have filed amendments to correct the unclear date. Moreover, assuming the warrants were invalid, the prosecution argued exclusion of the evidence seized was not required because the arresting officers acted in good faith. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court concluded the magistrate did not err in signing the arrest warrants because the complaints were facially valid (in that the only complete date they alleged, October 11, 2001, was within the statute of limitations) and the police officers acted in good faith in executing the warrants.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ott pleaded no contest to unlawful taking of a vehicle and possession of methamphetamine. As to the first charge, he admitted one prior strike conviction; as to the second charge, he admitted the on-bail enhancement, three prior prison terms and one prior strike conviction. All other charges and allegations were dismissed. Ott was sentenced, in accordance with the agreement, to 12 years 4 months imprisonment.
DISCUSSION
Ott renews his challenge to the arrest warrants on appeal. He again claims the complaints upon which the arrest warrants were based were invalid, and he argues the exclusionary rule should apply-despite the police officers good faith-because the complaints invalidity was so striking that the magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial function in issuing the warrants. We need not address the first argument, because even if the warrants were technically invalid due to the confused wording of the complaints, the evidence is clearly admissible under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
In United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 104 S. Ct. 3405, the Supreme Court held the exclusionary rule does not bar the admission of evidence obtained when a police officer reasonably relies in good faith on a search warrant that was issued by a detached, neutral magistrate but later found to be defective. For the exception to apply, "the officers reliance on the magistrates probable-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must be objectively reasonable . . . ."(id. at p. 922); thus, the question is "whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrates authorization." (Id. at p. 922, fn. 23.) The court observed an officer would not "manifest objective good faith in relying on a warrant based on an affidavit `so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 923.) Moreover, the court held suppression remains an appropriate remedy despite an officers good faith in executing a warrant if the magistrate was misled by statements the affiant knew or should have known were false (see Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667, 98 S. Ct. 2674), or if the magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role, "acting not as a judicial officer but as an adjunct law enforcement officer" (Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York (1979) 442 U.S. 319, 327, 60 L. Ed. 2d 920, 99 S. Ct. 2319). (United States v. Leon , supra, at p. 923.)
Ott conflates two of the exceptions discussed in Leon when he argues: "In this case, the complaint with its typos, confusing language, and lack of supporting information for the bold assertions made by the district attorney was so lacking in indicia of probable cause, that the magistrate abandoned its judicial function and had no business issuing the warrant here." First, it is important to note Ott does not challenge the objective good faith of the arresting officer. Indeed, Otts trial attorney conceded she "[could not] find fault with a single thing [Officer Pharo] did." Otts entire argument rests on an assertion that the magistrate signed warrants without demanding a sufficient showing of probable cause. But "the exclusionary rule was adopted to deter unlawful searches by police, not to punish the errors of magistrates and judges." (Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 263, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (conc. opn. of White, J.).) Under Leon, "the only conduct of a magistrate, as distinguished from that of a police affiant, which is egregious enough to trigger suppression is the shedding of his mantle of neutrality and assumption of the role of an `adjunct law enforcement officer, conduct denounced in Lo-Ji Sales Inc. v. New York, supra, 442 U.S. 319." (People v. Wilson (1986) 182 Cal. App. 3d 742, 753, 227 Cal. Rptr. 528.)
In any case, even assuming a magistrates improper reliance on a "bare bones" affidavit might be sufficient to exclude evidence seized pursuant to a warrant, the criminal complaints in this case were not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to raise a question of the magistrates neutrality in issuing arrest warrants. In general, a magistrate must issue an arrest warrant when presented with a misdemeanor complaint if: (1) the magistrate is satisfied from the complaint that a crime was committed, and (2) there is reasonable ground to believe the defendant committed it. (Pen. Code, § 1427, subd. (a).) The complaints here alleged Ott violated Health and Safety Code section 11590 and Penal Code section 457.1 because he provided a false address on forms he was required to file. We disagree with Otts assertion that these complaints merely recited statutory language. The offenses of failing to register are very simple in nature, and the complaints alleged Ott violated them by filing registration forms that stated a false address. The confusion the typographical error may have created as to the date when Ott committed the offenses was not such a serious error that "`it is plainly evident that a magistrate or judge had no business issuing a warrant. [Citation.]" (Massachusetts v. Sheppard (1984) 468 U.S. 981, 990 fn. 7, 82 L. Ed. 2d 737, 104 S. Ct. 3424.)
DISPOSITION
Judgment affirmed.
We concur: McGuiness, P. J., and Pollak, J. --------------- Notes: For some reason, the warrants themselves are not included in the appellate record. Nevertheless, because Otts arguments concern purported defects in the December 31 criminal complaints (and not the warrants, per se), the absence of these warrants does not preclude our consideration of the merits of the appeal.