Opinion
June 13, 1988
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Feldman, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing him to represent himself during the preliminary hearings and at trial. The record, however, establishes that the defendant made a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel while in the presence of his assigned counsel (see, People v McIntyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10; cf., People v Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479).
The trial court's admonitions to the defendant during the trial, most of which were made out of the presence of the jury, were limited to clarification of issues and exclusion of irrelevant considerations (see, People v Hazen, 94 A.D.2d 905), which under the circumstances was entirely appropriate. "To accept a defendant's lack of knowledge of legal principles and rules of law or his unfamiliarity with courtroom procedures as the ground for concluding that he is not qualified to represent himself would in effect be to eviscerate the constitutional right of self-representation" (People v Davis, 49 N.Y.2d 114, 120, appeal after remand 91 A.D.2d 948).
Finally, the defendant contends that the complaining witness should not have been believed because she was granted immunity from prosecution for lying about the amount of money that was taken. However, resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented are primarily questions to be determined by the jury, which saw and heard the witnesses (see, People v Gaimari, 176 N.Y. 84, 94). Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see, People v Garafolo, 44 A.D.2d 86, 88). Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15). Thompson, J.P., Brown, Weinstein and Rubin, JJ., concur.