Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, No. SCD211717, Margie G. Woods, Judge.
HALLER, Acting P. J.
Johnny Norton appeals from a judgment convicting him of several counts of assault, battery, vandalism, and criminal threats. He argues the trial court erred by (1) admitting evidence of his uncharged misconduct, and (2) instructing the jury on consciousness of guilt based on flight. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Norton committed the charged offenses against Oluwaseun Kuyoro during a 20-month period of time when Kuyoro was dating Norton's former girlfriend, Adsia Casey. Norton and Casey began dating in 1998; they were in a relationship for two or three years and have a son together. After they ended their relationship, they repeatedly got back together and then broke up again. The prosecution's evidence showed that Norton committed the charged offenses in 2006 and 2007 because he was angry that Casey was dating other people.
The charged offenses consisted of: (1) felony vandalism of Kuyoro's car with a "car club" locking device in April 2006; (2) assault with a deadly weapon of Kuyoro (with jumper cables) in April or May 2007; (3) misdemeanor battery (kicking of Kuyoro), criminal threats, and misdemeanor vandalism (of Kuyoro's cell phone) during an incident with Kuyoro outside Casey's home in April or May 2007; (4) criminal threats during a phone call to Kuyoro in July 2007; and (5) assault with a deadly weapon of Kuyoro (with a car and a car club), felony vandalism of Kuyoro's car (with the car club), and criminal threats during an incident in December 2007. The jury found Norton guilty of the charged offenses, except for the jumper cable assault, the cell phone vandalism, and the phone call criminal threats. Based on the substantive counts and several enhancements (i.e., personal use of a deadly weapon and a strike and serious felony prior conviction), he was sentenced to 19 years 4 months in prison.
We summarize the relevant incidents.
April 2006 Vandalism of Kuyoro's Car with Car Club
The first offense occurred on April 2, 2006, when Kuyoro drove Casey home in the early morning hours after they met at the club where Kuyoro worked. As they approached Casey's street, they saw Norton running towards Kuyoro's car. Casey knew there was going to be a problem, so she told Kuyoro to keep driving, explaining that Norton was her "baby's daddy." Kuyoro made a U-turn. Norton ran to his car and followed Kuyoro. Norton drove next to the passenger side of Kuyoro's car and repeatedly hit the car with a car club. As Kuyoro made a quick U-turn, Norton again tried to hit Kuyoro's car and Norton either dropped or threw the club. Casey or Kuyoro called 911. The police found the car club in the middle of the street where the incident occurred. Norton damaged the windshield, side mirror, and door of Kuyoro's car; the repair cost was $1,700.
2007 Assault with Jumper Cables (Acquittal)
We summarize the facts of this incident even though the jury found Norton not guilty of this assault. The offense is relevant to Norton's claim that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on consciousness of guilt based on flight.
The jumper cable assault incident was alleged to have occurred at about 11:30 p.m. in April or May 2007 when Casey's car broke down on her way home from work. Kuyoro arrived at the scene to assist Casey. As Kuyoro was helping Casey with her car, Norton drove up.
According to Kuyoro, Casey called him (Kuyoro) to come help. Casey testified that she called Norton to come assist her because he was a tow truck driver; that she did not call Kuyoro; and that Kuyoro happened to be driving by when he saw her and stopped to help.
According to Kuyoro, Norton ran towards Kuyoro, saying (apparently to Casey) " 'how you going to call this nigger while I'm here.... What can this nigger do for you?' " Norton picked up jumper cables that were on the ground and swung them at Kuyoro, hitting him in the head. Kuyoro was able to grab the cables and drop them to the ground. The two men fought, with Kuyoro trying to get away. According to Casey, Norton spoke to Kuyoro in an angry tone, and then the two men started fighting. She stated that during the fight she was trying to remove the jumper cables that were attached to the car batteries.
To try to stop the fight, Casey stated she was going to call the police, and she started dialing a few numbers on a cell phone. When Casey did this, Norton stopped fighting. Norton told Kuyoro that he was going to "get" him again and it was not over, and left in his car. Casey convinced Kuyoro not to call the police because she did not want to tell her son that she sent his father to jail.
2007 Kicking Incident and Criminal Threats
Another incident occurred in front of Casey's residence in April or May 2007. One night Casey had invited Kuyoro to come to her home after he got off work. Sometime after 10:00 p.m. when Kuyoro knocked on her door, no one answered. As Kuyoro was walking back to his car, the door opened and Norton ran out towards Kuyoro. Kuyoro tried to run away, but he tripped and fell. Norton kicked him several times, saying, "Didn't I tell you nigger.... Didn't I tell you stop fucking with my baby's mom.... [Y]ou're nothing but a trick"; "[L]eave her alone. Is she worth dying for... ?"
Kuyoro was able to run away, and as he did so, he dropped his cell phone. Norton grabbed the cell phone and threw it on the ground, causing it to break into pieces. Norton chased Kuyoro until Kuyoro ran to the other side of the building. Norton told Kuyoro that he was going to get him again and it was not over, and then returned to Casey's home. Kuyoro tried to pick up his cell phone pieces, and then left in his car. Kuyoro did not contact the police because he wanted to maintain his relationship with Casey. The assault caused Kuyoro to suffer body aches, bruises, and scratches.
The jury acquitted Norton of misdemeanor vandalism of the cell phone.
December 2007 Assaults, Vandalism, and Criminal Threats
Kuyoro also described a telephone call on July 15, 2007, during which Norton threatened to kill him. We need not summarize this testimony because the jury acquitted Norton of the criminal threat count related to this incident.
The final incident occurred at about 6:00 a.m. on December 11, 2007, when Kuyoro was driving home after dropping Casey off at her home. The incident was described at trial by Kuyoro and two eyewitnesses, a city bus driver (Thomas Graham) and another motorist (Aldo Ramirez). As Kuyoro was driving, Norton rear-ended Kuyoro's car with his car. Kuyoro stepped on the gas and "took off, " but Norton followed after him. When Kuyoro had to stop at a red light, Norton again rear-ended Kuyoro's car. While the light was still red, Norton got out of his vehicle and repeatedly kicked the driver's side door of Kuyoro's car. Norton went back to his car, retrieved a car club, and then hit the windshield and driver's side window of Kuyoro's car with the club.
Norton called Kuyoro a "bitch nigger" because Kuyoro did not get out of the car; Norton said that Kuyoro did not listen and Kuyoro had not learned his lesson yet; and Norton asked whether he had to actually kill Kuyoro for Kuyoro to realize Casey was not worth dying for. Norton broke the driver's side window of Kuyoro's car with the club, and then started hitting Kuyoro with the club. Kuyoro used his arm to protect his head from the blows.
Graham testified that he heard Norton use profanity and say, " 'You hit my car. Get out of the car.' "
When the light turned green, Kuyoro started driving, and Norton continued following him in his car. Kuyoro called 911 on his cell phone and received directions to a nearby police station. Just before the freeway, Norton turned onto a street. Kuyoro got on the freeway, and then exited and went to the police station. Kuyoro reported the incident to the police because he had decided this was the last time he would keep his "mouth shut" and he felt his life was in danger.
Kuyoro was hit on his shoulder, head, and arm, and he suffered bruises on his arm. He treated himself with painkillers. The damage to his car included dents to the bumper area from being rear-ended, dents to the door from the kicking, and a cracked windshield, shattered window, and chipped steering wheel from the blows with the club. Kuyoro paid about $3,900 to repair his car.
Corroborating Kuyoro's claim that Norton was the person who hit his car, Graham identified Norton in a photographic lineup and at trial. On January 8, 2008, the police went to Casey's home, where they found a Buick belonging to Norton. The Buick had damage to the front fender and head lamp, and matched the description of the vehicle involved in the incident provided to the police. At trial, Graham identified a photograph of Norton's Buick as the suspect vehicle. After the police towed the Buick, they received a voicemail from Norton inquiring why they towed his car.
Consistent with Norton's car, the witnesses described the suspect car as a white Buick with 20-inch chrome rims, no license plate, a permit sticker in the back window, and damage to the front light from the incident.
Norton was arrested on March 7, 2008, and agreed to speak with Detective Gregory Myers. Norton stated he was not involved in the December 11 incident. However, Norton admitted that in May or June 2007, after hearing a noise outside Casey's residence, he chased Kuyoro and beat him up, and he believed he "knocked him unconscious." Further, Norton told Myers that in the summer of 2007 when Kuyoro knocked on Casey's door, he beat and kicked Kuyoro. Norton stated that in October 2007 he again tried to assault Kuyoro when he saw Kuyoro driving in a car, but he could not do so because the car door was locked. Norton told Myers, " 'This guy has got his ass beat by me so many times. Why does he keep coming back for more?' "
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence
As we shall detail below, the prosecution also introduced evidence about several instances of Norton's prior misconduct during which Norton engaged in violence because of his anger over Casey dating other men, including assaultive and threatening conduct towards Casey in 2004 and assault on a man she was dating in 2005. The evidence was admitted to show Norton's identity, intent, common plan, and motive during the charged offenses.
Defense
Testifying on his own behalf, Norton gave his version of the alleged incidents. He stated it did not bother him that Casey was dating other men. Concerning the 2006 incident when he hit Kuyoro's car with a club, Norton testified that Casey and a friend had slashed the tires of his truck, and Casey called him and "taunt[ed]" him on the phone. He drove his car to her residence to discuss the situation. When he saw Casey passing by in a car, he followed the vehicle, blowing his horn and flashing his lights to get them to stop. He passed them, and then stopped his car in the middle of the street. He got out of his car and told them to stop and get out. When they did not stop, he threw the club at their car.
Regarding the alleged jumper cable assault in 2007, Norton testified that when he arrived to help Casey with her car, he and Kuyoro got into a fight. During the fight, he told Kuyoro he was going to "kick [his] ass." He stated the jumper cables were attached to the cars and he did not use them during the fight.
With respect to the kicking and threats incident outside Casey's home in 2007, Norton claimed that he went outside wearing his underwear and socks and when Kuyoro tripped and fell, he kicked Kuyoro one time. Norton threw Kuyoro's shoe at him, but did not do anything with his cell phone.
Norton denied that he ever threatened Kuyoro or called him on the phone. He also denied that he made the admissions to Detective Myers regarding his assaults of Kuyoro.
Concerning the December 11, 2007 incident, Norton presented an alibi defense, claiming he was out of town. He testified that during the last week of November 2007 his grandmother, who lived in Arkansas, fell and injured herself, and he made arrangements to go there and take care of her. He got a ride to Arkansas with a friend, and he arrived there before his mother's birthday on December 3. He flew back to San Diego on February 12, 2008. He testified that his Buick vehicle already had body damage when he purchased it.
Norton's wife (Monisha McNary) testified to corroborate Norton's alibi for the December 11 incident. McNary testified that Norton left town about December 1 or 2 to take care of his grandmother, and returned in mid-February just before Valentine's day.
DISCUSSION
I. Admission of Uncharged Misconduct
Norton asserts the trial court should have excluded the uncharged misconduct evidence under Evidence Code section 352 as more prejudicial than probative.
Background
Prior to trial, the prosecutor moved to admit evidence related to Norton's prior misconduct, including a restraining order obtained by Casey against Norton, incidents in 2004 when Norton choked and threatened Casey, and an incident in 2005 when Norton assaulted a man (Eddie Frierson) whom Casey was dating. The prosecutor contended that Norton had a pattern of following and harassing Casey and attacking anyone suspected of dating Casey, and the uncharged misconduct evidence was highly probative to prove such matters as identity, intent, motive, and common plan. Opposing admission of the evidence, defense counsel argued the prosecutor was trying to "demonize" Norton, and the court should exclude the evidence as more prejudicial than probative.
The trial court ruled in favor of the prosecution. At trial, the jury was presented with four evidentiary items of uncharged misconduct. First, Casey had a restraining order against Norton from May 2003 through May 2006, which she routinely allowed Norton to violate. Second, on October 19, 2004, Norton arrived at Casey's home and told her he knew she was dating someone else. He was very upset and stated he wanted to keep her for himself. During their argument, Norton choked Casey to the point where she began to lose consciousness; he then grabbed her as she fell and slapped her in the face to wake her up. Third, on October 20, 2004, while Casey was visiting at the home of a male friend, Norton arrived and demanded that she leave. Norton told her that he did not want her seeing anyone else, and if she continued to go to the man's house he was going to burn the house down. Fourth, in 2005 Norton assaulted Frierson. Frierson testified that on several occasions prior to the assault Norton was aggressive towards him because he was dating Casey. Frierson tried to avoid contact with Norton, and because Casey had a restraining order against Norton, he thought he was "safe" from Norton. However, on December 23, 2005, Frierson encountered Norton outside Casey's home. Norton, who became "instantly jealous" when Frierson arrived, started fighting with Frierson. The two men fought until Casey got some people to break them apart and Frierson left.
The trial court excluded one proffered item of uncharged misconduct evidence, involving an incident in 2007 when Norton followed Casey and confronted her at a gas station about who she was going to meet that night.
Casey and Frierson testified concerning the incidents of uncharged misconduct. Also, several police officers described Casey's reports to the police concerning the incidents because at trial Casey (who acknowledged she did not want to testify) claimed not to remember or denied some of the information she told the police.
The jury was instructed that it could consider the 2004 and 2005 incidents on the issues of identity, intent to threaten, motive and common plan.
The jury was instructed that if it found the defendant engaged in the 2004 and 2005 acts, it could consider them for the limited purpose of deciding whether or not the "defendant was the person who committed the offenses alleged in this case; or the defendant acted with the intent to threaten the victim in this case; or the defendant had a motive to commit the offenses alleged in this case; or the defendant had a plan to commit the offenses alleged in this case."
Governing Law
Evidence of the defendant's misconduct that is not charged in the current case is generally inadmissible for purposes of showing the defendant's bad character or propensity to commit crimes. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a); People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 369.) The rationale for excluding uncharged misconduct evidence is that the jury might convict merely because of the defendant's criminal propensity or bad character regardless of whether guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 631.) However, uncharged misconduct evidence may be admitted for the limited purpose of proving material facts apart from criminal disposition, such as identity, intent, motive, or common plan. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b); People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 369.)
To be admissible on the issues of identity, common plan, or intent, the conduct during the uncharged and charged acts must be sufficiently similar to support a rational inference of these facts. (People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 369.) To be relevant on the issue of identity, the uncharged misconduct must be highly similar to the charged offenses. (Ibid.) The charged and uncharged acts must share common marks that are sufficiently distinctive to be like a signature that sets them apart from crimes of the same general variety, thereby suggesting the offenses were committed by the same perpetrator. (Id. at p. 370; People v. Miller (1990) 50 Cal.3d 954, 987.) "The inference of identity... need not depend on one or more unique or nearly unique common features; features of substantial but lesser distinctiveness may yield a distinctive combination when considered together." (Miller, supra, at p. 987.) A lesser degree of similarity is required to establish relevance on the issue of a common plan; there must be common features indicating the existence of a plan rather than a series of similar spontaneous acts, but the plan need not be distinctive or unusual. (People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 371.) The least degree of similarity is required to establish relevance on the issue of intent; the uncharged misconduct need only be sufficiently similar to support the inference that the defendant probably harbored the same intent in each instance. (Ibid.)
Motive is an intermediate fact that may be probative of such ultimate issues as identity, intent, or commission of the act itself. (People v. Scheer (1998)68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1017-1018.) The uncharged misconduct evidence may be admissible to show motive if the uncharged and charged acts, even though dissimilar, share common features that tend to show the defendant had common reasons for engaging in the conduct. (People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 15.)
Because of the prejudice inherent in uncharged misconduct evidence, the evidence must have substantial probative value, and the trial court must evaluate under Evidence Code section 352 whether the probative value is outweighed by the probability of undue prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 404; People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 371.) We review the trial court's rulings for abuse of discretion. (Kipp, supra, at pp. 369, 371.)
Analysis
Norton asserts the trial court should have excluded the prior misconduct evidence under Evidence Code section 352 because the evidence was unnecessary given the substantial number of prosecution witnesses that could testify to prove the charged crimes; the uncharged misconduct was not sufficiently similar to the charged crimes; and the evidence was highly inflammatory. We reject these contentions.
The uncharged misconduct evidence showed that Norton engaged in aggressive conduct when he believed that Casey was dating other men. This was the same type of conduct involved in the charged offenses; i.e., Norton committed aggressive acts (assault, vandalism, and threats) because Kuyoro was dating Casey. Contrary to Norton's assertion, the uncharged and charged conduct was highly similar. When considered together, the uncharged and charged acts were like a signature that reflected a continuous pattern of the perpetrator erupting into violence in response to Casey's contact with other men. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the uncharged acts highly relevant on the issues of identity, intent to threaten, common plan, and motive.
The trial court also reasonably concluded the potential for prejudice did not outweigh the high probative value. The prosecution had to prove that Norton was the person who committed the alleged acts, that he committed them as described by Kuyoro, and (to prove criminal threats) that he intended to make a threat. The uncharged misconduct evidence supported that he was the perpetrator of the attacks on Kuyoro and he had an intent, plan, and motive to use violence and threats to disrupt Casey's socialization with other men. At trial, Norton disputed the issue of identity for the December 2007 incident, denied that he threatened Kuyoro, and sought to minimize his conduct with respect to the other alleged attacks. The uncharged misconduct evidence was highly relevant to support Kuyoro's version and refute Norton's version of the charged incidents. Further, the uncharged acts, consisting of assaults and a threat, were not unduly inflammatory when compared to the charged acts, which involved similar conduct.
The fact that the prosecution had several witnesses available to prove the charged conduct did not require exclusion of the uncharged misconduct evidence. The prosecution had the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and was entitled to present evidence, including relevant uncharged misconduct evidence, to support its case. The prosecution's evidence concerning the charged offenses did not so conclusively establish guilt as to make the uncharged misconduct evidence merely cumulative. (People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 372.) Indeed, the jury's acquittal of Norton on several counts shows the jury did not view the prosecution's evidence as overwhelming on all counts. Further, the acquittals reflect that the jury did not improperly rely on the uncharged misconduct evidence to convict without determining whether the prosecution had carried its burden to prove guilt.
There was no error in the admission of the uncharged misconduct evidence.
II. Instruction on Consciousness of Guilt Based on Flight
Norton argues the trial court erred in overruling his objection to an instruction that informed the jury that it could infer Norton's consciousness of guilt based on his flight after a crime. He asserts there was insufficient evidentiary support for the instruction.
The trial court instructed the jury that if it concluded Norton fled immediately after a crime was committed, it could consider this evidence to infer his consciousness of guilt of the crime. (See CALCRIM No. 372.) In closing arguments to the jury, the prosecutor referenced Norton's flight on two occasions, with respect to the jumper cable assault incident and the December 2007 attack. The prosecutor argued to the jury that (1) when Casey stated she was going to call the police (during the jumper cable assault), Norton fled because he knew he was breaking the law, and (2) Norton fled to Arkansas after attacking Kuyoro in December.
The jury was instructed in the language of CALCRIM No. 372: "If the defendant fled immediately after the crime was committed, that conduct may show that he was aware of his guilt. If you conclude that the defendant fled, it is up to you to decide the meaning and importance of that conduct. However, evidence that the defendant fled cannot prove guilt by itself."
A flight instruction is proper if there is evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant's departure from the crime scene or his usual environs was motivated by an awareness of guilt. (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 470-471.) Flight does not require the physical act of running nor the reaching of a far-away haven, but it does require a purpose to avoid being observed or arrested. (People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 869, abrogated on other grounds in People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 364-365.) A flight instruction should not be given if there is no evidence "from which a jury could reasonably infer that [the defendant] left to avoid being observed or arrested." (Crandell, supra, at p. 869.)
However, the fact that there may be several explanations for the defendant's departure merely goes to the weight of the flight evidence. (People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756, 771-774, overruled on another ground in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 28.) Similarly, flight does not require knowledge that criminal charges have been filed, nor a defined temporal period within which the flight must be commenced. (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1182.) The flight instruction may be given if there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer the defendant fled out of guilty knowledge. (People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 471.) The instruction leaves it to the jury to decide whether flight occurred, what weight to give the evidence, and whether there was an alternative explanation for the defendant's departure. (Ibid.; People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1055.)
Because the jury acquitted Norton of the jumper cable assault, the flight instruction could not have had a prejudicial effect as to this count. In any event, the instruction was proper based on the evidence concerning this incident. Norton acknowledges there was evidence of his flight when he left the scene after Casey tried to stop the fight on this occasion by threatening to call the police. However, he contends there may have been other reasons for him to flee rather than consciousness of guilt of the charged assault on Kuyoro, including the facts that Casey had a history of restraining orders against him and of reporting his assaultive behavior to the police.
The possibility of other reasons for Norton's departure during this incident was a matter for the jury to consider when weighing the evidence, and this did not preclude instruction on flight. The jury could reasonably infer that Norton left the scene because he thought Casey was going to call the police and he knew he had assaulted Kuyoro and could be arrested for this conduct. Because there was evidence from which the jury could infer Norton's consciousness of guilt from his departure during this incident, the evidence supported the flight instruction.
We also reject Norton's assertion that there was no evidence to support that his departure to Arkansas was a flight connected to the December 2007 incident. The prosecution's evidence showed that the police found Norton's car at Casey's home a few weeks after the December incident, but the police did not arrest Norton until March. Norton and his wife testified that Norton went to Arkansas in December, before the December 11 attack on Kuyoro. The jury could have rejected their claim regarding the date, and concluded instead that he left the state after the December attack because he was trying to avoid being arrested for the attack. The jury could consider that the level of violence used by Norton against Kuyoro escalated during the December attack as compared to the previous attacks, and Norton likely realized that the incident was witnessed by other motorists, thus giving him a greater incentive to flee the jurisdiction. The jury could also infer that the close timing between the attack and his departure from the state was not coincidental but evinced an awareness of his guilt of this incident. Although Norton returned to the state in February, this fact went to the weight of the flight evidence but did not preclude the jury from reasonably inferring his departure was related to the December incident.
Norton argues that it was improper to " 'bootstrap' " his alibi defense into consciousness of guilt evidence. We are not persuaded. The jury was entitled to evaluate all the evidence, from both the prosecution and defense, when deciding whether the prosecution had carried its burden to prove guilt. (See, e.g., People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 22 [defendant's testimony considered when determining sufficiency of the evidence to support jury's verdict].) Thus, the jury could properly consider whether Norton's testimony that he went to Arkansas in December suggested a consciousness of guilt.
Norton further challenges the flight instruction because there was no evidence he fled after being charged with any crimes. This showing was not necessary. A jury may properly consider evidence of flight even if the defendant did not know he was accused of the crime. (People v. Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1182; People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 941-942, fn. 11.)
The trial court did not err in providing the jury with the consciousness of guilt instruction based on flight.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McDONALD, J., McINTYRE, J.
The court also excluded evidence of the restraining order; however, at trial both parties elicited testimony referencing the restraining order. That is, when defense counsel questioned Frierson on cross-examination about Norton's and Casey's child and whether Norton was visiting Casey, Frierson answered that Norton was not supposed to visit Casey because she had a restraining order against him. The trial court overruled defense counsel's objection that the testimony was nonresponsive. Thereafter, the prosecutor elicited testimony concerning the existence of the restraining order, and defense counsel elicited testimony that Casey allowed Norton to violate it and at one point she was planning to lift it. Other than his general challenge to admission of the uncharged misconduct evidence, Norton does not assert that admission of the restraining order evidence was erroneous.