Opinion
G053545
07-27-2017
In re G. N., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. G. N., Defendant and Appellant.
Marilee Marshall, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Annie Featherman Fraser, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. DL050927-001) OPINION Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Lewis W. Clapp, Judge. Affirmed. Marilee Marshall, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Annie Featherman Fraser, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Before Bedsworth, Acting P. J., Moore, J., and Aronson, J --------
The juvenile court found true allegations that minor G.N. (minor) received stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a); count 1) and drove a motor vehicle without a valid license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a); count 3). The court granted a motion to dismiss count 2, possession of burglary tools (Pen. Code, § 466). Minor appeals from the ensuing judgment declaring him a ward of the court and imposing probation conditions. Minor contends the court impermissibly punished him for invoking his right to trial. We reject this assertion and affirm the judgment.
FACTS
On April 22, 2015, the owner of an "older model" Honda Civic returned after work to her parking spot in Fontana, California. She discovered that her car was missing. She contacted the police and reported the car stolen. Later that day, a police officer spotted the car in Buena Park, California. When the officer ran a license plate check, dispatch reported that it was a stolen vehicle. After following the car and calling for backup, a traffic stop was initiated.
Minor was driving the Honda Civic at the time of the traffic stop. The owner of the Honda Civic did not recognize minor and had not given anyone permission to drive the car. Minor was not a licensed driver in April 2015. The key being used to operate the car was found on the street next to the driver's side door. It was a "bent" and "shaved down" key for a non-Honda car.
Having found the allegations on counts 1 and 3 to be true, the court exercised its discretion to reduce count 1 to a misdemeanor. (See Pen. Code, § 17, subd. (b).) The court then declared minor to be a ward of the court and imposed supervised formal probation. Minor's probation conditions included 120 hours of community service, paying any applicable restitution, no contact with specified categories of individuals, no use of alcohol or illegal drugs, and no possession of dangerous or deadly weapons.
DISCUSSION
Minor contends that the court unconstitutionally punished him for exercising his right to trial on the charges against him. (See In re Edy D. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1199, 1202 [reversing wardship disposition because juvenile court stated it would not consider non-wardship disposition if minor inconvenienced witnesses by having them appear for adjudication hearing].)
Prior to trial, the probation department recommended deferred entry of judgment (see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 790 et seq.), with community service and other conditions (similar to those actually imposed here after trial) supervised by the probation department. Deferred entry of judgment is a statutory scheme intended to "provide an expedited mechanism for channeling certain first-time offenders away from the full panoply of a contested delinquency proceeding." (In re Kenneth J. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 973, 980.) Counsel and the court discussed prior to trial that deferred entry of judgment might be "waived" if trial began. They took care to avoid an unnecessary and premature waiver. Ultimately, however, minor opted to contest the allegations against him in a trial rather than pursuing deferred entry of judgment.
The primary contention in minor's opening brief is a nonstarter. Minor asserts that the court violated his constitutional rights by refusing to grant deferred entry of judgment after the charges were found to be true at the dispositional hearing. But the court could not grant deferred entry of judgment after minor availed himself of a trial on the allegations against him. Once presented with the choice between deferred entry of judgment and a contested hearing, minor was required to admit the allegations in the petition to utilize the deferred entry of judgment procedure. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 791, subds. (a)(3), (b); In re Spencer S. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1322-1323, fn. 3.)
Minor's reply brief concedes that he "may not have been eligible for" deferred entry of judgment. Nonetheless, minor asserts his punishment was still unnecessarily harsh because he could have been sentenced to probation without declaring him to be a ward of the court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 725, subd. (a) [court "may, without adjudging the minor a ward of the court, place the minor on probation"].) Of course, the court also had discretion to "order and adjudge the minor to be a ward of the court." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 725, subd. (b).) There is no reasonable argument to be made that the court abused its discretion in this case by declaring minor to be a ward of the court. And unlike In re Edy D., supra, 120 Cal.App.4th 1199, there was no statement by the trial court here that minor's decision to go to trial would affect the court's consideration of the proper disposition. Indeed, the court demonstrated its lack of vindictiveness against minor when it dismissed count 2 midway through the trial and reduced count 1 to a misdemeanor after the trial concluded. The record does not support minor's contention that his disposition violated his constitutional rights.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.