Opinion
H043695
07-27-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. VANLONG NGUYEN, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. C1503469)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
An information charged defendant Vanlong Nguyen with possession of cocaine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351; count 1), possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359; count 2), and possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count 3). After the trial court denied his Penal Code section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence, defendant pleaded no contest to all three counts. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for a period of three years.
Defendant now appeals from the judgment of conviction. He contends that we must reverse the judgment of conviction because the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress. Specifically, he asserts that the trial court erred in ruling a search of his property was authorized by Vehicle Code section 2805. As set forth below, we find no error and affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code unless otherwise indicated.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The evidence described below was presented at the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress.
In November 2014, Detective Greg Deger was assigned to the Santa Clara Police Department Special Enforcement Team. That team investigated automobile thefts. As part of those investigations, Detective Deger conducted inspections pursuant to section 2805. Detective Deger testified that the following evidence was "relevant" to vehicle theft investigations: "paperwork, shaved keys, VIN plates, license plates, automobile parts, intact automobile in its entirety." He explained that a VIN plate is a "unique identifier for a vehicle" and is generally about the size of a credit card. When asked what kind of paperwork is relevant to a vehicle theft investigation, Detective Deger testified that "registration paperwork and titles" are relevant.
Around 2:00 p.m. on November 6, 2014, Detective Deger conducted a section 2805 inspection at 2670 Pacer Lane. Detective Deger went to that location in order to inspect an "autobody shop." When he arrived at the location, he saw hydraulic lifts, tools, "vehicles strewn about," and a tow truck. When shown a photograph of 2670 Pacer Lane, Detective Deger identified a structure at the front of the location as an "office space" with a "red sign." He explained that the office space "looks like what is consistent with a business." Although Detective Deger initially testified that there were "numerous businesses" located at 2670 Pacer Lane, he later clarified that the entire location was "wide open" with "no delineation." He explained that the whole location was one "work area" and appeared to be "all . . . the same property." There was only one driveway leading in and out of 2670 Pacer Lane.
Detective Deger searched the south side of 2670 Pacer Lane. In that portion of the location, he saw "automotive parts," tools, automobiles that "appeared to be being worked on," a large "multi-drawer toolbox," and a laptop case. In the "same area" as the toolbox, he found an invoice bearing the business name "Pacer Automotive" with an address of "2670 Pacer Lane." Detective Deger searched the laptop case in order to look for "VIN plates," "tiles for vehicles," "registration forms for vehicles," and "any indicia of automobile theft activity." Inside the laptop case, he found $10,300 cash and defendant's driver's license. Detective Deger then searched the toolbox in order to look for "shaved keys," "VIN plates," and "paperwork." Because a "strong odor" of marijuana was emanating from the "vicinity" of the toolbox, he also searched the toolbox to determine "the source of the marijuana smell." Inside the toolbox, Detective Deger found cocaine, methamphetamine, and a "large amount" of marijuana. He also found a mirror, a razor, and a rolled-up bill inside the toolbox, and he described those items as "consistent with . . . a coke-usage platform."
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress because the search of his property was not authorized by section 2805. His argument is twofold. He first asserts that the search was unlawful "as there was no evidence that the space was a commercial business that fell under the purview of section 2805." (Capitalization omitted.) He then asserts that "the search of the toolbox and laptop case exceeded the scope of section 2805." (Capitalization omitted.) As explained below, section 2805 authorized the search of defendant's property, and the trial court did not err in denying his motion to suppress.
Defendant also argues that the search of the toolbox and laptop case was not justified by the plain view doctrine. Because we conclude that section 2805 authorized the search, we need not consider defendant's argument regarding the plain view doctrine. --------
The Trial Court's Ruling
At the end of the suppression hearing, the trial court found that the searched "business" was an automobile repair shop "covered by" section 2805. The trial court also found that the "toolbox and laptop case . . . could hold items that are within the range of the matters that law enforcement may be looking for in the enforcement of vehicle theft issues." The trial court ruled that section 2805 authorized the search, and it accordingly denied defendant's motion to suppress.
Standard of Review
"The standard of appellate review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment." (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.)
Legal Principles
"The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to commercial premises." (People v. Potter (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 611, 618 (Potter).) "Thus, the government must generally obtain a warrant prior to entry into commercial premises." (Ibid.) "However, there are several well-established exceptions to the warrant requirement, including . . . the closely-regulated-industry exception." (Ibid.)
"Under the closely-regulated-industry exception, the owner of a heavily regulated business is deemed to be on notice that his business premises will be subject to periodic warrantless administrative searches by government agents pursuant to a statutory inspection scheme." (Potter, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 618.) "[T]he theory of the closely regulated business exception is that inspection and visitation by agents of the government under the regulations are so regular and frequent that the licensee has no reasonable expectation of privacy." (Pinney v. Phillips (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1570, 1584-1585.) These warrantless administrative searches "are valid under the Fourth Amendment . . . because the owner of a closely regulated business has no reasonable expectation of privacy from administrative inspections in furtherance of a valid regulatory scheme." (Potter, supra, at p. 622, italics omitted.)
Warrantless searches pursuant to the closely-regulated-industry exception may be conducted "without notice . . . or individualized suspicion of wrongdoing." (Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1332.) These searches are "designed to enforce regulatory statutes." (New York v. Burger (1987) 482 U.S. 691, 700.)
Automobile repair shops are closely regulated businesses. (People v. Calvert (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1820, 1834 (Calvert).) Section 2805 "is a regulatory scheme providing for warrantless administrative searches" of automobile repair shops. (Potter, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 619.)
Section 2805 states: "For the purpose of locating stolen vehicles, . . . a member of a city police department . . . may inspect any vehicle of a type required to be registered under this code, or any identifiable vehicle component thereof, on a highway or in any public garage, repair shop, terminal, parking lot, new or used car lot, automobile dismantler's lot, vehicle shredding facility, vehicle leasing or rental lot, vehicle equipment rental yard, vehicle salvage pool, or other similar establishment, or any agricultural or construction work location where work is being actively performed, and may inspect the title or registration of vehicles, in order to establish the rightful ownership or possession of the vehicle or identifiable vehicle component." (§ 2805, subd. (a).) Section 2805 provides the following definition: "As used in this subdivision, 'identifiable vehicle component' means any component which can be distinguished from other similar components by a serial number or other unique distinguishing number, sign, or symbol." (Ibid.)
When determining whether a particular location is subject to warrantless search, the "pivotal inquiry under section 2805 is whether the inspected premises comprise a business providing auto-related services to the public, rather than premises utilized by private individuals with no services provided to the public." (Potter, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 622.) "[U]nder section 2805 the owner's expectation of privacy is defined by whether auto-related commercial activity—as opposed to personal activity—is being conducted on the premises. As long as the inspected premises constitute a commercial enterprise as contemplated by section 2805, the business owner and his employees are on notice that they cannot expect to be free from periodic inspection." (Ibid.)
As to the scope of such warrantless searches, section 2805 "authorizes inspections of automobile repair shops . . . to examine the title or registration of vehicles and vehicle components for the purpose of locating stolen vehicles." (Calvert, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 1826.) Section 2805 authorizes officers to search for "vehicle parts." (Potter, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 621, fn. 2.)
"Recognizing that [section 2805] does not allow indiscriminate, broad searches of business premises but rather only permits searches that are 'conducted under reasonable circumstances and limited in nature,' the courts have repeatedly concluded that section 2805 passes constitutional muster." (Potter, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 620.) Section 2805 "is not unconstitutional as applied to automobile repair shops" and "is a proper method of enforcing the administrative scheme." (Calvert, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 1836.)
The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying the Motion to Suppress
Defendant asserts that the search was unlawful because there was no evidence that he "used his . . . space as a commercial business, rather than as a space to work on his private vehicles." This argument is meritless. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that the searched location was a commercial automobile repair shop. There was an office with a sign at the front of 2670 Pacer Lane. Detective Deger testified that the office looked "consistent with a business." The rest of the property was a "wide open" work area with hydraulic lifts and "vehicles strewn about." In the immediate vicinity of the seized evidence, Detective Deger saw automotive parts, tools, toolboxes, and automobiles that "appeared to be being worked on." In the "same area" as the toolbox that housed the drugs, Detective Deger found an invoice bearing the business name "Pacer Automotive" with an address of "2670 Pacer Lane." The foregoing evidence certainly showed that the searched location was used for automobile repairs. The presence of the office and the invoice showed that this was "auto-related commercial activity" and not merely personal activity. (Potter, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 622.) Because the searched location was a commercial automobile repair shop, it was properly subjected to a section 2805 search. (Id. at pp. 619, 622.)
Defendant also contends that "the search exceeded the scope of section 2805" because the toolbox and laptop case "were clearly too small to contain vehicles or vehicle components." This argument fails. Section 2805 authorizes officers to search for vehicle parts. (Potter, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 621, fn. 2.) Section 2805 also authorizes officers to inspect the title and registration of vehicles. (Calvert, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 1826.) Detective Deger testified that he searched the toolbox and laptop case in order to search for "titles for vehicles," "registration forms for vehicles," and "VIN plates." Section 2805 authorized Detective Deger's search for those items. The toolbox and laptop case were not too small to contain those items. Vehicle registration forms and title documents could fit inside the laptop case and the toolbox, which was "large" and had multiple drawers. Detective Deger testified that VIN plates are about the size of credit card, so the laptop case and toolbox could have contained VIN plates as well. Thus, contrary to defendant's contention, the search did not exceed the scope authorized by section 2805.
In sum, defendant's property was lawfully searched pursuant to section 2805. The trial court did not err in denying his motion to suppress.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
ELIA, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
PREMO, Acting P. J. /s/_________
MIHARA, J.