Defendant's trial on the instant charge commenced on January 8, 2013, well within 120 days after he was arrested on the charge on which he was ultimately convicted. ¶ 18 We agree with the State that the instant case is similar to People v. Neumann, 148 Ill.App.3d 362, 101 Ill.Dec. 899, 499 N.E.2d 487 (1986), which held that the state's speedy trial term did not begin until a federal case was resolved and the defendant was in state custody. In Neumann, the defendant was indicted by a Cook County grand jury with several counts of murder on October 4, 1982.
The State cited cases in which defendants who were initially taken into custody on federal charges were later charged with state offenses. See People v. Arsberry, 242 Ill. App. 3d 1034 (1993); People v. Neumann, 148 Ill. App. 3d 362 (1986). In each of these cases, the court held that the state speedy-trial term did not commence until the federal case was resolved and the defendant was in state custody.
The verdict will not be disturbed on appeal where the challenged comments do not constitute a material factor in the conviction or where they are of such minor character that prejudice to defendant is not a probable result. People v. Neumann (1986), 148 Ill. App.3d 362, 499 N.E.2d 487. • 7 Applying these principles to the instant case, we first consider that portion of the State's rebuttal argument that referred to defendant as a liar.
See the cases cited in Doering, 316 Md. at 356-57, 558 A.2d 733. In addition, see State v. Thompson, 150 Ariz. 554, 556-58, 724 P.2d 1223, 1225-27 (1986); In re Richard W., 91 Cal.App.3d 960, 968, 155 Cal.Rptr. 11, 17 (1979); People v. Neumann, 148 Ill. App.3d 362, 101 Ill.Dec. 899, 904, 499 N.E.2d 487, 492 (1986); Jones v. State, 416 N.E.2d 880, 881-82 (Ind. App. 1981). Although it is clear that information obtained by a judge in prior proceedings involving the same case is not "personal" knowledge within the meaning of Canon 3C, the question presented here is whether information gained from prior proceedings involving codefendants is also properly treated as "judicial" and not "personal" information.
The mere fact that a judge has already presided over the separate jury trial of a codefendant hardly constitutes reasonable grounds for questioning that judge's impartiality in a subsequent trial of the remaining codefendant. United States v. Cowden, 545 F.2d 257, 265-66 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 909 (1977); Paradis v. Arave, 20 F.3d 950, 958 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he judicial system could not function if judges had to withdraw from a case whenever they had presided in a separate trial in the same case."); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 1998); People v. Neumann, 499 N.E.2d 487, 492 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). In United States v. Wilson, 77 F.3d 105 (5th Cir. 1996), defendant Michael Wilson's trial had been severed from that of his codefendants, who were tried first.
A trial judge is under no duty to recuse because they presided at a prior trial of a codefendant or even because they presided at a prior trial of the defendant in the same cause. People v. Neumann, 148 Ill. App. 3d 362, 369 (1986). Further, to be disqualifying, the alleged bias or prejudice of the trial court must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on a basis other than what the judge learned from the case.
When a defendant's own argument invites statements in rebuttal, the defendant cannot then complain of those statements. People v. Neumann (1986), 148 Ill. App.3d 362, 374, 499 N.E.2d 487, 495. • 14, 15 The defendant also complains that the prosecutor improperly and prejudicially called the defendant and his witnesses liars. It is not improper for the prosecution to assert that the defendant is lying if the evidence is conflicting or if such a statement is a fair inference from the evidence.
A prosecutor has wide latitude in closing argument. ( People v. Neumann (1986), 148 Ill. App.3d 362, 373-74, 499 N.E.2d 487, 494, appeal denied (1987), 113 Ill.2d 581, cert. denied (1987), 481 U.S. 1051, 95 L.Ed.2d 840, 107 S.Ct. 2184.) The prosecutor has a right to comment on the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom.
The appellate court recognized that in order for the duty to recuse to arise, a judge must have a "'personal bias or prejudice for or against a defendant.'" Id. (quoting People v. Neumann, 499 N.E.2d 487, 492 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)). Surely, a "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest," Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523, would constitute a "bias or prejudice ... stemmed from an extrajudicial source, Exh. A, Order on Direct Appeal at 22.
Following his conviction, petitioner appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court, contending that: "(1) the trial court erred in denying his petition for discharge based on the denial of his right to a speedy trial; (2) the trial court erred in failing to disqualify itself from defendant's retrial after the original proceeding was declared a mistrial; (3) the State failed to prove defendant guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence and excluding other evidence about the State's key witness . . .; and (5) the prosecutor's remarks during closing and rebuttal arguments were prejudicial and constituted reversible error." People v. Neumann, 148 Ill. App.3d 362, 365, 101 Ill. Dec. 899, 901, 499 N.E.2d 487, 489 (1st Dist. 1986). The Illinois Appellate Court rejected each of petitioner's claims, thereby affirming his convictions and sentence.