Opinion
October 13, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Bronx County (John Collins, J.).
Defendant's motion to suppress his statement was properly denied. There is nothing in the record to substantiate defendant's claim that he was arraigned within the meaning of CPL 1.20 (9) earlier than April 1990 (see, People ex rel. Kehoe v Harkness, 84 Misc.2d 927, affd 50 A.D.2d 1010). The record in fact substantiates that CPL 710.30 notice requirements were satisfied, that no "additional delay" resulted from the arraignment of defendant on the eve of trial, and that the purpose of CPL 710.30 was fulfilled (see, People v. O'Doherty, 70 N.Y.2d 479, 488).
Defendant's CPL 30.20 motion, claiming that the 14-month delay deprived him of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, was properly denied. The relevant factors weigh against defendant (People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442). Firstly, 14 months is not far from the average time it takes to move from indictment to trial in Bronx County (cf., People v. Rarba, 40 N.Y.2d 922; People v. Jackson, 178 A.D.2d 305, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 948; People v. Romero, 173 A.D.2d 654, lv denied 78 N.Y.2d 1014). Secondly, it is apparent that the delay was inadvertent and not designed to gain an advantage (see, People v. Johnson, 38 N.Y.2d 271). Thirdly, the defendant was incarcerated on an unrelated charge (see, People v. Jackson, supra). Finally, defendant failed to establish his claim of being prejudiced by the delay (see, People v. Fuller, 57 N.Y.2d 152, 160).
Finally, we perceive no abuse of sentencing discretion.
Concur — Murphy, P.J., Sullivan, Rosenberger, Nardelli and Tom, JJ.