Opinion
June 21, 1993
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Marrus, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Initially we note that, contrary to the defendant's contention, the court properly allowed a psychiatrist to offer expert testimony concerning child sexual abuse syndrome to explain why victims of sexual abuse or rape may delay in reporting the crime (see, People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277; People v. Keindl, 68 N.Y.2d 410; People v. Singh, 186 A.D.2d 285; People v Sansevero, 185 A.D.2d 256; People v. Daniels, 185 A.D.2d 894; People v. Guce, 164 A.D.2d 946, 950; People v. Ivory, 162 A.D.2d 551, 552). Insofar as the defendant is claiming on appeal that certain aspects of the expert's testimony constituted improper bolstering of the complainant's testimony or otherwise invaded the factfinding province of the jury, the claims are unpreserved for appellate review and we decline to address them (see, CPL 470.05; People v. Van Loan, 179 A.D.2d 885).
In addition, the trial court did not err in excluding evidence purportedly of the complainant's prior sexual history (see, People v. Boyd, 122 A.D.2d 273). After the People rested, the defendant sought to testify that the complainant's mother told him that she received a letter from an aunt in Ecuador informing her that the complainant had been sexually molested before coming to the United States. The defendant argued that such evidence was relevant because of the medical testimony that the complainant's hymen had been "ruptured", and the implication that he was the cause. Such evidence plainly would have constituted inadmissible hearsay (see generally, People v. Nieves, 67 N.Y.2d 125). Therefore, we need not consider whether such evidence would be admissible under CPL 60.42 (4) or (5). Lawrence, J.P., Ritter, Copertino and Santucci, JJ., concur.