Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 06CF1168, Richard M. King, Judge.
Martha M. Hall, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Lilia E. Garcia and Elizabeth S. Voorhies, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
FYBEL, J.
Introduction
Juan Manuel Munoz pleaded guilty to receiving stolen property and petty theft after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. Munoz’s appeal challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Munoz contends the trial court should have granted the motion because the evidence was obtained during an unduly prolonged investigatory detention after his car was stopped for a Vehicle Code violation.
This appeal presents two issues: first, whether Munoz forfeited his challenge to the denial of his motion to suppress on any ground other than whether the police officers had probable cause to make the initial traffic stop; and second, if he has not forfeited that claim, whether the investigatory detention constituted a de facto arrest without probable cause.
We conclude Munoz forfeited his argument the detention was unduly prolonged and constituted a de facto arrest because he did not raise that issue in the trial court. Even if Munoz had preserved the argument, we conclude the investigatory detention did not constitute a de facto arrest without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Therefore, we affirm.
Facts from the Suppression Hearing
The following facts are taken from the evidence presented at the suppression hearing held on February 9, 2007.
On April 15, 2006 about 5:00 a.m., Officer Brian Smith of the Orange Police Department pulled over a car driven by Munoz because Officer Smith saw a crack in the car’s windshield. (A cracked windshield is a violation of Vehicle Code section 26710.) Also in the car were Ken Roger Vasquez and Francisco Cazares (not parties to this appeal).
Officer Smith asked to see Munoz’s driver’s license. Munoz did not have one. Officer Smith asked Munoz where the three were heading. Munoz replied they were going “to work construction” at a site in Costa Mesa. Officer Smith noticed wet spools of wire and copper tubing in the car’s backseat. It had been raining until shortly before the traffic stop, and Officer Smith knew it was common for tools and construction equipment to be stolen from construction sites in the early morning hours. Officer Smith suspected the wet spools of wire had been stolen.
Officer Smith asked Munoz, in English, if he could search the car. Munoz appeared to understand the request and said, “yes.” Officer Smith requested a Spanish-speaking officer to better communicate with Munoz. About five minutes later, Officer Salmon arrived to back up Officer Smith. When Officer Salmon arrived, Officer Smith asked Munoz, Vasquez, and Cazares to exit the car and sit on the curb.
Officer Bueno, the Spanish-speaking officer requested by Officer Smith, arrived about five minutes later, and about 15 minutes after Officer Smith initially stopped Munoz’s car. Officer Bueno asked Munoz, in Spanish, for permission to search the car. Munoz again said, “yes.”
Officer Smith searched the car and found three spools of wire, copper tubing, a nail gun, a jigsaw, a cell phone, four screwdrivers, a power flashlight, and a variety of other tools. Officers Smith and Bueno spoke to Vasquez away from Munoz and Cazares. Vasquez said he, Munoz, and Cazares had been stealing items from trucks parked at construction sites in the City of Orange. Vasquez led Officer Bueno to one construction site to confirm the story.
Officer Smith arrested Munoz. Officer Smith noted in the postarrest report he initiated the traffic stop because of a defective windshield in violation of Vehicle Code section 26710.
Proceedings in the Trial Court
Munoz was charged with knowingly receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)), grand theft (id., § 487, subd. (a)), and petty theft (id., § 484, subd. (a)).
Munoz moved to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5 on the ground that the initial traffic stop was an illegal detention. He argued the car windshield was not cracked when Officer Smith stopped him. Officer Smith, Officer Bueno, Munoz, and Vasquez testified at the suppression hearing. The trial court found Officers Smith and Bueno to be credible, and found Munoz and Vasquez to be not credible. The trial court denied the suppression motion, finding “by a preponderance of the evidence[,] the officer believed the windshield was defective in violation of the Vehicle Code, and therefore, the stop was justified by the Fourth Amendment, and then the activities that flowed therefrom were proper.”
After the trial court denied the motion to suppress, the prosecution dismissed the count of grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a)). Munoz withdrew his not guilty plea to the counts of receiving stolen property and petty theft, and pleaded guilty to those counts. Munoz timely appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (m).
Standard of Review
As the finder of fact in a proceeding to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), the trial court assesses witness credibility, resolves any conflicts in the testimony, weighs the evidence, and draws factual inferences in deciding whether a search is constitutionally unreasonable. (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673.) We view the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, resolve all conflicts in its favor, and defer to those express or implied findings supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 969; People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 673.) We independently review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts. (People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 969.)
Discussion
I.
Munoz Forfeited the Argument That His Detention Was Unduly Prolonged.
The Attorney General argues Munoz forfeited the argument his detention was unduly prolonged by failing to present that argument to the trial court. We agree. Munoz did not specify prolonged detention as a ground in his written suppression motion and did not orally argue prolonged detention at the suppression hearing.
“[W]hen defendants move to suppress evidence under [Penal Code] section 1538.5, they must inform the prosecution and the court of the specific basis for their motion.” (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 129.) When the search is warrantless, and the defendants have a specific argument other than the lack of a warrant to suppress the evidence, “they must specify that argument as part of their motion to suppress and give the prosecution the opportunity to offer evidence on the point.” (Id. at p. 130.) “In sum, . . . under section 1538.5, as in the case of any other motion, defendants must specify the precise grounds for suppression of the evidence in question, and, where a warrantless search or seizure is the basis for the motion, this burden includes specifying the inadequacy of any justifications for the search or seizure. . . . The degree of specificity that is appropriate will depend on the legal issue the defendant is raising and the surrounding circumstances. Defendants need only be specific enough to give the prosecution and the court reasonable notice. Defendants cannot, however, lay a trap for the prosecution by remaining completely silent until the appeal about issues the prosecution may have overlooked.” (Id. at pp. 130-131.)
Munoz did not specify prolonged detention as a basis for suppressing the evidence seized when his car was searched. Munoz’s written motion to suppress specified one ground: “[T]here was no traffic violation or defective windshield so the stop of the vehicle was unjustified and unlawful.” The motion specified no other ground and did not mention prolonged detention.
On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the Orange County Superior Court file No. 06CF1168 in this case. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d)(1) & 459, subd. (a); Deschene v. Pinole Point Steel Co. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 33, 37, fn. 2.)
Munoz argues the issue of prolonged detention was raised at the hearing on the suppression motion. Munoz did not, however, mention prolonged detention much less assert it as a ground for suppression. During the hearing, the trial court stated: “I’m going to hear what your position is as to whether I even should make that finding [on whether the windshield was defective], but . . . to save time, if I do make that finding, then the arguments that counsel is making, . . . was there a prolonged detention, the [People v.] Gomez [(2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531] case, valid consent.” Vasquez’s counsel responded, “I’d like to focus on th[e] . . . issue about the officer having a reasonable belief that there was a crack [in the windshield].” During argument at the close of the suppression hearing, Munoz’s counsel did not mention prolonged detention but argued only the windshield was not defective when Officer Smith stopped Munoz.
Munoz had a specific argument other than the lack of a warrant to suppress the evidence—prolonged detention—but did not specify that argument as part of his motion to suppress. He did not argue prolonged detention at the suppression hearing, even though the trial court mentioned that issue, and his counsel directed his argument entirely to the issue of the defective windshield. The issue of prolonged detention was separate and distinct from the issue of the defective windshield, was based on different evidence, and required different factual findings. Munoz therefore had an obligation to specify prolonged detention as a ground for suppression in order to give the prosecution and the court reasonable notice.
“‘[T]he scope of issues upon review must be limited to those raised during argument . . . . This is an elemental matter of fairness in giving each of the parties an opportunity adequately to litigate the facts and inferences relating to the adverse party’s contentions.’” (People v. Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 136.) Munoz did not raise the issue of prolonged detention to the trial court and therefore has forfeited the issue on appeal.
II.
Probable Cause Justified the Length of Detention and De Facto Arrest.
Notwithstanding forfeiture, we exercise our discretion to address Munoz’s argument the detention was unreasonably prolonged and constituted a de facto arrest without probable cause. (Hale v. Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388, 394; People v. Marchand (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1061.) The Attorney General does not argue the detention was reasonable in length, but argues any de facto arrest was supported by probable cause.
A. Legal Standards
An ordinary traffic stop is treated as an investigatory detention. (United States v. Sharpe (1985) 470 U.S. 675, 682.) A traffic stop must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. (Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 500.)
A traffic stop that lasts longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop is unreasonable and amounts to a de facto arrest that must be supported by probable cause to be constitutionally valid. (Dunaway v. New York (1979) 442 U.S. 200, 212; see also People v. Gomez, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th 531, 538.) “Probable cause exists when the facts known to the arresting officer would persuade someone of ‘reasonable caution’ that the person to be arrested has committed a crime.” (People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 673.)
B. Officer Smith Had Probable Cause to Detain Munoz
Officer Smith had probable cause to extend Munoz’s detention longer than would have been necessary for the original Vehicle Code violation. At the suppression hearing, Officer Smith testified he saw spools of wire and copper tubing in the backseat of Munoz’s car. Officer Smith stopped Munoz about 5:00 a.m. It had been raining, and Officer Smith noticed the spools of wire and tubing were wet. Officer Smith knew from his experience as a police officer that tools and construction equipment commonly are stolen from construction sites in the early morning hours. Officer Smith could rationally infer the wire spools and tubing recently had been outside at a construction site in the early morning rain. Based on the facts and the rational inferences from those facts, a person of reasonable caution would be persuaded that Munoz and the others in the car had stolen the wire and tubing or were in receipt of stolen property.
The evidence therefore supported the conclusion that Officer Smith had probable cause to prolong Munoz’s detention. As a result, the de facto arrest and search did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and the trial court did not err by denying Munoz’s motion to suppress evidence.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J., O’LEARY, J.