The prosecution further argued that, in light of Jackson's failure to present an affidavit from trial counsel explaining his defense of the case, the motion should be denied without a hearing. Id. at 2-3, ¶ 5 (citing, inter alia, People v. Morales, 58 N.Y.2d 1008, 1009 (N.Y. 1983)). Finally, the prosecution argued that, in any event, trial counsel's conduct, viewed either with respect to specific alleged errors or as a whole, did not rise to the level of egregious or prejudicial conduct necessary to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. at 3, ¶ 6 (citing People v. Flores, 84 N.Y.2d 184, 187-88 (N.Y. 1994)).

The prosecution further argued that, in light of Jackson's failure to present an affidavit from trial counsel explaining his defense of the case, the motion should be denied without a hearing. Id. at 2-3, ¶ 5 (citing, interalia, People v. Morales, 58 N.Y.2d 1008, 1009 (N.Y. 1983)). Finally, the prosecution argued that, in any event, trial counsel's conduct, viewed either with respect to specific alleged errors or as a whole, did not rise to the level of egregious or prejudicial conduct necessary to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

The prosecution further argued that, in light of Jackson's failure to present an affidavit from trial counsel explaining his defense of the case, the motion should be denied without a hearing. Id. at 2-3, ¶ 5 (citing, inter alia, People v. Morales, 58 N.Y.2d 1008, 1009 (N.Y. 1983)). Finally, the prosecution argued that, in any event, trial counsel's conduct, viewed either with respect to specific alleged errors or as a whole, did not rise to the level of egregious or prejudicial conduct necessary to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. at 3, ¶ 6 (citing People v. Flores, 84 N.Y.2d 184, 187-88 (N.Y. 1994)).

nt defendant, but that allegation is directly contrary to defendant's express representations to the trial court during the Gomberg inquiry (cf.People v. Ferreras , 70 N.Y.2d 630, 631, 518 N.Y.S.2d 780, 512 N.E.2d 301 [1987] ). "[T]he court [is] not required to credit defendant's evidence of fraud" – particularly, his own, utterly unexplained, fraud on the trial court – "that [is] self-serving and uncorroborated" because the "court does not have ‘to accept every sworn allegation as true’ " ( People v. Chu–Joi , 26 N.Y.3d 1105, 1107, 26 N.Y.S.3d 229, 46 N.E.3d 612 [2015], quoting People v. White , 309 N.Y. 636, 641, 132 N.E.2d 880 [1956], cert denied 352 U.S. 849, 77 S.Ct. 69, 1 L.Ed.2d 60 [1956] ). Under these circumstances, "[t]he failure to include an affirmation from [trial] counsel, or an explanation for the failure to do so, ... warrant[s] the summary denial of ... defendant's postconviction motion" ( People v. Wright , 27 N.Y.3d 516, 522, 35 N.Y.S.3d 286, 54 N.E.3d 1157 [2016] ; seePeople v. Morales , 58 N.Y.2d 1008, 1009, 461 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 448 N.E.2d 796 [1983] ; People v. Scott , 10 N.Y.2d 380, 381–382, 223 N.Y.S.2d 472, 179 N.E.2d 486 [1961] ).In short, "[t]he motion is based upon the existence or occurrence of facts and the moving papers do not contain sworn allegations" that actually "substantiat[e] or tend[ ] to substantiate all the essential facts as required by [ CPL 440.30(1) ]" ( CPL 440.30[4][b] ; cf.People v. Coleman , 10 A.D.3d 487, 487–488, 781 N.Y.S.2d 510 [1st Dept. 2004] ).

Whatever the strategy of omission, we simply do not know whether Long's answer would have aided defendant's claim. The failure to include an affirmation from counsel, or an explanation for the failure to do so, has been held to warrant the summary denial of a defendant's postconviction motion (see People v. Morales, 58 N.Y.2d 1008, 1009, 461 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 448 N.E.2d 796 [1983] ; People v. Scott, 10 N.Y.2d 380, 381–382, 223 N.Y.S.2d 472, 179 N.E.2d 486 [1961] ). Of course, if defendant either obtains the requisite information from Long or Long proves uncooperative, he is permitted by statute to bring a subsequent CPL article 440 motion (see People v. Session, 34 N.Y.2d 254, 256, 357 N.Y.S.2d 409, 313 N.E.2d 728 [1974] ).

Whatever the strategy of omission, we simply do not know whether Long's answer would have aided defendant's claim. The failure to include an affirmation from counsel, or an explanation for the failure to do so, has been held to warrant the summary denial of a defendant's postconviction motion (see People v. Morales, 58 N.Y.2d 1008, 1009, 461 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 448 N.E.2d 796 [1983] ; People v. Scott, 10 N.Y.2d 380, 381–382, 223 N.Y.S.2d 472, 179 N.E.2d 486 [1961] ). Of course, if defendant either obtains the requisite information from Long or Long proves uncooperative, he is permitted by statute to bring a subsequent CPL article 440 motion (see People v. Session, 34 N.Y.2d 254, 256, 357 N.Y.S.2d 409, 313 N.E.2d 728 [1974] ).

Here, defendant neither provided an affidavit from his attorney nor explained his efforts to obtain one (see CPL 440.30[4][b]; see also People v Morales, 58 NY2d 1008 [1983], citing People v Scott, 10 NY2d 380 [1961] [failure to supply attorney's affirmation warranted summary denial of motion collaterally attacking conviction based on attorney's alleged conduct]). Perhaps such failure is explained by the inclusion of an affirmation from Mr. Baker in the People's opposition papers.

Here, defendant neither provided an affidavit from his attorney nor explained his efforts to obtain one (see CPL 440.30[b]; see also People v Morales, 58 NY2d 1008, citing People v Scott, 10 NY2d 380 [failure to supply attorney's affirmation warranted summary denial of motion collaterally attacking conviction based on attorney's alleged conduct]). Perhaps such failure is explained by the inclusion of an affirmation from Mr. Baker in the People's opposition papers.