Opinion
November 27, 1989
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Felig, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that the court improperly imposed a greater sentence than that which had been promised was not preserved for appellate review as she did not object nor did she move to vacate her plea (see, People v Belsito, 130 A.D.2d 583; People v Polanksy, 125 A.D.2d 342; People v Ifill, 108 A.D.2d 202). In any event, the court had clearly conditioned the promised sentence upon, inter alia, the defendant's cooperation with the Probation Department. The defendant failed to fulfill that condition and the proffered explanation for such failure was vague, unsubstantiated and insufficient (see, People v Asencio, 143 A.D.2d 917).
We find that the defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. A review of the record shows that acceptance of the plea offer greatly reduced the defendant's sentencing exposure. In advising the defendant to accept that offer, her attorney afforded her meaningful representation and thereby satisfied the constitutional requirements (see, People v Satterfield, 66 N.Y.2d 796; People v Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137; People v Rivera, 71 N.Y.2d 705; People v Saggese, 135 A.D.2d 669, 670; People v Hidalgo, 120 A.D.2d 675). Defense counsel's failure to move to withdraw the defendant's plea or to object to the enhanced sentence cannot be characterized as ineffective assistance of counsel since vacatur of the plea would have exposed the defendant to a substantially greater period of incarceration if she were convicted under the original charges. Lawrence, J.P., Kunzeman, Eiber and Harwood, JJ., concur.