Opinion
4-23-0364
12-05-2023
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT P. MONROE, Defendant-Appellant.
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County No. 20CF184 Honorable William G. Workman, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice DeArmond and Justice Doherty concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
ZENOFF, JUSTICE.
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court did not impose an excessive sentence for defendant's conviction of retail theft.
¶ 2 In February 2021, defendant, Robert Monroe, pleaded guilty to one count of retail theft (720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) (West 2020)). The trial court sentenced defendant to eight years in the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC). Defendant appeals, arguing his sentence is excessive. Defendant asks this court to reduce his sentence or, alternatively, to vacate his sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing. We affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 A. Indictment and Guilty Plea
¶ 5 In March 2020, a grand jury indicted defendant on two counts of retail theft: count I as a Class 3 felony on the basis that the value of the merchandise exceeded $300 in value (720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1), (f)(3) (West 2020)) and count II as a Class 4 felony on the basis that defendant was previously convicted of retail theft (720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1), (f)(4) (West 2020)).
¶ 6 In February 2021, defendant pleaded guilty to count I in an open plea and the State agreed to dismiss count II. The trial court admonished defendant that he could be sentenced to between 5 to 10 years in prison because he was eligible for an extended-term sentence. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(1) (West 2020) (permitting an extended-term sentence where the defendant was previously convicted of the same or greater class felony); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-40(a) (West 2020) ("The sentence of imprisonment for an extended term Class 3 felony *** shall be a term not less than 5 years and not more than 10 years.").
¶ 7 The State provided a factual basis for the guilty plea. An employee of All About Eyes, an eyeglass business in Bloomington, Illinois, witnessed a male suspect conceal two pairs of designer eyeglasses in his clothing and leave the store without paying for them. The incident was also captured on store surveillance video. Defendant was later identified as the person who stole the merchandise, which had a total retail value of $950. Defense counsel stipulated the State could call witnesses that would testify substantially to the factual basis given by the State.
¶ 8 The trial court set the sentencing hearing for April 2021.
¶ 9 B. Sentencing Hearing
¶ 10 Defendant failed to appear for the initial sentencing hearing, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. In December 2022, defendant was arrested in an unrelated case.
¶ 11 In January 2023, the trial court held the sentencing hearing. The presentence investigation report (PSI) submitted to the court indicated defendant had a lengthy criminal history dating back to 1985. Defendant's criminal record included 11 felonies, 2 misdemeanors, 1 driving under the influence offense, 2 ordinance violations, and 38 traffic violations. The PSI indicated defendant was on parole when he was arrested in the present case.
¶ 12 The PSI also described defendant's long history of mental illness and substance abuse. Defendant's parents married and divorced twice by the time defendant was a teenager, and his father, whom defendant lived with, "had an alcohol problem." As an adult, defendant was repeatedly hospitalized due to his severe mental illness and began receiving intermittent treatment at multiple mental health facilities beginning as early as 2012. He had attempted to take his own life on three separate occasions.
¶ 13 In January 2013, defendant was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, cocaine dependence, and severe post-traumatic stress disorder. In October 2015, defendant was additionally diagnosed with a mood disorder, polysubstance abuse disorder, and antisocial personality traits. During a 2018 comprehensive assessment at Memorial Health Systems in Springfield, Illinois, defendant reported he engaged in stealing" 'to feel better and instead of trying to kill himself,'" and asked "for assistance with figuring himself out and to stop stealing."
¶ 14 The PSI indicated defendant had struggled with substance abuse for over 20 years. Defendant stated he first tried cannabis in high school and eventually began using two or three grams of crack cocaine daily since the age of 28 years old. Defendant stated he was" 'not much of a drinker,'" but he had consumed alcohol on the occasions he attempted to take his own life. Defendant indicated he received substance abuse treatment at various facilities over the past decade but records from some of those facilities were unavailable. In September 2020, defendant entered an outpatient program at Gateway Foundation in Springfield but was discharged before completing the program.
¶ 15 The State recommended an eight-year prison sentence. The State noted defendant was eligible for an extended-term sentence and he had previous opportunities for probation from which he was unsuccessfully discharged. Defendant also had multiple prior theft-related convictions, including a residential burglary conviction. The State requested a sentence at the higher end of the permissible range to deter defendant and others from committing retail theft.
¶ 16 Defense counsel requested a community-based sentence of 30 months' probation. Counsel acknowledged defendant's "long history of crimes of dishonesty" but asserted defendant wanted to get help to stop stealing. Counsel emphasized defendant's long-term struggle with mental illness and substance abuse, including one of the attempts at taking his own life. She pointed out that defendant was remorseful and willing to take responsibility for his actions. Defendant had also successfully completed probation in a 2005 felony theft case in Tazewell County. Counsel argued that treatment for defendant's mental illness and substance abuse, and not a prison sentence, would fix his underlying issues.
¶ 17 Following the parties' arguments, defendant gave a statement on his own behalf. Defendant stated he did not purposely avoid his sentencing hearing. He explained he was attempting to resolve a matter pending in another county so he could be placed in drug court or mental health court before appearing for sentencing in the present case.
¶ 18 The trial court sentenced defendant to eight years in prison. The court indicated it considered the PSI, defendant's statement in allocution, arguments by the parties, and the financial impact of incarceration. Next, the court noted defendant had two pending theft cases, but it clarified that it was not considering the pending cases for sentencing purposes. The court stated it considered the "factors in aggravation and mitigation, both by statute and nonstatutory," and found "very few factors in mitigation that speak out for the defense." The court agreed defendant's offense was "not a crime of violence and he did not anticipate anyone to have been harmed in this situation." However, the court found that two aggravating factors stood out: (1) defendant's lengthy criminal history and (2) the need to deter others from similar conduct. The court ultimately concluded, "to impose a sentence of a community based sentence would deprecate the seriousness of this conduct and would be inconsistent with the ends of justice."
¶ 19 Before imposing the sentence, the trial court also noted defendant was 54 years old and commented that "[u]sually, by this age, criminal conduct is long past in your history. But you have demonstrated that you are the exception rather than the rule."
¶ 20 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied.
¶ 21 This appeal followed.
¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 23 Defendant argues his eight-year sentence was excessive given the mitigating evidence presented to the trial court. Specifically, defendant contends the court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to eight years in prison because defendant has significant mental health and substance abuse issues, pled guilty and showed remorse, and did not cause physical harm while committing the offense. According to defendant, the court "placed outsized importance" on his lengthy, but nonviolent, criminal history, while failing to consider relevant mitigating factors.
¶ 24 A. Standard of Review
¶ 25 "The trial court has broad discretionary powers in imposing a sentence, and its sentencing decisions are entitled to great deference." People v. Alexander, 239 Ill.2d 205, 212 (2010) (citing People v. Stacey, 193 Ill.2d 203, 209 (2000)). The court must carefully consider all factors in aggravation and mitigation, including "the defendant's age, demeanor, habits, mentality, credibility, criminal history, general moral character, social environment, and education, as well as the nature and circumstances of the crime and of defendant's conduct in the commission of it." People v. Center, 198 Ill.App.3d 1025, 1033 (1990). Unlike the reviewing court, which must rely on a "cold record," the trial court weighs the factors, having directly observed the defendant and the proceedings. People v. Fern, 189 Ill.2d 48, 53 (1999).
¶ 26 A reviewing court will not disturb a sentence that falls within the statutory range permissible for an offense absent an abuse of discretion. People v Jones, 168 Ill.2d 367, 373-74 (1995). The trial court abuses its discretion when a sentence is "greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense." Stacey, 193 Ill.2d at 210. We must "proceed with great caution" not to substitute our judgment for the trial court's merely because we would have weighed the factors differently. Fern, 189 Ill.2d at 53.
¶ 27 B. Defendant's Sentence Was Not Excessive
¶ 28 We first note that defendant was eligible for an extended-term sentence, with a permissible sentencing range of 5 to 10 years' imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-40(a), 5-5-3.2(b)(1) (West 2022). Because the trial court's eight-year sentence was within the statutory range provided by the legislature, we presume that defendant's sentence is proper. People v. Wheeler, 2019 IL App (4th) 160937, ¶ 38.
¶ 29 For the reasons that follow, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant.
¶ 30 1. Mental Illness, Substance Abuse, and Difficult Childhood
¶ 31 Defendant first argues the trial court "failed to give adequate consideration" to his mental illness, struggles with drug abuse, and difficult childhood as factors in mitigation.
¶ 32 "[T]his court, like others, has recognized that a history of substance abuse is a double-edged sword at the aggravation/mitigation phase of the penalty hearing." People v. Madej, 177 Ill.2d 116, 138 (1997). "Simply because the defendant views his drug abuse history as mitigating does not require the sentencer to do so." People v. Shatner, 174 Ill.2d 133, 159 (1996). Similarly, evidence of a defendant's turbulent childhood can be viewed as an aggravating factor. People v. Montgomery, 192 Ill.2d 642, 673 (2000). It is within the discretion of the trial court to view mental illness or substance abuse as either mitigating or aggravating, depending" 'on whether the individual hearing the evidence finds that it evokes compassion or demonstrates possible future dangerousness.' "Madej, 177 Ill.2d at 139 (quoting People v. Tenner, 175 Ill.2d 372, 382 (1997)).
¶ 33 Here, the record shows a pattern of repeated, yet unsuccessful, attempts by defendant to address his mental illness and drug abuse. Although defendant acknowledged at one point that his mental health and drug abuse caused him to steal, he also persisted in refusing or avoiding treatment. Defendant's medical history to this point shows he has been unresponsive to treatment for his underlying issues. As such, the trial court was under no obligation to view defendant's mental illness, drug abuse, or difficult childhood as factors in mitigation.
¶ 34 Defendant also claims the trial court never addressed his assertion that he stole as a coping mechanism for his mental health and substance abuse issues. However, the court is not required to recite every sentencing factor when rendering its sentencing decision. People v. McDonald, 322 Ill.App.3d 244, 251 (2001). "If the record contains evidence of mitigating factors, we presume that the court considered this evidence unless there is some indication, other than the sentence imposed, to the contrary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Weiser, 2013 IL App (5th) 120055, ¶ 31. The PSI, which was submitted to and considered by the court, included defendant's statement that he stole as a coping mechanism. As there is no indication to the contrary, we presume the court considered this information.
¶ 35 Defendant further argues his "criminal conduct would be unlikely to recur if he were to receive adequate support and treatment" for his underlying issues. Yet, as the State points out, defendant had previous opportunities to address his mental health and substance abuse issues, and each time, he failed to do so or made no significant progress in his treatment. Defendant began receiving outpatient mental health services in 2013, and he voluntarily admitted himself into inpatient treatment in 2014. However, defendant later refused inpatient substance abuse treatment in 2015 because he thought" 'rehab was useless.'" Defendant was also unsuccessfully terminated from mental health recovery court programs in 2016 and 2017 felony retail theft cases. The record shows, despite the numerous opportunities for treatment over the years, defendant has not responded to interventions and has continued in his criminal conduct.
¶ 36 Therefore, the trial court could have reasonably concluded defendant's mental illness, substance abuse, and difficult childhood all weighed as factors in aggravation.
¶ 37 2. Plea of Guilty and Remorse
¶ 38 Next, defendant claims he showed remorse for his actions and acknowledged his mistakes by pleading guilty, which should weigh in favor of minimizing his sentence. "Admission of fault has been recognized as a first step toward rehabilitation and should be treated as a factor in mitigation." People v. Pippen, 324 Ill.App.3d 649, 653 (2001). While defendant is correct that showing remorse and pleading guilty can be viewed as mitigating, neither factor is determinative. "The existence of mitigating factors does not obligate the trial court to reduce a sentence from the maximum allowed." Pippen, 324 Ill.App.3d at 653. The court could have reasonably concluded that the aggravating factors in this case outweighed any mitigating effects of defendant's guilty plea or remorse for his actions.
¶ 39 3. Criminal Background
¶ 40 Defendant next asserts the trial court "placed outsized importance" on defendant's nonviolent criminal history. Although lacking in violent offenses, defendant's criminal history is nonetheless quite extensive and includes several felony convictions. Most notably, this was not defendant's first theft-related conviction. Defendant committed the present offense following 12 prior theft-related convictions, including: (1) a 1986 case resulting in one residential burglary conviction and four burglary convictions, (2) a 2005 felony theft conviction and felony retail theft conviction, (3) a 2006 retail theft conviction, (4) a 2016 felony theft conviction, (5) a 2017 felony retail theft conviction, (6) a 2018 felony retail theft conviction, and (7) a 2018 felony theft conviction. Even after serving multiple sentences of incarceration, defendant continued in his conduct of theft . Defendant's most recent felony theft conviction, for which he served a two-year sentence in the DOC, was apparently not enough to deter him from continuing to steal.
¶ 41 Moreover, the trial court found the sentence was necessary to deter others from similar criminal conduct. The need to deter others is an appropriate factor for the court to consider when imposing a more severe sentence. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(7) (West 2022). The court reasonably concluded that, given defendant's lengthy criminal history, a community-based sentence would "deprecate the seriousness" of defendant's conduct. See People v. Quintana, 332 Ill.App.3d 96, 109 (2002) ("The seriousness of the crimes is the most important factor in determining an appropriate sentence, not the presence of mitigating factors.").
¶ 42 We remind defendant that our review is limited to ascertaining an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Defendant's contention that the court below "placed outsized importance" on defendant's criminal history goes to the weight placed on this factor. Defendant is in effect asking us to reweigh the sentencing factors, which we cannot do. "A reviewing court does not reweigh the factors involved in a trial court's sentencing decision." Pippen, 324 Ill.App.3d at 653.
¶ 43 The trial court properly considered defendant's criminal history in fashioning defendant's sentence.
¶ 44 4. Age
¶ 45 Defendant also takes exception with the trial court treating his age as a factor in aggravation. We are not aware of any authority which precludes the court from considering age as an aggravating factor. See Pippen, 324 Ill.App.3d at 652 (rejecting age as a mitigating factor for 39-year-old defendant). At the time of his sentencing, defendant was 54 years old. The court recognized that defendant had not aged out of his criminal behavior. Accordingly, the court properly considered defendant's age in sentencing him.
¶ 46 In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to eight years in prison, and we will not disturb his sentence as a result.
¶ 47 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 48 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 49 Affirmed.