Opinion
A148669
08-04-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JESSE JAMES MONREAL, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Napa County Super. Ct. No. CR176095)
A probation search of appellant Jesse James Monreal's listed residence, conducted in his absence, yielded a gun, ammunition, and cocaine from a locked safe in a bedroom closet. Monreal was convicted by jury of being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)), possession of ammunition by a felon (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)), and possession of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)). Monreal contends the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the contraband items were his. We affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
I. BACKGROUND
Monreal was on probation in April 2015. The terms of his probation provided that his residence was subject to search without warrant. From 2009 through November 2015, Monreal's listed address with his probation officer was 1105 Headlands Drive in Napa.
Monreal was required to maintain an accurate address of record with the probation office. He self-reported the Napa address to the probation office in 2009 and 2013, and he reported a change of address to Vallejo in November 2015.
On April 22, 2015, law enforcement officers went to 1105 Headlands Drive to conduct a probation search. Receiving no response to an announcement of their presence, the officers entered the residence through an open side garage door. In the house, officers again announced their presence and received no response. While conducting a protective sweep of the home, officers entered a bedroom that had "young male clothing" both on the bed and in the closet, "several items of paperwork" addressed to Monreal, "pictures of a young child," and "other things being in line with being occupied by a young male." Mail addressed to Monreal was located in the bathroom adjoining this bedroom, along with a marijuana pipe, a marijuana grinder, and two digital scales. The documents included materials regarding automobile insurance, worker's compensation, a Napa County District Attorney's Office criminal complaint, and correspondence from a financial indemnity company, a credit union, and a health insurance company. Documents with Monreal's name were found on the kitchen refrigerator.
Monreal was 25 years old at the time of trial.
A locked shoebox-size electronic safe was found in the bedroom closet. The safe was forced open. Inside was a nine-millimeter semi-automatic pistol, a box of 120 rounds of ammunition, and a bag of white powdery substance, later analyzed as consisting of 5.099 grams of cocaine. The gun had been reported stolen from the state of Pennsylvania in 2005.
The house had two additional bedrooms. One bedroom appeared to belong to Monreal's parents and contained photographs of an older couple. The other bedroom contained paperwork addressed to a different individual.
Monreal's father, Paul, arrived as officers were leaving the house. An officer reported that Paul appeared "taken aback" and "surprised" when told the officers had found a gun, ammunition and cocaine in a safe in a bedroom closet. Paul did not claim the items were his own.
We refer to Monreal's father by first name to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended.
Paul telephoned Monreal, who then spoke to California Highway Patrol Officer Patrick Ensley. Monreal confirmed that he currently resided at 1105 Headlands Drive. Monreal admitted a safe was in his bedroom. When confronted with the safe's contents, Monreal said he had purchased the gun on the street for target shooting. He initially claimed the white powder was ground up Advil pills, but then admitted the substance was cocaine purchased for personal use.
When arrested on September 15, 2015, Monreal insisted he did not live at the Headlands address at the time of the search. Monreal said he was only storing some belongings at the residence. He did not, however, deny that the items seized from the safe belonged to him. Monreal was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), possession of ammunition by a felon (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)), receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)), and possession of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)).
At trial, Monreal testified that he did not live at the Headlands address and lived in Fairfield with his girlfriend and daughter, at either his girlfriend's father's home or her mother's home. Monreal did not update his address with probation to reflect the change of residence. He said his mother would sometimes put documents on the refrigerator to give to him. Monreal denied telling Ensley that he lived at the Headlands address, or that the gun and cocaine were his. He denied that the safe, gun, ammunition, and cocaine belonged to him.
Paul testified that Ensley spoke to him outside the home, but did not show him a gun or drugs. He told Ensley that Monreal had not lived at the Napa residence for a year and a half, that Monreal sometimes received mail at a family post office box, and that he or his wife would leave Monreal's mail on the refrigerator so they would remember to give it to him. Paul said he slept in the bedroom that police believed was Monreal's. Paul claimed that many of the items in the bedroom and bathroom, including the safe and its contents, belonged to him and not Monreal.
On May 3, 2016, a jury acquitted Monreal of receiving stolen property, but convicted him on all other counts. The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Monreal on probation for a period of five years, with a condition that he serve a term of 90 days in county jail. Monreal filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Monreal's sole contention on appeal is that the evidence failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed or controlled the items found in the safe. "Claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a judgment are generally reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. Under that standard, ' "an appellate court reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find [the elements of the crime] beyond a reasonable doubt." ' " (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 630-631.) We " 'presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence.' " (People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87.) Moreover, "it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends." (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403.) Reversal is required only if " 'it appears "that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction]." ' " (People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 508.) Given this deferential standard of review, a "defendant bears an enormous burden in claiming there is insufficient evidence" to support a conviction. (People v. Veale (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 40, 46.) B. Possession
A violation of section 29800, subdivision (a)(1) requires proof that a convicted felon knowingly possessed a firearm. (People v. White (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 512, 524 [" 'statutory elements of a violation of [former § 12021, subd. (a)(1)] . . . are that a person, who has previously been convicted of a felony, had in his or her possession or under his or her custody or control any firearm' "].) A convicted felon who is prohibited from owning or possessing a firearm may also not knowingly possess ammunition. The elements of possession of a controlled substance "are physical or constructive possession thereof, coupled with knowledge of the presence and narcotic character of the drug." (People v. Williams (1971) 5 Cal.3d 211, 215.) Possession of contraband may be actual or constructive. (People v. Brimmer (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 782, 795.) "Constructive possession occurs when the accused maintains control or a right to control the contraband; possession may be imputed when the contraband is found in a place which is immediately and exclusively accessible to the accused and subject to his dominion and control, or to the joint dominion and control of the accused and another." (Williams, at p. 215.) Constructive possession "is established by showing a knowing exercise of dominion and control" over it. (People v. Mejia (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1272.)
Section 29800, subdivision (a)(1) provides: "Any person who has been convicted of a felony . . . and who owns, purchases, receives, or has in possession or under custody or control any firearm is guilty of a felony." Monreal does not dispute that he is a convicted felon.
Section 30305, subdivision (a)(1) provides: "No person prohibited from owning or possessing a firearm . . . shall own, possess, or have under custody or control, any ammunition or reloaded ammunition."
Monreal asserts the prosecution did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed any of the contraband items, or that in the case of the firearm and ammunition, that those items were within his custody or control. He insists the prosecution "did not offer any evidence that contraband found in a fourth degree nestled space—(1) in a locked safe (2) which was stored in a closet (3) of an upstairs bedroom (4) in a jointly occupied house—actually belonged to [Monreal]." We disagree. C. Trial Evidence
We find Monreal's repeated mischaracterization of the evidence disturbing. Monreal first insists there was insufficient proof he resided at 1105 Headlands Drive at the time of the search. Not so. Monreal self-reported Headlands Drive as his residence, but he claims the self-reported address was "the only indication of [Monreal's] stay in this home." Also incorrect. Clothing and photographs consistent with occupancy by a young man were found in the bedroom, as were documents in Monreal's name. Correspondence and documents addressed to Monreal were found on the kitchen refrigerator, and in the bedroom and adjoining bathroom. More directly, in his telephone conversation with Ensley, Monreal confirmed he then resided at 1105 Headlands Drive. That Monreal presented contrary evidence at trial matters not. The jury quite clearly did not find the contrary evidence persuasive. "[I]t is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends." (People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 403.)
Monreal next contends there was insufficient evidence that he actually lived in the bedroom where the contraband was found. Monreal again ignores his admissions to the probation officer and to Ensley that he lived in the house, and points to no evidence in the record indicating he lived elsewhere in the house. Monreal dismisses the personal indicia found in the bedroom and puzzlingly asserts that the paperwork found with his name in the bedroom "forged no temporal nexus between [Monreal] and the bedroom space" because three of the items found were dated November 2015, January 2014, and August 2011, and "Ensley did not recover any paperwork in appellant's room that was dated in 2016." The search was conducted on April 22, 2015. There was testimony that one document was dated "November 6th, 2015," but this was quite obviously a misstatement. Monreal ultimately ignores entirely our required focus " 'on the whole record of evidence presented to the trier of fact, rather than on " 'isolated bits of evidence.' " ' " (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1329.)
Finally, Monreal argues there was no proof he used the closet and safe. Again untrue. While acknowledging Ensley's testimony that Monreal admitted owning the safe and its contents, Monreal contends that evidence is insufficient to support a conviction because it is disputed and "otherwise uncorroborated." Monreal recognizes the rule that "unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction" (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181), but maintains Ensley's testimony was inherently improbable. " ' "To warrant the rejection of the statements given by a witness who has been believed by a trial court, there must exist either a physical impossibility that they are true, or their falsity must be apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions." ' " (People v. Allen (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 616, 623.) We find nothing inherently improbable in the testimony, and we decline Monreal's obvious invitation to reweigh the evidence.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
BRUINIERS, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
SIMONS, Acting P. J. /s/_________
NEEDHAM, J.