Opinion
D075192
06-18-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSEPH D. MOLINA, Defendant and Appellant.
Christine M. Aros, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Michael D. Butera, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. SCN388947) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Daniel S. Belsky, Judge. Affirmed in part. Remanded with instructions. Christine M. Aros, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Michael D. Butera, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Joseph D. Molina was charged with and convicted of grand theft firearm and unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle after he was discovered by police inside the cab of a stolen Ford Ranger truck and in possession of stolen, loaded firearms. The firearms had been unloaded and stored in a locked toolbox in the bed of the truck at the time of the theft. He was sentenced to two years in prison and issued a $2,400 restitution fine as well as various assessments and fees.
On appeal Molina sets forth six contentions: (1) the jury instructions were incomplete because grand theft firearm requires proof of intent to steal the firearm; (2) grand theft firearm does not constitute a serious felony under Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c) resulting in a strike for future sentencing; (3) there was insufficient evidence to convict Molina of grand theft firearm and unlawful taking and driving of a vehicle; (4) the sentence for count 2, unlawful taking and driving a vehicle, should have been stayed under section 654; (5) any restitution and revocation fines must be reduced based on that stay; and (6) the fines, fees, and assessments should have been stayed to determine his ability to pay.
Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
We disagree that there is a special intent requirement for grand theft firearm, and we will affirm the jury instructions as given. We lack jurisdiction to consider whether the conviction for grand theft firearm constitutes a serious felony in the event that Molina is subsequently convicted of another felony. We conclude there was substantial evidence for the jury to convict Molina of grand theft firearm and unlawful taking and driving a vehicle, and we will affirm the convictions on those counts. However, we agree with Molina that the sentence for unlawful taking and driving a vehicle should have been stayed under section 654, and any part of the restitution fine based on the sentence that should have been stayed is invalid. Accordingly, we will remand the matter with directions to stay the sentence on count 2 and reconsider any fine based on it. Because the trial court will have an opportunity to revisit its fines, fees, and assessments on remand, we decline to reach a conclusion on that contention.
II.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL FACTS
On July 17, 2018, after working the night shift, Jose G. arrived home around 9:30 a.m., parked his Ford Ranger on the street about 20 feet from the end of his driveway in Pomona, locked the truck, and went inside. He usually left a spare key inside the glove compartment, as well as a small bag of tools in the back seat. He also left ammunition underneath the seat, some shotgun shells under the passenger seat, magazines for the long rifle in a compartment by the cupholder, and his Boost Mobil ZTE Warp cell phone in the vehicle. There was a locked toolbox in the bed of the truck that contained three unloaded firearms: a 10/22 LR Ruger semi-automatic rifle and two Rossi single barrel 12 gauge shot guns.
He reported the truck and firearms stolen around 5:00 p.m. on July 17, 2018.
About three days after the truck was taken, Jose G. received a Google account notification of photos being taken on the phone, which was connected to his cloud account. There were three photos, with time and date stamps listing them as taken around 5:48 p.m. July 17, 2018. One of the photos showed the bed of the truck and the long rifle taken from the toolbox. Other photos showed the subwoofer and amplifier, which were inside the truck. He also received a notification indicating that a new person had logged onto his device to use email. The email address belonged to Molina.
On July 20, 2018, just before 4:00 a.m., San Diego Deputy Sheriff Travis Womack received an email alert from a license plate reader about a stolen vehicle in the vicinity of the Vista station. The alert provided the plate number and approximate location of the vehicle. Deputy Womack verified the plate was connected to a stolen vehicle, and he learned the vehicle was taken with two shotguns and a rifle inside.
As Deputy Womack approached the driver's side of the Ford Ranger, he could see a person lying on the bench seat; that person was later identified as Molina. Molina was leaning toward the passenger-side door, with his legs in the floorboard area near the center, where the gear shift would be. After Molina was alerted to police presence, he sat up into the passenger seat, and he exited the vehicle on the passenger side, where other deputies were waiting.
The key hole on the driver-side door had been punched out, and there was a valet-style key in the ignition that went with the vehicle. Deputies found a loaded rifle under the lip of the bench seat. They also found ammunition in the glove box for a .22 caliber, and a Ruger magazine behind the bench. When they asked Molina where the other guns were, he told them he left them in the toolbox in the bed of the truck, and those weapons were stolen from there.
Police found a pocket knife, a syringe, and a cell phone on Molina's person. A search of the cell phone showed the settings had been changed to Molina's name, along with a photograph of Molina. The phone also had photos of the stolen truck, the toolbox, a subwoofer, one of the rifles, and a selfie of someone who was not Molina. There were emails on the phone that showed Molina had logged onto the device on July 17. There were also ads on an application called Letgo offering to sell the toolbox and subwoofer.
Jose G. testified that he did not know Molina or give Molina permission to drive or possess his car, or to possess his firearms or his cell phone.
Deputy Sheriff Dylan Haddad testified that he had interviewed Molina at the Vista station, and Molina told the deputy he lived in LaVerne, about a five-minute drive from Pomona, from where the truck was stolen.
Other testimony and evidence addressed whether Molina was under the influence of narcotics at the time of his arrest, but because those charges are not at issue in the matter before us, we do not detail that information.
The amended information charged Molina with five counts: grand theft firearm (count 1; Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (d)(2)); unlawful taking and driving a vehicle valued greater than $950 (count 2; Veh. Code § 10851, subd. (a)); buying, receiving, concealing, selling, or withholding a stolen vehicle (count 3; Pen. Code, § 496d); carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle when the firearm is stolen (count 4; Pen. Code, §§ 25850, subd. (a) & 25850, subd. (c)(2)); and being under the influence of a controlled substance with a firearm (count 5; Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (e)).
The case proceeded to trial, and the jury was given instructions for these five counts, as well as lesser-included offenses of unlawfully taking and driving a vehicle valued at less than $950 (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d). It returned guilty verdicts on counts 1, 2, 4, and 5.
Molina was sentenced to two years for count 1, then two years concurrently for each of counts 2, 4, and 5, for a total sentence of 2 years. He was issued a $2,400 restitution fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (b)) and a $2,400 parole revocation fine, suspended (Pen. Code, § 1202.45). He was charged a $615 drug program fee (Health & Saf. Code, § 11372.7, subd. (a)), a $160 court operations assessment (Pen. Code, § 1465.8), a $120 conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373), and $154 under Government Code section 29550.
Molina timely appealed.
III.
DISCUSSION
A. There is No Special Intent Requirement for Grand Theft Firearm
1. Additional Facts
Defense counsel requested a jury instruction specific to section 487, subdivision (d)(2) because the pattern jury instructions do not offer an instruction unique to grand theft firearm. She argued that because the grand theft charge involved a firearm, there was an implicit requirement that the defendant must know he is stealing a firearm at the time of the taking. She asked the court to instruct the jury that the prosecution was required to prove Molina had knowledge that he was taking firearms when he took the truck.
To support her request, defense counsel cited to People v. Rodola (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1505, a case that addresses section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(26), which lists "grand theft involving a firearm" as a serious felony for sentencing purposes. The court there concluded the use of "involving" in section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(26) meant the firearm had to be used to effect the crime or as the object of the crime. (Rodola, at p. 1508.) Defense counsel argued that because grand theft firearm could only be considered a serious felony for purposes of future strikes if the firearm were the object of the theft here, the court should require such a factual finding by the jury.
Although the prosecutor agreed that no specific instruction exists for grand theft firearm, he argued the general theft instruction, CALCRIM No. 1800, was sufficient for the situation because it properly detailed the elements of the crime.
To support his position, he relied on People v. Campbell (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 599, 615 (Campbell), a case in which the defendant was convicted of grand theft firearm when the firearm had been contained inside a purse the defendant took. The prosecutor analogized the theft of the firearms here to a theft of the contents of a wallet or purse; even though a defendant would not know the contents at the time of the theft, the defendant still would be accountable for the items stolen inside.
Following a hearing and supplemental briefing on the issue, the court concluded section 487, subdivision (d)(2) does not require specific knowledge that the object of the theft was firearms and declined to offer such an instruction to the jury.
The instruction provided to the jury, CALCRIM No. 1800, stated: "The defendant is charged in Count One with grand theft of a firearm in violation of Penal Code section 484 and Penal Code section 487. [¶] To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant took possession of a firearm owned by someone else; [¶] 2. The defendant took the firearm without the owner's consent; [¶] 3. When the defendant took the firearm he intended to deprive the owner of it permanently; [¶] AND [¶] 4. The defendant moved the firearm, even a small distance, and kept it for any period of time, however brief."
2. Analysis
Molina challenges the intent requirement, arguing that knowledge of the specific property stolen should be inferred as part of the mens rea requirement for grand theft firearm. He contends the failure to instruct the jury on this point was erroneous.
Molina's opening brief argues that in the absence of " 'a finding that a grand theft was committed using a firearm or that the firearm was the intended object of the theft,' the conviction should not be deemed a strike and serious felony." In the reply brief, he expands the argument, contending that the lack of specific knowledge of the firearms in the vehicle means he should not have been convicted of grand theft firearm.
We review the validity of jury instructions de novo and determine whether the instructions accurately state the law. (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218; People v. Hernandez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 559, 568). We similarly review the refusal to give a pinpoint instruction de novo. (Posey, at p. 218.)
Section 484, which makes larceny a crime, states that every person who steals or drives away personal property of another is guilty of theft. Grand theft occurs when the value of the personal property exceeds $950. (§ 487, subds. (a).) Section 487, subdivision (d)(2) specifies that grand theft firearm occurs when the property taken is a firearm. Although there is no pattern instruction specific to section 487, subdivision (d)(2), CALCRIM No. 1800, theft by larceny, applies to theft of personal property including firearms. It requires proof that the defendant took possession of property of another without consent and intended to deprive the owner of the property permanently. (CALCRIM No. 1800.)
Specific intent is required because the defendant must intend to deprive the owner of property the defendant takes that belongs to the owner. (See People v. Gomez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 249, 254-255 ["Larceny requires the taking of another's property, with the intent to steal and carry it away"]; CALCRIM No. 1800.) Neither the elements of the crime nor the plain language of the instruction require the defendant to have knowledge of the details of the property taken. (See CALCRIM No. 1800.) There is no requirement that a defendant must intend to take every item concealed within a container when he steals the container. The intent to steal the owner's possessions is sufficient.
Campbell is directly on point. There, a firearm was contained inside a purse the defendant took. (Campbell, supra, 63 Cal.App.3d at p. 615.) The defendant argued that while there was evidence he intended to steal the purse, there was no evidence he intended to steal the firearm; thus, he did not form the required mens rea. (Ibid.) The court explained that because the defendant intended to steal the purse, he also intended to steal the contents of the purse, whatever that included, in that case a gun. (Campbell, at p. 615.) Therefore, the scienter requirement was met.
The appellate court in Campbell commented it was persuasive to think of a defendant's intent to purposely act with respect to one object as transferring to a different object because it places responsibility on the person who violates the law. (Campbell, supra, 63 Cal.App.3d at p. 615, fn. 11.) The Supreme Court subsequently applied transferred intent to explain that "those who intend to steal are guilty of the theft of all the property they actually take." (In re Jesus O. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 859, 868 (Jesus O.).)
Other case law similarly describes the required mental state for theft crimes as the intent to steal, not intent to steal specific property. (See, e.g., Jesus O., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 868 [no requirement to intend to steal specific property]; People v. Davis (1998) 19 Cal.4th 301, 305, 317-219 [theft crimes generally require only the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession of property].) For example, in Jesus O., the defendant, who was charged with assault, intended to steal money from a person. (Jesus O., at p. 861.) Instead of money, the defendant took the victim's cell phone, which the victim had dropped when he fled. (Ibid.) The defendant argued there was no union of act and intent because he did not intend to steal a phone when he assaulted the victim. (Id. at pp. 865, 867.) The Supreme Court explained that while there was no evidence the defendant intended to steal the cell phone until it was discarded from the victim's person, there was nonetheless evidence of intent to steal property of some kind when he approached the victim. (Id. at p. 868.) The request for money rather than a phone was not significant; "[t]he required mental state is an intent to steal, not an intent to steal specific property." (Ibid.)
We recognize the defendant in Jesus O. knew what property he was taking when he picked up the cell phone, while Molina may not have known there were firearms in the vehicle when he took the truck. This does not change our analysis because the specifics of the property taken are not important to establish intent: "[G]eneralized intent to steal . . . satisfies the larcenous intent element of grand theft." (Jesus O., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 868.)
Citing to People v. Taylor (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 933, 937 (Taylor), Molina also argues that wrongful intent to steal the specific object should be inferred because the crime is not purely regulatory. In Taylor, the defendant was convicted of unlawfully possessing a cane sword. (Id. at p. 938.) He argued he did not know the cane contained a concealed sword. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court inferred a scienter requirement of actual knowledge "to protect against the significant possibility of punishing innocent possession by one who believes he or she simply has an ordinary cane." (Id. at p. 941.)
Taylor is inapplicable here. It addressed possession, an act which can occur innocently, and its decision was based on a "significant possibility" the defendant was innocent. (Taylor, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 938.) In contrast to the situation in Taylor, Molina did not innocently possess a vehicle that contained unlawful contraband. He stole the truck and everything in it, including firearms. His intent to steal satisfies the larcenous intent element of grand theft. Thus, the court's use of CALCRIM No. 1800 was proper here, as it correctly identified the elements of grand theft firearm. B. It is Premature to Determine Whether Molina's Grand Theft Firearm Conviction Qualifies as A Serious Felony Strike under Section 1192.7, Subdivision (c)(26)
While we conclude the required mens rea for counts 1 and 2 was the intent to steal property belonging to the victim by absconding with the vehicle and everything in it, we also note that in convicting Molina on counts 4 and 5, the jury found that Molina knew he was carrying a firearm and knew he was in possession of a firearm.
Molina asks us to determine whether grand theft firearm (§ 487, subd. (d)(2)) should be automatically viewed as a serious felony under section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(26). The Attorney General maintains that while Molina raised this issue before the trial court, because the court never ruled on the issue, the issue is not justiciable. Molina concedes the trial court never drew a conclusion regarding this issue. However, he asks us to reach a conclusion on the merits because the uncertainty of the potential impact of a conviction under section 487, subdivision (d)(2) prevented a successful plea negotiation.
Appellate courts only entertain justiciable issues. (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489.) Courts lack jurisdiction to review claims that are not ripe. (United States v. Streich (9th Cir. 2009) 560 F.3d 926, 931.) This is a question of timing; a claim is unripe if it relies on " 'contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.' [Citation.]" (Ibid.) While we recognize there is a specific factual context for the current crime, the issue presented regards the effect of the current conviction only if Molina commits a felony in the future. "[A]llegations of possible future injury" do not demonstrate a concrete injury in fact. (See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA (2013) 568 U.S. 398, 409 [injury in fact required for standing]; see also Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of Redwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1585 [claim unripe because it required speculation about unpredictable future events].) A court can determine whether the grand theft firearm constitutes a serious crime and a strike in the future if and when Molina commits a crime that would implicate that law.
Additionally, because the court did not decide the issue, we do not have jurisdiction to address it. "A reviewing court has jurisdiction over a direct appeal only when there is (1) an appealable order or (2) an appealable judgment." (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696.) We do not have jurisdiction to consider this argument on appeal because, as the parties agree, there is no order or judgment on the record for us to review. C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Convictions for Grand Theft
At the close of the prosecution's case in chief, Molina moved pursuant to section 1118.1 to dismiss the charges based upon alleged insufficiency of the evidence. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Molina renews his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, contending there was insufficient evidence to convict him of grand theft. As we explain, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions.
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence in support of a conviction for substantial evidence, reviewing the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 562.) Substantial evidence is that which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) We do not resolve credibility issues or evidentiary conflicts, and if a circumstance could either reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings or a contrary finding, this will not justify a reversal of the judgment. (People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 253; Zamudio, at p. 357.) This standard of review applies even in cases where the prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence. (Burney, at p. 253; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 792.)
It is "a long-standing rule of law" that a jury may "infer guilt of a theft-related crime from the fact a defendant is in possession of recently stolen property when coupled with slight corroboration by other inculpatory circumstances which tend to show guilt, [Citations.]" (People v. Barker (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1173; People v. O'Dell (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1574 (O'Dell).) This principle also applies to unlawful driving of a vehicle, Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a); "[k]nowledge that a vehicle was stolen, while not an element of the offense, may constitute evidence of the defendant's intent to deprive the owner of title and possession." (O'Dell, at p. 1574.)
Corroboration that accompanies possession of stolen property "may consist of no explanation, of an unsatisfactory explanation, or of other suspicious circumstances that would justify the inference." (O'Dell, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1575.) The corroborative evidence does not need to independently establish an inference of guilt. (Id. at p. 1576.) "It is for the jury to decide whether to make an inference of guilt based upon the totality of the evidence presented." (Ibid.)
To establish guilt, the prosecution must prove the defendant took or drove property belonging to another person without the owner's consent, and that the defendant intended to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of title or possession. (O'Dell, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1575.)
There is no question that the truck and firearms were taken from Jose G. without permission to take or use them. When peace officers recovered the vehicle less than three days after it was reported stolen, the entry key hole was damaged, evidence of forced entry, which supports an inference that there was intent to take and drive the vehicle without the owner's consent. (See In re J.R. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 805, 815-816.) It was clear the truck had been driven because it was recovered in Vista, a distance from Pomona, where the victim left it.
The issue here was the identity of the thief, and substantial evidence points to Molina. Molina alone was in possession of the truck and the firearms when the police arrested him. The valet key was in the ignition next to Molina, implying that the car had been driven recently or was ready to be driven.
Molina exhibited control of the items contained in the vehicle. For example, the recovered firearm was loaded when it had not been at the time of its theft, and Molina acknowledged at least some limited control over the other two weapons commenting they had been stolen out of the toolbox where he left them.
Molina was found in possession of the cell phone, which he had been using, as evidenced by his changes to the settings and his use of email, dating back to the day of the theft, suggesting his involvement in the theft of the truck. Molina was also the person offering for sale online the items taken from inside the vehicle, which he documented via photos taken using the stolen cell phone. This suggests he had possession of the items shortly after they were taken from the victim, and he planned to permanently deprive the owner of their possession.
Molina also lived near the location from which the vehicle had been stolen, and he was in possession of it in Vista, a significant distance away, again suggesting that Molina was directly involved in the truck's theft.
Finally, there is no reasonable, innocent explanation for Molina's possession of the stolen property; there were no facts that would suggest an innocent justification for his possession of the truck and firearms so far from the scene of the theft. This evidence, taken in a light most favorable to the judgment, is sufficient corroboration to cause a jury to determine that Molina was guilty. D. Count 2 Should Have Been Stayed Under Section 654
Molina contends the court improperly sentenced him for unlawful taking and driving a vehicle valued greater than $950 when that sentence should have been stayed under section 654. He further contends the restitution fine cannot properly be based on a stayed sentence. The Attorney General concedes that count 2 should have been stayed consistent with the rule that intent to steal is generalized and not tied to the specific object taken. As the Attorney General notes, the theft here was a single, indivisible act that resulted in the theft of both the vehicle and its contents.
Section 654, subdivision (a) provides that "[a]n act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision." It prohibits punishment for two crimes that arise from a single, indivisible course of conduct and serve the same criminal objective. (People v. Rodriguez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 501, 507; People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1208.) This requirement helps make the defendant's punishment commensurate with culpability. (Id. at p. 1205.)
The parties do not dispute that Molina's actions constituted a single course of conduct. Molina took the vehicle that contained the firearms. Because section 654 prohibits punishing Molina for both counts 1 and 2, we will direct the trial court to stay the concurrent sentence for count 2, and to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the stay.
A restitution fine awarded under section 1202.4 that is based on a sentence that should have been stayed is erroneous. (People v. Sencion (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 480, 483; People v. Le (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 925, 933-934.) The Attorney General concedes the restitution fine cannot be based on a stayed sentence but suggests there is no need to remand the matter for reconsideration of the fine amount because there is a split of authority as to whether a fine that falls within the statutory range must be reconsidered. (See Sencion, at p. 483 [harmless error where the amount issued fell within the statutory range]; but see People v. Gaynor (2019) 654, 809 [remanding matter even though amount fell within statutory range] and Le, at pp. 935-936 [reasonably probable trial court would have imposed smaller restitution fine after imposing stay].)
While there is some evidence here that the trial court based the restitution amount on the formula detailed in section 1202.4, subdivision (b)(2), which considers the number of felony counts, we cannot be sure. Because we do not know whether the court would have awarded a lesser amount, we will remand the matter for the trial court to reconsider the restitution fine. E. Restitution Fine and Other Fees and Assessments
Finally, although Molina did not challenge the restitution fine for inability to pay at the time of the sentencing hearing, he now asserts that the court-issued fines, fees, and assessments should be stayed to determine his ability to pay them. Because we will remand the matter for resentencing in light of the section 654 stay, the court will have an opportunity to consider this argument on remand.
DISPOSITION
We remand the matter and direct the court to modify the judgment by staying the sentence for count 2, pursuant to section 654. On remand, the court should consider its imposition of fines, fees, and assessments to determine what, if any, adjustments should be made. The court is directed to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect its changes and to forward an amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR: O'ROURKE, J. GUERRERO, J.