Opinion
E073265
05-20-2020
In re M.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. M.M., Defendant and Appellant.
James R. Bostwick, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Susan Elizabeth Miller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. RIJ600941) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Mark E. Peterson, Judge. Affirmed as modified. James R. Bostwick, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Susan Elizabeth Miller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant, M.M. (minor), admitted to one count of assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).) After a contested dispositional hearing, the court committed minor to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). Minor appealed.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
On appeal, minor argues the juvenile court abused its discretion when it committed minor to DJJ, because the record does not contain substantial evidence that minor would benefit from a placement with DJJ and that less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective. We affirm.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts are taken from the probation officer's report prepared prior to the dispositional hearing.
In 2016, minor was charged in Riverside County with inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, or mother of his child. (§ 273.5, subd. (a).) Minor admitted the allegation and was adjudged a ward of the court and committed to juvenile hall and a juvenile work program, all totaling less than 28 days.
On April 10, 2019, minor and his girlfriend E.C. were at their friend I.M.'s house together. All three left to attend a car show in Chino, California. I.M. took his own car, while minor drove E.C. in minor's car.
When they arrived at the parking lot holding the car show, J.W. drove up next to minor's car and cut minor off. J.W., minor, and I.M. were apparently feuding at the time. J.W. parked and got out of his car. J.W. approached I.M., who was sitting in his parked car. When J.W. arrived at I.M.'s car, he began to punch I.M. through I.M.'s open driver's side window.
Witnessing this incident, minor gunned his car towards J.W. Minor's car struck J.W., pinning him between minor's and I.M.'s car. After striking J.W., minor got out of his car and attempted to flee the scene, but was stopped by bystanders.
Minor admitted that he drove his car at J.W. to stop J.W. from assaulting I.M. However, minor told police that he did not intend to hit J.W., but lost control of his vehicle. Minor claimed he blacked out just before hitting J.W. J. W. survived, but his right leg needed to be amputated. I.M. suffered a lumbar sprain.
On April 12, 2019, the San Bernardino County District Attorney filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 charging minor with attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), aggravated mayhem (Pen. Code, § 205, subd. (a)(1)) and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)). The San Bernardino County Probation Department recommended that minor's new case remain in juvenile court rather than be transferred to adult court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code 707. The Riverside County Probation Department filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 alleging that minor violated a condition of his wardship by violating the law.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (a)(1), permits district attorneys to move to transfer a minor who is 16 years or older and is charged under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 to a court of criminal jurisdiction. The constitutionality of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 is currently under review by the California Supreme Court. (See O.G. v. Superior Court (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 626, review granted November 26, 2019, S259011.)
On June 20, 2019, minor admitted to one count of assault with a deadly weapon. The court granted the People's request to dismiss all other counts. Shortly thereafter, the San Bernardino case was transferred to Riverside County.
The Riverside County Juvenile Court held a dispositional hearing on July 22, 2019. The court committed minor to DJJ for a maximum term of five years. Despite its order committing minor to DJJ, the juvenile court also imposed probation conditions. The juvenile court also dismissed the Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 petition on motion of the People.
Minor timely appealed.
III. DISCUSSION
Minor argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by committing him to DJJ because there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that this commitment would probably benefit minor and that there were no less restrictive alternatives. We find that substantial evidence supports the minor's commitment to DJJ, and there was no abuse of discretion.
A. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Ordering Commitment to DJJ
1. Evidence Considered by the Juvenile Court
Before the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court considered minor's prior delinquency and school history, a report prepared by probation, a letter from minor, and an academic achievement report. At the dispositional hearing, the court heard from minor's parents and the victim.
Minor's personal history is mixed. Minor was expelled from elementary school in 2012 for taking a knife to school and suspended twice from middle school for fighting. Minor was diagnosed with bipolar disorder at age 14. In June 2019, minor's parents reported that minor was diagnosed with ADHD, oppositional defiance disorder, and depression. Minor was initially declared a ward of the court in 2016, after admitting to inflicting corporal injury on an intimate partner. A probation report dated March 9, 2017, showed that during minor's wardship his attendance at school was good and his behavior was fair, but that he was sometimes disruptive and defiant. Minor's behavior at home was not as good. Both his parents agreed that he was prone to mood swings and anger, and often used profanity toward his parents and siblings. Minor's father feared minor's outbursts. In the past, minor broke his mother's windshield during such an outburst. At some point in 2016, minor also punched his mother and got into a physical struggle with his father when the father tried to prevent him from leaving the house.
Minor denies being affiliated with any gang, but a probation report filed June 14, 2019, states that he is associated with two gangs: the South Side Rivas and Mad Down Locos. Minor himself admitted that he had "past associates" from "SSR," presumably South Side Rivas.
The Riverside County Probation Department's report recommended commitment to DJJ. The report included statements from a DJJ parole agent. The agent stated that minor qualified for DJJ. The agent disclosed that if the court committed minor to DJJ, an individual treatment plan would be developed over the course of a 45-day diagnostic. During this process, DJJ would perform "a full psychological, medical, educational, and risk-needs evaluation." After these diagnostics, DJJ would create "an individual evidence-based treatment plan," which would include "a Gang Awareness/Intervention Program, . . . substance abuse counseling, individual counseling, and other mandatory programs." The agent emphasized that minor's program would be individualized and overseen by a psychologist who would determine when minor was ready to graduate.
Probation's recommendation for commitment to DJJ was at least partially based on the severity of minor's offense. Probation noted that minor "willingly played the primary role in the commission of the crime and his behavior does not appear to have been coerced or influenced by those around him," and "he had time to assess the situation before acting," including "the opportunity to stop his vehicle or turn away." The probation officer claimed minor was a danger to the public because minor's vehicular assault occurred in a public parking lot "where innocent bystanders could have been seriously injured," and thus minor's actions exhibited "no regard for the safety and well-being of not just the victims, but the community." The probation report also emphasized that minor attempted to flee the scene after hitting J.W., which indicated that minor had "no concern for the potential victims," and "lack[ed] . . . remorse for his actions and or concern for anyone else, other than himself."
Accordingly, the probation officer felt that minor was "beyond the scope of private or county level facilities, including the Youth Treatment Education Center (YTEC)," and that minor needed "a more secure structured level of supervision," such as the kind provided by DJJ. The probation officer stated that commitment to DJJ "would not only prevent [minor] from harming others in the community, but will provide him with a therapeutic environment where his treatment needs could be met."
At the dispositional hearing, minor's counsel argued that minor's offense was not premeditated or malicious and was merely an impulsive choice by a child suffering from ADHD. Minor requested placement in YTEC for a year or less and expressed to the court that he worried a commitment to DJJ would result in him "doing something I don't want to do." Minor apologized and expressed his belief that YTEC would help him to cope better.
Minor's parents testified that they also believed YTEC would be a better placement for minor. Minor's mother in particular testified that she felt minor has never received the treatment for his issues that he needs, and believed YTEC could finally provide that treatment.
Finally, the victim J.W. testified that his injury has left him unable to work, has restricted his time with his children, has resulted in continual pain and has left him a burden on his parents. J.W. felt that minor's current rehabilitation programs were not working and recommended that the court "might want to think about something better or stronger-wise."
2. Standard of Review
"We review a commitment decision only for abuse of discretion, and indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court." (In re Asean D. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 467, 473; see In re Michael D. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1392, 1395.) "A DJJ commitment is not an abuse of discretion where the evidence demonstrates a probable benefit to the minor from the commitment and less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective or inappropriate." (In re M.S. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250-1251 [substantial evidence supported court's reason for finding less restrictive alternative would be inadequate or ineffective].)
An appellate court will not lightly substitute its decision for that of the juvenile court. It "must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to support them." (In re Michael D., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1395.)
3. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile Court's Discretionary Decision to Commit Minor to DJJ
In determining placement in a juvenile delinquency case, the court focuses on the dual concerns of the best interest of the minor and the need to protect the public. (In re Jimmy P. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1679, 1684.) Accordingly, there must be sufficient evidence demonstrating probable benefit to the minor and the inappropriateness or ineffectiveness of the less restrictive alternatives. (In re Michael D., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1396; In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396.) In arriving at a disposition, the court considers the probation officer's report and any other relevant and material evidence that may be offered. (In re Jimmy P., at p. 1684.)
Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 734, a juvenile court is authorized to commit a juvenile to DJJ when it is fully satisfied that DJJ "with its specialized institutions and rehabilitative programs tailored to the [juvenile's] sophistication and need for security [citation], offer[s] the promise of probable rehabilitative benefit." (In re Tyrone O. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 145, 153.) "Although the DJJ is normally a placement of last resort, there is no absolute rule that a DJJ commitment cannot be ordered unless less restrictive placements have been attempted." (In re M.S., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1250.) Moreover "[t]here is no requirement that the court find exactly how a minor will benefit from being committed to DJJ. The court is only required to find if it is probable a minor will benefit from being committed." (In re Jonathan T. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 474, 486.)
Minor cites In re Carlos J. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1 (Carlos J.) to support his position that more specific evidence of probable benefit is required to support a commitment to DJJ than what was provided in this case. However, Carlos J. actually supports the opposite conclusion. In that case, our colleagues in the First District reversed the juvenile court's commitment because no witnesses testified at the dispositional hearing and the probation officer's report contained no discussion of the programs available at DJJ that would meet the minor's needs. (Id. at pp. 7-8.)
Though the court refused to create any bright line rule about how much evidence was enough for commitment, it explained that "it is reasonable and appropriate to expect the probation department, in its report or testimony, to identify those programs at the DJ[J] likely to be of benefit to the minor under consideration." (Carlos J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 12.) Stating what programs are available is sufficient to meet the initial burden of showing probable benefit, since "the probation department is not required in its report and initial testimony to provide in-depth information about the DJ[J]'s programs or to preemptively respond to even predictable criticisms of the DJ[J]." (Id. at p. 13.) The court acknowledged that in meeting this obligation, these reports may contain some boilerplate language, and that "[i]t will likely be acceptable for the probation department to include substantially similar information about the DJ[J] in most of its reports, with appropriate updates and customization based on the needs of the minor involved." (Id. at p. 12.)
The court went on to state that once some information about the programs available is provided to the court, "[i]f a minor wishes to dispute the availability or efficacy of particular programs . . . the minor must present sufficient evidence to reasonably bring into question the benefit he or she will receive from the adoption of the probation department's recommendation." (Carlos J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 13.) Only once a minor expresses "concerns about a particular aspect of the DJ[J] and presents evidence supporting those concerns," is it "necessary for the People to provide additional information to the juvenile court in order for the court to make a properly supported finding of probable benefit." (Id. at p. 14.)
The record in this case thus satisfied the standards set by Carlos J. From the record, it does not appear that minor has any specific needs that must be met by a placement other than generalized treatment for his mental health conditions and impulsivity. The probation officer provided a report containing information about the 45-day diagnostic that would assess these mental health conditions and provide the minor with a tailored program to treat those conditions. This is consistent with the evidence demanded by the court in In re Carlos J.
Indeed, as examples of cases where probation officers provided more detailed information about DJJ programs, the court in In re Carlos J. cited In re Jesse McM. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 187, 193. In In re Jesse McM., the only information about programs presented was "that it was the practice at the Youth Authority to conduct a three-week diagnostic evaluation when a minor arrived at the facility, and that if it was determined that the minor had a special problem, he would be placed in a program where he would be treated by a psychiatrist, a psychologist and two social workers." (Id. at p. 193.) This is entirely consistent with the kind of information presented in this case.
Minor only criticized DJJ generally, arguing that a commitment would be bad because it would result in him "doing something I don't want to do." Minor never criticized any particular program offered by DJJ, or argued in favor of any particular program offered by YTEC. Minor presented no affirmative evidence, and the thrust of minor's argument largely focused on YTEC as an alternative to DJJ without addressing what distinctions exist or why, exactly, YTEC would be a better placement. Carlos J. thus counsels against minor's position, not for it.
Moreover substantial evidence did exist that DJJ had programs that would suit minor's needs, including individual counseling and gang intervention. In contrast, minor provided no information regarding what programs were available at YTEC, or even what programs he preferred at YTEC over the ones offered at DJJ. Thus, minor failed to rebut the People's initial showing of probable benefit.
The record also contains substantial evidence supporting the fact that the court considered less restrictive alternatives but found they would be ineffective or inappropriate. The court stated that prior to the dispositional hearing, it had considered defendant's prior history and the evidence in the probation report regarding DJJ's mental health treatment programs. In particular, the probation report noted that "[minor] is beyond the scope of . . . county level facilities, including the [YTEC]," and that "DJJ would not only prevent [minor] from harming others in the community, but will provide him with a therapeutic environment where his treatment needs could be met." After hearing this evidence, and the additional evidence at the dispositional hearing, the court considered and rejected YTEC, noting that DJJ would provide "a little more intensive services and I believe that the needs of the minor would require that . . . ." There is no requirement that the court do anything more than consider less restrictive alternatives. (See In re Joseph H. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 517, 544 [Holding that "[t]he minor cannot complain that the court rejected," an alternate placement where the court heard testimony that DJJ commitment met the minor's needs and the minor presented no evidence in favor of alternate placement.].)
The record also supports a finding that less restrictive alternatives were not appropriate in this case. The probation officer's opinion, offered through reports, was that minor's dangerous actions meant that a more restrictive placement was necessary to protect the public. Given how dangerous minor's actions were, not only to his intended victim but to all others in the vicinity, there was substantial evidence that minor's impulsivity and anger issues represented a real danger to the public. Substantial evidence thus supported the court's decision that less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective.
In sum, the juvenile court considered all the proper factors and sufficient evidence existed to support its decision to follow the probation officer's recommendation that minor be committed to DJJ. We find no abuse of discretion.
B. The Probationary Terms Should be Stricken
Finally, minor argues that the juvenile court erred when it imposed conditions of probation on minor after committing him to DJJ. The People agree with minor. We agree with the parties and strike the probation conditions.
A "juvenile court loses the authority to impose conditions of probation once it commits a ward to DJ[J]." (In re Edward C. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 813, 829.) This is because imposing such conditions is "an attempt to regulate or supervise the minor's rehabilitation, a function solely in the hands of [DJJ] after the minor's commitment." (In re Allen N. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 513, 516.) Accordingly, we exercise our independent authority to strike the probation conditions. (See In re Edward C., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at pp. 829-830 [striking probation conditions].)
IV. DISPOSITION
The probation conditions imposed by the court in its dispositional order of July 22, 2019 are stricken. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS
J. We concur: McKINSTER
Acting P. J. MENETREZ
J.