Opinion
1-24-0269B
05-22-2024
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERIE MITCHELL, Defendant-Appellant.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County No. 241105233 Honorable Maryam Ahmad, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE LYLE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Mikva and Navarro concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
LYLE JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The circuit court's order denying defendant's pretrial release is affirmed.
¶ 2 On January 23, 2024, the State filed a petition to detain the defendant-appellant, Erie Mitchell, under the dangerousness standard of section 110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) as amended by Public Acts 101-652, § 10-255 and 102-1104 § 70 (eff Jan. 1, 2023) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act. On January 23, 2024, the circuit court granted the State's petition for pretrial detention under the dangerousness prong. On appeal, Mr. Mitchell challenges the circuit court's decision. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 3 BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On January 22, 2024, while on pretrial release for an unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, Mr. Mitchell was arrested and charged with unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24- 1.1(a) (West 2022)); possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2022)); and possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(c) (West 2022)). On January 23, 2024, the State filed a petition for pretrial detention.
¶ 5 On January 23, 2024, the trial court conducted a hearing on the State's petition for pretrial detention. In the hearing, the State proffered that on January 22, 2024, Chicago Police Department officers observed Mr. Mitchell, via POD cameras, engage in a suspected hand-to-hand transfer of narcotics from his front right pant pocket to another person in exchange for money. Chicago Police Department officers approached and detained Mr. Mitchell, before conducting a pat down of his front right pant pocket. The officers recovered four loosely knotted bags of suspected crack cocaine. Officers also performed a protective pat-down of Mr. Mitchell, which revealed a loaded nine-millimeter Glock handgun in his pant leg.
¶ 6 In the State's proffer, the State detailed Mr. Mitchell's criminal background. His background consisted of a pending aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, for which he was on pretrial release, and six felony convictions which were all narcotics related. Mr. Mitchell also had an order of protection against him from Cuyahoga County.
¶ 7 The State argued that the proof was evident and the presumption was great that Mr. Mitchell committed the offense because of the firearm revealed as part of the pat-down and Mr. Mitchell's felony background. Regarding the dangerousness element, the State argued that Mr. Mitchell posed a real and present safety threat due to the fact that he possessed a firearm without a concealed carry license or a FOID card. The State argued that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the dangerousness because Mr. Mitchell committed the current offense while on pretrial release for a firearm offense and had two previous unsatisfactory terms of probation.
¶ 8 Mr. Mitchell contended that the State did not meet any of the three elements. As to the first element, Mr. Mitchell argued that there were Fourth Amendment issues with the search, since officers only saw one alleged hand-to-hand transaction of an unknown object. After that, they detained Mr. Mitchell without questioning him or observing him further. He reasoned that nothing in the officers' observations gave them any suspicion that he was armed and dangerous necessitating a pat-down or frisk of his person. Thus, the State could not meet its burden as to that element, inferring the case would be dismissed at a later proceeding. Regarding the second element, he contended neither his previous case nor the case before the trial court showed any aggressive behavior or violence but mere possession of a firearm, indicating he was not a danger to the community. He also explained that most of his felonies were before he was 20 years old, and the terminated probations occurred when he was 17 and 19 years old. He had two warrants for failure to appear, one in 2002 and again in 2014. He was 38 years old at the time of the hearing. He is a life-long resident of Chicago with five children, one adult child and four minor children.
¶ 9 Pretrial services assessed Mr. Mitchell and gave him a five on the new criminal activity scale and a four for the failure to appear scale. The recommendation of pretrial services was pretrial supervision, level three.
¶ 10 The trial court, in its ruling, first acknowledged Mr. Mitchell's criminal background. While the court stated that a search, based solely on one hand-to-hand transaction, may have been an issue if this was just a possession of narcotics case, it noted that there was sufficient evidence to justify further investigation. Moreover, Mr. Mitchell was located in an area where officers had previously observed gang activity and narcotic transactions. Given those circumstances, the court found the officers were justified in conducting a pat-down for their protection, which elicited a loaded firearm. The court found that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the proof was evident and the presumption was great that Mr. Mitchell committed the offense. Regarding the dangerousness prong, the court found that, while Mr. Mitchell did not brandish the firearm, possessing a firearm as a felon and without a license in public was dangerous.
¶ 11 Lastly, the trial court considered if any condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the risk to public safety. In its consideration, the court found that the 20-year span between this offense and Mr. Mitchell's unsatisfactory probation weighed in Mr. Mitchell's favor. When the court considered whether pretrial supervision or electronic monitoring was appropriate, it noted that Mr. Mitchell was on pretrial supervision, at the time of the instant offense, on another firearm charge. While on supervision, he still had access to firearms, which concerned the court. The court also highlighted that electronic monitoring does not prohibit Mr. Mitchell's access and use of firearms, but merely monitors his movement. It reasoned that neither would prevent Mr. Mitchell from being outside of his home in possession of a firearm even if the court ordered unannounced home visits. As a result, the court found that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the risk to public safety. On February 5, 2024, Mr. Mitchell filed his notice of appeal.
¶ 12 ANALYSIS
¶ 13 We note that we have jurisdiction to consider this matter, as Mr. Mitchell filed a timely notice of appeal. See Ill. S.Ct. R. 604(h)(1)(iii) (eff. Sept. 18, 2023).
¶ 14 We initially note that Mr. Mitchell decided not to file an appellant memorandum and stands on the notice of appeal. In the notice of appeal, Mr. Mitchell argued that the search was improper and could not meet the proof is evident prong, that merely possessing a firearm does not constitute dangerous as outlined in the statute, the State failed to meet its burden on the dangerousness prong, and the trial erred by finding that no conditions could mitigate the safety risk.
¶ 15 Under section 110-6.1 (a) (1.5) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a) (1.5) (West 2022)), a trial court may deny a defendant pretrial release only if, "the defendant's pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, and the defendant is charged with a forcible felony." Moreover, though all defendants "shall be presumed eligible for pretrial release," the State bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that "the proof is evident or the presumption great" that the defendant committed an offense listed in section 110-6.1(a) of the Code; that the defendant "poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on articulable facts; and that "no condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of section 110-10 [of the Code] can mitigate (i) the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community" for the enumerated offenses in section 110-6.1(a) of the Code, or "(ii) the defendant's willful flight for offenses listed in section 110-6.1(a)(8) of the Code." 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022)).
¶ 16 The appropriate standard of review for the first two determinations-whether the defendant committed a detainable offense and if he or she poses a threat to a person or someone in the community-is manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Whitaker, 2024 IL App (1st) 232009, ¶ 68. "A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented." People v. Deleon, 227 Ill.2d 322, 332. The standard of review for the determination regarding whether any condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the safety threat or flight risk of a defendant is an abuse of discretion. Whitaker, 2024 IL App (1st) 232009, ¶ 68. "An abuse of discretion occurs when the circuit court's decision is 'arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable,' or where 'no reasonable person would agree with the position adopted by the trial court.'" People v. Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st) 191253, ¶ 9 (quoting People v. Becker, 239 Ill.2d 215, 234 (2010)).
¶ 17 Here, as to the first determination, Mr. Mitchell was observed on POD surveillance engaged in an alleged hand-to-hand narcotic transaction, which prompted officers to detain and pat-down Mr. Mitchell. The pat-down revealed a firearm. While the notice of appeal argues the nature of the search was improper, a trial court's review of the nature of a search, at this stage, is relevant in assessing the weight to give the evidence against a defendant. People v. Parker, 2024 IL App (1st) 232164, ¶ 61. A more thorough investigation is meant for a suppression hearing. Parker, 2024 IL App (1st) 232164, ¶ 61. The question on review is whether the trial court failed to properly weigh the search in light of the circumstances. We cannot find that it did.
¶ 18 The trial court acknowledged that the single hand-to-hand transaction was not enough for probable cause but was enough for reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Mitchell. From there, the police were authorized to pat-down Mr. Mitchell for officer safety, especially in light of the reported gang activity in the area. Upon finding the firearm, the police were permitted to arrest Mr. Mitchell. At the time of the arrest, Mr. Mitchell had previously been convicted of multiple felonies. Based on those facts, the court's finding that the proof was evident and the presumption was great that Mr. Mitchell committed the offense of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon was not against the manifest weight of evidence.
¶ 19 In terms of the dangerousness determination, the trial court noted that the fact that the defendant was in possession of narcotics and a firearm without a FOID card, after having previously been charged with another firearm offense. Given that the second offense occurred in public, the court found that in conjunction with the other information, he presented a threat to the safety of the community. We cannot say this was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The statute asks if a defendant is a threat to the community, and we find it reasonable to believe that a convicted felon allegedly involved in illicit narcotics transactions, while armed with a firearm, which legally he should not possess, constitutes a threat to the community.
¶ 20 The last determination for the trial court is whether there was a condition or combination of conditions that could have mitigated the safety risk. The court stated that Mr. Mitchell was in front of the court on another firearm case after being granted pretrial release on a firearm possession case. The court noted that he violated pretrial supervision that he was previously given by allegedly committing this crime and that electronic monitoring could not inhibit his ability to possess another firearm. While it noted that it could order unannounced home visits, nothing in its power could stop Mr. Mitchell from leaving his home. In that circumstance, police officers would not be able to immediately intervene and stop Mr. Mitchell from obtaining a firearm. For that reason, the court found that no set of conditions could mitigate the safety risk that Mr. Mitchell posed. The trial court engaged in a careful analysis which detailed its process and stated the reasons for its conclusion. Mr. Mitchell has shown a disregard for court orders by allegedly possessing a firearm as a felon in his first case and then by alleging possessing a firearm while on pretrial supervision for that case. We find that the court's careful analysis was not an abuse of discretion in light of Mr. Mitchell's clear pattern of disregarding judicial constraints. Therefore, the trial court did not err by detaining Mr. Mitchell.
¶ 21 CONCLUSION
¶ 22 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 23 Affirmed.