Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. SCD215535, David J. Danielsen, Judge.
McDONALD, Acting P. J.
Rahin Lane Mitchell entered a negotiated guilty plea to assault with a firearm on a peace officer with personal and intentional discharge of a firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (d)(1), 12022.53, subd. (c)), making a criminal threat (§ 422), and robbery with personal use of a firearm (§§ 211, 12022.53, subd. (b)). The court sentenced Mitchell to 33 years in prison: the eight-year upper term for assault with a firearm on a peace officer and 20 years for the enhancement; eight months (one-third the middle term) for making a criminal threat; and one year (one-third the middle term) for robbery and three years four months (one-third the 10-year term) for the enhancement. Mitchell appeals. We affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
BACKGROUND
Mitchell assaulted with a firearm a person whom he knew to be a peace officer engaged in the performance of his duties. Mitchell personally and intentionally discharged the firearm. Mitchell threatened a police officer, causing the officer reasonably to be in sustained fear for his own safety. Mitchell intended the threat to be taken seriously. The threat was immediate and specific, and the crime was one that would result in death or great bodily injury. Mitchell took property of another by force or fear and personally used a firearm to accomplish his specific intent to steal.
DISCUSSION
Appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief summarizing the facts and proceedings below. Counsel presents no argument for reversal, but asks this court to review the record for error as mandated by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, counsel lists, as possible but not arguable issues, whether Mitchell's guilty plea was constitutionally valid and whether the court abused its discretion by sentencing him to prison for 33 years.
We granted Mitchell permission to file a brief on his own behalf. He responded, contending "I'm rec[ei]ving 85% when I should be getting 50% [.] My sentence range was not doubled up making it illegal to be subjected to serving 85%. Prior to this situation I had no strikes or violence on my record." We requested a letter brief from Mitchell's counsel discussing this contention in the context of the court's statement Mitchell must serve 85 percent of the sentence imposed and could receive only 15 percent good conduct credits. Counsel has responded, correctly noting the following: conduct credits are normally earned at the rate of six days "for every four days spent in actual custody" (§ 4019, subd. (f)), a rate of 50 percent. Conduct credit is limited to 15 percent, however, for "any person who is convicted of a felony... listed in" section 667.5, subdivision (c). (§ 2933.1, subd. (a).) Both robbery and "[a]ny violation of [s]ection 12022.53" are listed in section 667.5, subdivision (c). (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(9), (22).) Mitchell's conduct credit is therefore limited to 15 percent. (§§ 2933.1, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (i); In re Reeves (2005) 35 Cal.4th 765, 772-773.)
A review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 738, including the possible issues listed pursuant to Anders v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 738, has disclosed no reasonably arguable appellate issues. Mitchell has been competently represented by counsel on this appeal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McINTYRE, J., AARON, J.