Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. E1007454
ELIA, J.On April 15, 2010, defendant Raul Meza pleaded no contest to one count of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459-460, subd. (a), count one). Defendant admitted that he had suffered three prior strike convictions within the meaning of Penal Code sections 667, subdivisions (b)-(i) and 1170.12, and two prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of Penal Code sections 667, subdivision (a) and 1192.7. In addition, defendant admitted that before the commission of the offense charged in count one, he had been convicted as an adult two or more times within a 10-year period of charges brought and charged separately within the meaning of Penal Code section 1203.08.
Defendant's prior strike convictions consist of two first degree burglary convictions in Santa Clara County and one first degree burglary conviction in Alameda County.
In exchange for his no contest plea, the prosecutor moved the court to dismiss a remaining prior serious felony conviction allegation (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)) and two prior prison term allegations (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).
On November 8, 2010, the court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life on count one, consecutive to 10 years for the two prior serious felony convictions, for a total of 35 years to life in state prison.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. We appointed counsel to represent defendant in this court. Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, counsel filed an opening brief that stated the facts, but raised no specific issues. On March 7, 2011, we notified defendant of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf within 30 days. To date, we have not received a response from defendant.
In fact, defendant filed two notices of appeal and sought and was granted a certificate of probable cause both times.
Pursuant to People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we provide "a brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case, the crimes of which the defendant was convicted, and the punishment imposed." (Id. at p. 110.) In addition, we have included information about aspects of the trial court proceedings that might become relevant in future proceedings. (Id. at p. 112.)
Since there was no preliminary hearing in this case, we take the facts from the probation officer's report.
At approximately 10:30 a.m. on January 8, 2010, Sunnyvale police officers responded to a report of a residential burglary. The reporting party told the officers he witnessed a male and a female run out of the back door of a nearby residence and leave in a vehicle. This person was able to provide the officers with the license plate number of the fleeing vehicle.
Teresa Medina, the occupant of the apartment, told police that she left her apartment at about 9:30 that morning to go to the supermarket. When she arrived home at approximately 10:30 a.m. she noticed that the window screen was missing from her bedroom window; the window was located next to the front door. When she opened the front door she noticed the television sitting on the floor near the back door and that drawers in both bedrooms had been opened and items were thrown on the floor. Medina thought that there was approximately $100 in cash missing from her purse and it appeared her passport was missing along with some jewelry.
Later that day, officers stopped a vehicle in which defendant was the front seat passenger. Defendant told the officers he was on parole following a burglary conviction. The person who witnessed two people run from Medina's apartment identified defendant as the male he saw running away from there earlier in the day.
Proceedings Below
By way of a first amended information, the Santa Clara County District Attorney charged defendant with one count of first degree burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459-460, subd. (a).) The information alleged that defendant had three prior strike convictions, three prior serious felony convictions, and had served two prior prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). In addition, the information contained an allegation, within the meaning of Penal Code section 1203.08, that prior to the commission of the burglary defendant had been convicted two or more times within a 10-year period of felony charges that had been brought and tried separately.
Before defendant entered his no contest plea, he signed a form entitled "PLEA FORM, WITH EXPLANATIONS AND WAIVER OF RIGHTS-FELONY." By signing the form he acknowledged that he "ha[d] read or have had read to [him]" the form and that he had initialed each of the items that applied to his case. The form outlined the charges and the maximum term to which he was pleading—35 years to life— all the consequences of his plea, including the immigration consequences of a guilty or no contest plea, and the constitutional rights to which he was entitled and would be giving up by entering a plea. Defendant initialed each box to acknowledge that he understood and agreed with what he had read on the form; he signed the defendant's statement.
In full the defendant's statement read, "I have read or have had read to me this form and have initialed each of the items that applies to my case. If I have an attorney, I have discussed each item with my attorney. By putting my initials next to the items in this form, I am indicating that I understand and agree with what is stated in each item that I have initialed. The nature of the charges, possible defenses, and the effects of any prior convictions, enhancements, and special allegations have been explained to me. I understand each of the rights outlined above, and I give up each of them to enter my plea."
Before taking defendant's plea, the court asked defendant if he had read the form in its entirety with his attorney. Defendant confirmed that he had and that he understood everything on the form. When asked by the court if the initials and signature on the form were his, defendant stated, "Yes, they are, sir." Thereafter, the court filed the form and noted for the record that the form had been signed by defendant, his attorney and the district attorney. The court countersigned the form. After taking defendant's plea, defense counsel and the prosecutor stipulated that there was a factual basis for the plea in the police reports attached to the complaint.
Before sentencing, defendant filed a Romero motion in which he asked the court to strike his prior strike convictions in the interest of justice. At the hearing on the Romero motion, defense counsel asked the court to strike at least two of defendant's prior strike convictions and sentence defendant to a determinate term of 22 years. Defense counsel argued that for a man who had no crimes of violence as an adult, had avoided violence, and had not used weapons or any threats during the course of his crimes, 22 years would be appropriate. The court declined to strike any of defendant's prior strike convictions finding that defendant fell "within the spirit of the three strikes law" because the current offense was serious, defendant was on parole when he committed the offense and he had "never taken advantage of the chances" he had had.
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
Thereafter, as noted, the court imposed a prison sentence of 25 years to life, consecutive to 10 years. The court awarded defendant 432 days of custody credit consisting of 288 actual days plus 144 days pursuant to the version of Penal Code section 4019 that was in effect during the time he was in custody. The court imposed a restitution fund fine of $7000 (Pen. Code, §1202.4, subd. (b)) and imposed, but suspended, a parole revocation fine in the same amount (Pen. Code, § 1202.45). The court ordered that defendant pay $1100 in direct restitution to Medina. The court imposed various other fees including a court security fee of $30 (Pen. Code, § 1465.8), a criminal conviction assessment of $30 (Gov. Code, § 70373) and a criminal justice administration fee of $129.75 (Gov. Code, §§ 29550 et seq.).
Pursuant to our obligation as set forth in People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, we have reviewed the entire record. We conclude that there are no arguable issues on appeal for which we must seek further briefing. Therefore, we will affirm the judgment.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: RUSHING, P. J.PREMO, J.