Opinion
A147409
07-13-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JUAN MEZA, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 5-151553-5)
A jury convicted defendant Juan Meza of false imprisonment, infliction of corporal injury on a person in a dating relationship, and assault with a deadly weapon, and the trial court sentenced him to five years and eight months in prison. On appeal, he contends that the court erred by admitting his prior conviction for unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor as impeachment evidence because (1) that offense is not a crime involving moral turpitude and (2) the evidence was unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352 (section 352). We disagree with both contentions and affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
A. Meza and the Victim Fight Outside a Club.
Meza and the victim dated each other for approximately six years, a relationship marked by physical violence and frequent break-ups. The victim testified that by late June 2015, she had again broken up with Meza. Early on the morning of June 29, she went to a club near her home in Concord to pick up some friends as their designated driver. As she was waiting outside, she was surprised to see Meza, who appeared "[a]ngry and sort of desperate" and seemed like he was intoxicated. He asked what she was doing there, suggesting she was with another man. She clarified that she had not been inside the club and was there to get her friends.
The victim testified that she walked back to her SUV and Meza followed, "calling [her] a whore," saying "that [she] was going to the club to . . . pick up a man," and threatening to kill her. The victim got inside her vehicle, and Meza stood by the driver's-side window, which she opened, and continued to talk to her. Eventually, the victim told him she was leaving, at which point he flung beer onto her from a bottle he was holding. He leaned closer and said if he found out she was seeing another man, he was going to kill her.
The victim noticed a police car nearby and began honking her horn to attract attention. Meza told her, "[R]emember what is going to happen to you," and ran away. Feeling "very afraid," the victim did not wait for her friends to come outside or contact the police and instead went home.
B. Meza Assaults the Victim After Appearing in Her SUV.
The victim testified that about four hours after seeing Meza at the club, she left home to go to work. As was her custom, she stopped at a smoothie shop about a block away. After purchasing a smoothie, she returned to her vehicle. As she put the SUV in reverse, she turned around and saw Meza sitting in the back seat. She asked him what he was doing there, and he responded, "Do you remember what I said yesterday? . . . I am going to kill you." He then reached down and grabbed a golf club from the floor. He told the victim to begin driving and held the golf club against the side of her face.
At trial, the victim denied having previously seen the golf club. In contrast, a CHP officer who took the victim's report testified that the victim said she kept the golf club in her truck.
The victim got on Highway 680 toward her workplace in Dublin. She asked Meza to reconsider what he was doing, and he pulled her hair. Feeling "desperate," she decided to continue driving and not say anything so as not to anger him. Eventually, she pulled over and told Meza they needed to talk. She then got out of the truck and began running down the freeway shoulder. Meza chased after her and grabbed her hair. He kicked her leg and then hit her as she covered her face with her hands. Two witnesses who were driving on Highway 680 at the same time testified to seeing a man hitting a woman on the side of the freeway.
The victim testified that as Meza was still holding her hair, he walked her back to the truck. They got in, and Meza directed the victim to drive. Meanwhile, a third witness began following them. After catching up with the truck, the witness pulled alongside the driver's side and made eye contact with the victim, who "looked upset, distraught," and used hand gestures to convey she needed help. The witness called 911.
The victim eventually exited the freeway in Dublin, the third witness still following her. Meza told the victim, "[S]omebody is following us," and he directed her to pull into a parking lot. After she did so, he got out of the truck, taking the golf club with him. She watched in the rearview mirror as he threw the golf club into some bushes. Meanwhile, the witness also pulled into the lot, approached the victim, and asked if she was okay. The victim, who was "very upset" and crying, said that she was all right and drove away in her truck. Soon afterward, Meza was located and detained.
A CHP officer went to the victim's workplace later that morning and took her report. The victim was crying and seemed upset. She sustained swelling and scratches on her face and bruises on her leg.
C. The Defense Case.
Meza testified in his own defense. He claimed that he broke up with the victim around February 2015 because she was jealous of his relationships with other women. He testified that afterward she came to his home several times. On one occasion, she began yelling and accused him of being a "coward" because he was not answering her telephone calls. He went inside, and she kicked the door. He came back outside, at which point "[s]he started to hit [him] and [he] told her to calm down because it was [his] sister's house." After she had hit him a few times, he grabbed her, and they both fell to the ground. At trial, the victim admitted that she hit Meza on this occasion, but only after he hit her first.
Meza testified that he broke up with the victim again a few months later, in early June. The victim came to his other sister's house, where he was staying, and "asked if [he] had another woman or something." The victim then "started hitting [him] the same as always." Meza's teenaged niece corroborated his story about this incident, claiming that the victim had tried to jump the fence into the backyard and, once Meza came outside, "started swinging at him because she was mad." The victim admitted to climbing the fence so she could see if Meza was inside the house, but she denied physically assaulting him during the incident.
According to Meza, he was the one who broke up with the victim in late June 2015. He testified that he was on his way to see his friend at the club on June 29 when he ran into the victim, and he claimed that the two had an uneventful interaction. In particular, he denied threatening to kill the victim or throwing beer on her. He did admit to banging his beer on her truck but said the gesture was directed at another man present with whom he had a conflict, not the victim.
According to Meza, a couple hours later he went to the victim's home because he "wanted to apologize to her for the incident that happened." He claimed that because he felt "very drunk," he fell asleep in the victim's truck instead of going inside to see her. When he woke up, the victim was driving the truck. After she indicated she was going to work, he told her to keep driving. They began talking, and the victim asked him why he had not come inside to sleep with her. He apologized to her and "said to her there is no other woman. I was sleeping in the car." The victim became angry and called him a liar.
Meza testified that the victim eventually pulled over on the freeway shoulder and moved her hand as if she was going to hit him. He grabbed her arm, and she struck him. She then got out of the truck and he followed her, caught up to her, and told her to calm down. He claimed she "slapped [him] in the face twice" and told him "to leave her alone." He wrapped his arms around her from behind, trying to calm her, but she began hitting him in the stomach. He put her in a headlock and told her he was going to take the truck and leave. She then told him that she would drop him off in Dublin.
Meza claimed that after they began driving again, with him in the back seat, the victim told him a car was following them. He then picked up the golf club. The victim got off the freeway, and the other car continued to follow them. Spotting a police officer, the victim told Meza, "Baby, they're going to arrest you." He told her to drop him off and got out of the truck with the golf club, which he admitted to throwing in the bushes.
D. The Verdict and Sentencing.
The jury convicted Meza of a misdemeanor count of assault with a deadly weapon and felony counts of false imprisonment (a lesser included offense of the kidnapping offense charged) and infliction of corporal injury on a person in a dating relationship. He was acquitted of two felony counts of criminal threats.
Meza's convictions were under Penal Code sections 245, subdivision (a)(1) (assault), 237, subdivision (a) (false imprisonment), and 273.5, subdivision (a) (infliction of corporal injury). The kidnapping charge was brought under Penal Code section 207, subdivision (a). All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
The criminal-threats charges were brought under section 422.
After the trial court found true the allegations that Meza had a prior conviction with a prison term and had violated his probation terms, it sentenced him to five years and eight months in prison. The sentence was comprised of a term of four years for the infliction of corporal injury, a consecutive term of eight months for the false imprisonment, a concurrent term of one year in county jail for the assault, and a consecutive term of one year for the prior conviction with a prison term.
The prison-term allegation was found true under section 667.5, subdivision (b).
II.
DISCUSSION
Meza contends that his prior felony conviction for unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor was inadmissible to impeach his testimony because (1) that offense is not a crime involving moral turpitude and (2) the evidence was unduly prejudicial under section 352. We are not persuaded.
A. Additional Facts.
Before Meza testified, the prosecution moved to admit as impeachment evidence Meza's 2012 felony conviction for unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under section 261.5, subdivision (d) (section 261.5(d)). The defense argued that the prior conviction was inadmissible because the offense was not a crime involving moral turpitude and the evidence was unduly prejudicial under section 352. The trial court rejected both contentions and admitted the prior conviction. When Meza testified, he admitted to having "a prior felony conviction for statutory rape" from 2012. The court then instructed the jury that it could consider the conviction only "on the issue of credibility, not on the issue of character. So it's not to show he's a bad person."
B. Unlawful Sexual Intercourse Is a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude.
Meza claims that a violation of section 261.5(d) does not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude and that the prior conviction was therefore inadmissible as impeachment evidence. He is incorrect.
In general, evidence "that has any tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of a [witness's] testimony" is admissible. (Evid. Code, § 780; see also id., § 210.) Although "[n]ot all past misconduct has a 'tendency in reason to prove or disprove' a witness's honesty and veracity" (People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 295), "[a] witness may be impeached with any prior conduct involving moral turpitude whether or not it resulted in a felony conviction, subject to the trial court's exercise of discretion under . . . section 352." (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 931.)
Crimes involving moral turpitude are divided into two groups: those "in which dishonesty is an element," such as fraud, and those "that indicate a ' "general readiness to do evil," ' from which a readiness to lie can be inferred." (People v. Chavez (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 25, 28.) In determining whether an offense is a crime involving moral turpitude, a court must determine whether " 'the least adjudicated elements of the conviction necessarily involve moral turpitude.' " (People v. Rivera (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1374, 1380, quoting People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 317.) Thus, a court may not "go[] 'behind the conviction and tak[e] evidence on or consider[] the facts and circumstances of the particular offense. Instead, the court must look [only] to the statutory definition of the particular crime.' " (Rivera, at p. 1380.) Although we generally review a trial court's admission of a prior conviction as impeachment evidence for an abuse of discretion (People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 722), we exercise our independent judgment in determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude. (See Clerici v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1016, 1027.)
Under section 261.5(d), "[a]ny person 21 years of age or older who engages in an act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is under 16 years of age is guilty of either a misdemeanor or a felony." "Unlawful sexual intercourse," in turn, is defined as "an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person who is not the spouse of the perpetrator, if the person is a . . . person under the age of 18 years." (§ 261.5, subd. (a).)
In People v. Fulcher (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 749 (Fulcher), this division held that unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under section 261.5 is a crime involving moral turpitude. (Id. at pp. 753-754.) Fulcher explained that until our state Supreme Court's decision in People v. Hernandez (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529 (Hernandez), a violation of section 261.5 was not a crime involving moral turpitude because a reasonable but mistaken belief about the victim's age was not a defense to the crime. (Fulcher, at p. 754.) Hernandez, however, recognized such a defense. (See Fulcher, at p. 754.) Thus, a post-Hernandez conviction under section 261.5 like Meza's is for a crime involving moral turpitude because the conviction necessarily did not involve a reasonable mistake about the victim's age. (See Fulcher, at p. 754.)
The Hernandez defense is not always available to a defendant charged under section 261.5(d). Even if the defendant reasonably believes the victim is at least 16 years old, the defendant is still guilty under one of section 261.5's other subdivisions criminalizing conduct with older minors unless the defendant had a reasonable belief that the victim was at least 18 years old. (See People v. Scott (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 784, 800.) This does not affect our analysis because Meza's conviction under section 261.5(d) necessarily establishes that Meza did not reasonably believe that his victim was at least 18 years old, meaning he was guilty of engaging in unlawful sexual intercourse. --------
Meza offers us no reason to reconsider Fulcher's holding. Although he recognizes that a reasonable mistake of age may be a defense to a violation of section 261.5(d), he draws the wrong conclusion from this principle. He argues that because of the defense, "it cannot be found that the act prohibited was inherently wrong, as might be the case if section 261.5[(d)] applied regardless of the defendant's good faith belief that the minor involved was 16 years of age or older, or applied regardless of whether the defendant and the minor were married." In fact, as Fulcher teaches, it is because of the defense that a violation of section 261.5 is now a crime involving moral turpitude, as a defendant's conviction under that statute means the defense did not apply.
Nor are we persuaded by Meza's reliance on Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler (9th Cir. 2007) 506 F.3d 688, 692-694, which held that a conviction under section 261.5(d) is not a crime involving moral turpitude under federal immigration law. Whether an offense is a crime involving moral turpitude under California law is a "very different issue" than whether it is a crime involving moral turpitude for immigration purposes. (Castrijon-Garcia v. Holder (9th Cir. 2013) 704 F.3d 1205, 1211, overruled in part on another ground in Ceron v. Holder (9th Cir. 2014) 747 F.3d 773, 782, fn. 2.) Specifically, whereas under California law we ask whether the offense demonstrates " ' "general readiness to do evil," ' from which a readiness to lie can be inferred" (People v. Chavez, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 28), the federal standard requires that the crime " '(1) [be] vile, base[,] or depraved and (2) violate[] societal moral standards' " as well as " 'be done willfully' or with 'evil intent.' " (Quintero-Salazar, at pp. 692-693.) Because of the differences between the two legal standards, Quintero-Salazar does not affect our conclusion that a violation of section 261.5(d) constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude under California law. Therefore, the trial court did not err by concluding that Meza's prior conviction was relevant to impeach him.
C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion Under Section 352 by Admitting the Prior Conviction.
Meza also claims that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the prior conviction because the evidence was unduly prejudicial under section 352. There was no error.
Section 352 provides that evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." We review the trial court's ruling under section 352 for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724.)
Meza contends that the prior conviction was unduly prejudicial because "the very fact of the conviction . . . implied that [he] was likely to assault or otherwise mistreat the . . . victim" in this case. We do not follow his logic, and he neither explains his reasoning nor cites any supporting authority. We are similarly unpersuaded by his conclusory statement that the "conviction was impermissibly prejudicial as it would cause the jury to discredit [his] testimony." Although it is true that "evidence a defendant committed an offense on a separate occasion is inherently prejudicial," such evidence is subject to exclusion under section 352 "only when its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect" to the extent " 'it poses an intolerable "risk to the fairness of the proceedings or the reliability of the outcome." ' " (People v. Tran (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1040, 1047, italics omitted.) The bare contention that the prior conviction reflected negatively on Meza's credibility, without more, is insufficient to establish error under section 352.
Meza also argues that the prior conviction was unduly prejudicial because it undermined the credibility of his niece, who was 15 years old at the time of trial in late 2015. She was the only witness other than himself to testify in his defense and, as we have mentioned, corroborated his testimony that the victim had previously struck him. He argues that his niece's credibility was undermined by the admission of the prior conviction because it gave rise to a "circumstantial inference" that he and his niece "might themselves have been engaging in sexual intercourse, making [him] guilty of the statutory rape charge and [his niece's] testimony worthless." This argument is frivolous. No evidence was presented that the prior conviction involved Meza's niece or that she and Meza otherwise had a sexual relationship, and no reasonable juror would have so inferred solely because she was a minor and he briefly lived in her and her mother's home years after the conviction. Meza fails to demonstrate any abuse of discretion under section 352.
III.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Humes, P.J. We concur: /s/_________
Dondero, J. /s/_________
Banke, J.