( Ranger , supra , 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 996, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 25.) Similarly, when a defendant escapes, whether to a foreign country or another county, the risk of such escape is one of the risks of the bail surety business, and one of the situations the bail surety guarantees against. ( North River , supra , 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 877, 227 Cal.Rptr.3d 243 ; see People v. Meyers (1932) 215 Cal. 115, 119, 8 P.2d 837 ( Meyers ) ["Ordinarily the escape is a deliberate unlawful act on the part of the prisoner, and the sureties take the risk of such acts on the part of the person bailed."].) The surety asserts that Meyers supports its argument that a voluntary departure should not result in forfeiture of a bond.
The trial court properly ordered the $75,000 bond exonerated. The County claims that exoneration of the $75,000 bond conflicts with People v. Ranger Ins. Co . (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 812, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 806 ( Ranger Ins. Co . ), People v. Meyers (1932) 215 Cal. 115, 8 P.2d 837 ( Meyers ), County of Los Angeles v. Maga (1929) 97 Cal.App. 688, 276 P. 352 ( Maga ) and People v. Amwest Surety Ins. Co. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 69, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 282. The cited cases do not help the County.
(See Rest., Security, § 207, and comment and illustrations, pp. 559-560; 8 Am.Jur.2d, Bail and Recognizance, § 187, pp. 885-886; 8 C.J.S., Bail, § 77, p. 210 and § 92, pp. 263-264; Annot., Bail-Discharge of Sureties (1949) 4 A.L.R.2d 440-446-449.) In People v. Meyers (1932) 215 Cal. 115 [ 8 P.2d 837] the court stated, "The obligation assumed by defendants to produce the accused was absolute, and there is no room for interpretation of the contract. The sole defense was impossibility of performance, and the contention is that performance was prevented by operation of law and by act of the other party to the contract.
It is not here contended that the surety is entitled to exoneration on the ground that performance of its obligation was rendered impossible by any act or hindrance on the part of the state, the other party to the contract for bail. (See People v. Meyers, 215 Cal. 115, 118, 119 [ 8 P.2d 837].) No reason appears which would justify exoneration of the bond on that ground or any other ground.
Modern cases recognize as a defense not only objective impossibility in the true sense, but also impracticability due to excessive and unreasonable difficulty or expense. (See Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289 [ 156 P. 458, L.R.A. 1916F, 1]; People v. Meyers, 215 Cal. 115 [ 8 P.2d 837]; Restatement, Contracts, sec. 454.)
The trial court properly ordered the $75,000 bond exonerated. The County claims that exoneration of the $75,000 bond conflicts with People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 812 (Ranger Ins. Co.), People v. Meyers (1932) 215 Cal. 115 (Meyers), County of Los Angeles v. Maga (1929) 97 Cal.App. 688 (Maga) and People v. Amwest Surety Ins. Co. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 69. The cited cases do not help the County.
Appellants contend their performance was made impossible by agents of the state, and therefore the contract doctrine of impossibility (Civ. Code, § 1511) applied and required exoneration of the bond. Appellants cite three cases for this proposition: People v. Meyers (1932) 215 Cal. 115 (Meyers), People v. American Surety Ins. Co. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1063 (American Surety), and People v. National Automobile & Casualty Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 481 (National Automobile). None apply.
Allegheny also contends that its inability to produce Tingcungco before the exoneration deadline should be excused under the contract doctrine of impossibility (Civ.Code, § 1511 ) because the district attorney failed to make a timely extradition decision. Allegheny cites two cases for this proposition: People v. Meyers (1932) 215 Cal. 115, 8 P.2d 837 (Meyers ); and People v. American Surety Insurance Co. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1063, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 216 (American Surety ). Neither is applicable.
It contends that it ceased its efforts to locate Elarmo because the United States Marshals Service threatened it with criminal prosecution if it continued the investigation. The surety relies initially on Reese v. United States (1869) 76 U.S. 13 and People v. Meyers (1932) 215 Cal. 115 (Meyers). In those cases, the Supreme Courts of the United States and of California, respectively, held that where "the government" interferes with or prevents the surety's performance of its obligation to secure the defendant's appearance in court, the surety is relieved of its obligations.
For these reasons, we find no merit in the Surety’s equitable estoppel claim. The Surety also argues that its position that a court clerk’s misrepresentations are a proper basis for relieving a surety from the time limits for filing a motion to vacate forfeiture is supported by the decisions in People v. Meyers (1932) 215 Cal. 115 (Meyers) and People v. Far West Ins. Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 791 (Far West). We disagree.