Opinion
December 5, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Beldock, J., Kramer, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and a new trial is ordered. No questions of fact have been raised or considered; and it is further,
Ordered that the amended judgments are reversed, on the law, and the matters are remitted for further proceedings on the issue of the defendant's violations of probation.
We agree with the defendant that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial discovery request, pursuant to CPL 240.20 (1), to conduct independent testing of the drugs which were the subject of his conviction. Contrary to the court's ruling, it was not necessary for the defendant to make a "special showing" in order to conduct such testing since the statute provides that "upon a demand to produce by a defendant * * * the prosecutor shall disclose to the defendant and make available for * * * testing * * * [a]ny * * * property obtained from the defendant" (CPL 240.20 [f] [emphasis supplied]).
We also note that during the jury selection process, in response to defense counsel's Batson claims, the trial court essentially conceded that the defendant had established a prima facie case of discrimination based upon the prosecutor's use of 10 out of 11 challenges against prospective jurors who were black (see, People v Simmons, 79 N.Y.2d 1013; People v Reed, 178 A.D.2d 666). Nevertheless, the court failed to require the prosecutor to provide racially-neutral reasons for such challenges. This was error.
It is well established that a party's race-based use of peremptory challenges violates both State and Federal constitutional equal protection requirements (see, Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79; People v Childress, 81 N.Y.2d 263; People v Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, cert denied 498 U.S. 824). Moreover, where a defendant has demonstrated a prima facie case of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, the burden shifts to the prosecution to come forward with a racially-neutral explanation for its challenges (see, People v Childress, 81 N.Y.2d 263, supra).
Accordingly, in the case at bar, the court should have compelled the prosecutor to proffer such an explanation in response to defense counsel's Batson claim. Bracken, J.P., Santucci, Krausman and Goldstein, JJ., concur.