Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Patrick O'Hara, Judge. Super. Ct. No. VCF155465, VCF162457 & VCF162657
Central California Appellate Program, George Bond, Executive Director, and William Davies, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kathleen A. McKenna and Connie Broussard Proctor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Ardaiz, P.J., Vartabedian, J. and Harris, J.
OPINION
Appellant Manuel Mesa entered into a plea agreement, covering Tulare County Superior Court case Nos. VCF155465, VCF162457, and VCF162657 (hereafter case Nos. 155465, 162457, & 162657, respectively), whereby he was to receive a stipulated sentence of eight years four months in prison. Although he was sentenced to the agreed-upon term, he now contends that, in one of the cases, the trial court sentenced him to a term in excess of the negotiated disposition for that case. He also claims excessive fines were imposed. Respondent counters that the appeal must be dismissed because appellant did not obtain a certificate of probable cause with respect to the issues he now raises, and that, in any event, appellant was properly sentenced. For the reasons that follow, we will modify the sentence, but otherwise affirm.
The facts of the underlying offenses are not pertinent to this appeal.
In case No. 155465, appellant was charged with offenses committed on November 5, 2005. On February 28, 2006, he pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count 1), with an admission that he had previously suffered a conviction under the Three Strikes Law (Pen. Code, § 1170.12); no contest to being under the influence of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a); count 2); and guilty to driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or higher (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b); count 4), and driving without a license (id., § 12500, subd. (a); count 5), in return for an indicated prison sentence of 32 months, calculated as the mitigated term on count one, doubled.
Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
Sentencing initially was set for May 1, 2006, and appellant was allowed to remain at liberty on bail. Within a short time, however, he picked up two more cases. Case No. 162457 involved offenses committed on March 2, 2006, while case No. 162657 involved offenses committed on April 10 of that year.
On August 28, 2006, appellant entered into a plea bargain, covering all three cases, whereby he would receive a sentence of eight years four months in prison. To that end, in case No. 162457, appellant pled no contest to evading an officer with willful disregard for safety (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 1), with admissions that he had suffered a prior strike conviction (§ 1170.12) and was on bail when he committed the offense (§ 12022.1); and no contest to possession of ammunition (§ 12316, subd. (b)(1); count 2), driving with a suspended or revoked license (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a); count 3), and possession of a smoking device (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364; count 4). In case No. 162657, appellant pled no contest to sale or transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a); count 1), with admissions that he had suffered a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(e)) and was personally armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (c)) and on bail (§ 12022.1) when he committed the offense; no contest to driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, having suffered three prior convictions (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (a), 23550, 23550.5; count 2); and no contest to being under the influence of methamphetamine while in possession of a loaded firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (e); count 4), carrying a loaded firearm (§ 12031, subds. (a)(1), (a)(2)(D); count 7), carrying a concealed dirk or dagger (§ 12020, subd. (a)(4); count 9), and possession of a smoking device (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364; count 10).
The reporter’s transcript of the change of plea proceedings reflects that appellant additionally pled no contest to sale or transportation of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360, subd. (a); count 5), with an admission that a principal was armed with a firearm during commission of the offense (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). However, neither the clerk’s minutes of the hearing nor the probation officer’s report shows a plea to that count. The prosecutor did not address its omission at sentencing, and respondent’s statement of the case recites that it was one of the counts dismissed by the prosecution pursuant to the plea bargain. Under the circumstances, we will assume appellant was not convicted on count 5 in case No. 162657.
On October 12, appellant was sentenced on all three cases. In case No. 162657, he was sentenced to four years on count 1, plus a consecutive three-year term for the arming enhancement. He received a consecutive one-year four-month term on count 2. On count 4, he was sentenced to a concurrent four-year term, with the consecutive two-year on-bail enhancement stayed so as to remain within the negotiated plea. On count 7, appellant was sentenced to four years, stayed, and, on count 9, to a four-year concurrent term. The total unstayed term thus was eight years four months. Appellant was also ordered to pay various fines and penalties, including a court security fee of $120 pursuant to section 1465.8.
In case No. 162457, appellant was sentenced to four years on count 1, with the consecutive two-year on-bail enhancement stayed; a four-year term on count 2; and 30 days in jail, with credit for 30 days, on count 3. Sentence in this case was ordered to run concurrently to that imposed in case No. 162657, and appellant was ordered to pay, inter alia, a court security fee of $80 pursuant to section 1465.8.
In case No. 155465, appellant was sentenced to four years on count 1, and 120 days in jail, with credit for 120 days, on counts 2 and 4. Sentence in this case was ordered to run concurrently to that imposed in case No. 162657, and appellant was ordered to pay, inter alia, a court security fee of $80 pursuant to section 1465.8.
Appellant timely submitted a handwritten notice of appeal and request for a certificate of probable cause in which he declared, under penalty of perjury, that he believed his convictions were illegal, was misrepresented by his attorney, and felt entitled to a new trial. The court granted the certificate in part, writing on the request form that it would issue a probable cause certificate to review denial of appellant’s Marsden request.
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118. Appellant made unsuccessful complaints against his attorney on May 24, 2006, and again on August 21, 2006.
DISCUSSION
I
Dismissal of the Appeal
At the threshold, we must determine whether the appeal should be dismissed. Respondent says dismissal is required because appellant failed to obtain a probable cause certificate on the issues he raises on appeal. Appellant counters that a probable cause certificate need not isolate specific issues. Unfortunately, the issue is not quite as cut-and-dried as both parties would make it.
There is a distinction between an appeal from a judgment of conviction following a not guilty plea and a trial, and an appeal from a judgment of conviction following a plea of guilty or no contest. “When a defendant pleads not guilty and is convicted as the result of a trial, in general any issue bearing on the determination of guilt and apparent from the record is cognizable on appeal. [Citation.] By contrast, when a defendant pleads guilty or no contest and is convicted without a trial, only limited issues are cognizable on appeal. A guilty plea admits every element of the charged offense and constitutes a conviction [citations], and consequently issues that concern the determination of guilt or innocence are not cognizable. [Citations.] Instead, appellate review is limited to issues that concern the ‘jurisdiction of the court or the legality of the proceedings, including the constitutional validity of the plea.’ [Citations.]” (In re Chavez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 649, fn. omitted.)
“The right to appeal following a guilty or no contest plea is controlled by section 1237.5.” (People v. McEwan (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 173, 177.) The purpose of this statute “is to discourage and weed out frivolous or vexatious appeals following guilty [and no contest] pleas.” (People v. Earls (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 184, 190.) “The objective is to promote judicial economy ‘by screening out wholly frivolous guilty [and nolo contendere] plea appeals before time and money is spent preparing the record and the briefs for consideration by the reviewing court.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 75-76.)
Pursuant to section 1237.5, a defendant may not appeal from a judgment of conviction entered upon a plea of guilty or no contest, unless: “(a) The defendant has filed with the trial court a written statement, executed under oath or penalty of perjury showing reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings [and] (b) The trial court has executed and filed a certificate of probable cause for such appeal with the clerk of the court.” Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b), except under circumstances discussed post, the defendant must file a notice of appeal and the statement required by section 1237.5 for issuance of a certificate of probable cause. (Rule 8.304(b)(1).) The trial court then has 20 days to sign and file either a certificate of probable cause or an order denying the certificate. (Rule 8.304(b)(2).) If the defendant does not file the statement required by section 1237.5 or the superior court denies a certificate of probable cause, the superior court clerk must mark the notice of appeal “‘Inoperative.’” (Rule 8.304(b)(3).)
All references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
A defendant seeking appellate review following a guilty or no contest plea must fully and timely comply with the requirements of both section 1237.5 and rule 8.304(b), or the appeal is inoperative and must be dismissed. (People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1099; People v. Way (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 733, 735.) However, “appeals raising solely search and seizure or postplea punishment issues may proceed without issuance of a certificate.” (People v. Jones (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1102, 1106, disapproved on other grounds in In re Chavez, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 656.) To this end, rule 8.304(b)(4) provides: “The defendant need not comply with [rule 8.304(b)](1) if the notice of appeal states that the appeal is based on: [¶] (A) The denial of a motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5; or [¶] (B) Grounds that arose after entry of the plea and do not affect the plea’s validity.” Where the notice of appeal states that it is based upon such noncertificate grounds, the reviewing court may proceed to address the merits of such issues even absent compliance with section 1237.5, “[b]ut it must decline to address certificate issues: the presence of a notice of appeal stating noncertificate grounds does not supply the absence of a statement of certificate grounds and a certificate of probable cause.” (People v. Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1099.) Thus, rule 8.304(b)(5) specifies, “If the defendant’s notice of appeal contains a statement under [rule 8.304(b)](4), the reviewing court will not consider any issue affecting the validity of the plea unless the defendant also complies with [rule 8.304(b)](1).”
To summarize, if a defendant fails to obtain a certificate of probable cause or to state in the notice of appeal that the appeal is based on noncertificate grounds, the appeal is not operative and is subject to dismissal on respondent’s or the court’s own motion. (People v. Jones, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1108.) A defendant may obtain review of noncertificate issues if the appeal is based solely on such grounds and the notice of appeal so states. (People v. Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1099.) Unless a defendant obtains a certificate of probable cause, however, he or she may not obtain review of certificate issues – issues going to the validity of the plea – even if noncertificate grounds have been properly presented. (Ibid.; People v. Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 75; see People v. Ward (1967) 66 Cal.2d 571, 574 [issues going to validity of plea require compliance with § 1237.5].)
As respondent observes, the California Supreme Court has held that “a challenge to a negotiated sentence imposed as part of a plea bargain is properly viewed as a challenge to the validity of the plea itself. Therefore, it [is] incumbent upon defendant to seek and obtain a probable cause certificate in order to attack the sentence on appeal. [Citation.]” (People v. Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 79.) Neither appellant’s notice of appeal nor the certificate of probable cause says anything about his sentence. As he correctly points out, however, “[n]o statute or rule purports to restrict criminal appeals to issues stated in the notice of appeal.” (People v. Jones, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1109.) The California Supreme Court has rejected the notion that section 1237.5 should be interpreted to require a defendant to identify, and the trial court to certify, each nonfrivolous issue for appeal, so that a reviewing court would be precluded from entertaining any claims not identified in the defendant’s statement and certified as nonfrivolous by the superior court. (People v. Hoffard (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1174, 1176-1177.) The statute determines whether an appeal may be taken, not the particular issues reviewable on that appeal. (Id. at p. 1177.) “Section 1237.5 does not restrict the scope of inquiry into a cognizable error once a certificate has been issued. [Citation.]” (Hoffard, at p. 1178.) Accordingly, where a trial court has issued a certificate of probable cause, “the defendant may raise on appeal cognizable issues other than those identified in the statement of grounds.” (Id. at p. 1173.)
It has similarly been held that a defendant will be estopped from complaining of a sentence to which he or she agreed. (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295; People v. Couch (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1056-1057, 1058.)
If this were the extent of the issue, we would have no problem concluding that appellant’s appeal is operative, and addressing the merits thereof. There are two problems, however,
First, although a probable cause certificate was issued here, the issue certified by the superior court as nonfrivolous was denial of appellant’s Marsden requests. A certificate of probable cause does not operate to expand the scope of appellate review to include a noncognizable issue. (People v. Hoffard, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1178.) Issues waived by a guilty or no contest plea are not cognizable. (People v. Kaanehe (1977) 19 Cal.3d 1, 9; see In re Chavez, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 649.) Claimed Marsden errors fall into this category when they do not go to the legality of the proceedings resulting in the plea, such as when there is no claim the defendant received inappropriate legal advice concerning the plea (People v. Lovings (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1311) or that the plea was not intelligently and voluntarily made or was the product of poor legal advice (People v. Lobaugh (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 780, 786), or when the defendant simply expressed dissatisfaction with counsel (People v. Gonzalez (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 707, 716). On the other hand, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not waived by a guilty or no contest plea, although a certificate of probable cause is a prerequisite to their review on appeal following such a plea. (People v. Kaanehe, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 9, fn. 5; In re Brown (1973) 9 Cal.3d 679, 682, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 1097-1098 & fn. 7); People v. Stubbs (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 243, 244-245; People v. Everett (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 274, 279, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 1097-1098 & fns. 7-9.)
We have reviewed the reporter’s transcripts of appellant’s Marsden hearings and ascertain no indication his claimed Marsden errors went to the legality of the proceedings resulting in his pleas. In examining the change of plea proceedings in case Nos. 162457 and 162657, however, we note that appellant insisted he was not prepared to go to trial on case No. 162657 and asked defense counsel what his defense was going to be, to which counsel replied that he was not going to talk to appellant about it. The trial court told appellant he could either plead or the case was going to trial that day. The court and counsel then explained how a sentence of eight years four months would be calculated, and appellant agreed to accept the offer. During the change of plea itself, the court inquired whether appellant had had enough time to discuss matters with his attorney, and whether he was satisfied with the advice he received. Appellant answered affirmatively to both questions. Thus, we cannot be sure whether the superior court, in issuing the certificate of probable cause, had in mind the possibility of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, or certified the appeal as not frivolous or vexatious based on a noncognizable issue.
Second, contrary to respondent’s assertion, the issues appellant raises do not go to the validity of the plea, but merely concern his sentence – in short, they are classic postplea issues for which compliance with section 1237.5 is not required. This is so because appellant does not seek to challenge the trial court’s imposition of the eight-year four-month prison term to which appellant agreed, but instead asserts error in the imposition of a sentence in case No. 155465 that exceeded the agreed-upon term in that case. Because the trial court ordered the sentence imposed in case No. 155465 to run concurrently to that imposed in case No. 162657, case No. 155465 added no actual time to appellant’s sentence, and so reducing the sentence imposed in that case would likewise not reduce appellant’s eight-year four-month term. Accordingly, appellant’s claim of error does not constitute a challenge to the validity of the plea itself. (Compare People v. Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 79 [challenge to negotiated sentence constitutes challenge to plea itself] with People v. Brown (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1220 [no probable cause certificate required where appellant did not contend negotiated plea was invalid in any respect or argue trial court lacked authority to impose negotiated sentence, but grounds for appeal instead arose from trial court’s failure to give effect to terms of plea] & People v. Scott (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 910, 915-916 [appeal seeking to enforce terms of original plea bargain does not challenge validity of plea itself].) Additionally, appellant’s challenge to the amount of the fees imposed pursuant to section 1465.8 does not implicate the validity of the pleas, since calculation of the section 1465.8 fees was not part of the plea agreement. As we previously observed, however, appellant’s notice of appeal makes no reference to his sentence or grounds arising after entry of the plea that do not affect the plea’s validity. (See rule 8.304(b)(4).)
“Generally speaking, a notice of appeal shall be liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency. [Citations.]” (People v. Earls, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 191.) By contrast, section 1237.5 and rule 8.304(b)(1) are to be applied in a strict manner. (People v. Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1098 [construing predecessor rule, rule 31(d)].) In the present case, appellant did not file a notice of appeal that stated or even implied the appeal was based on grounds arising after entry of the plea and not affecting the plea’s validity. (See People v. Lloyd (1998) 17 Cal.4th 658, 664-665; People v. McEwan, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 178; People v. Way, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 735-736.) He did, however, timely seek and obtain a certificate of probable cause, which, as we have seen, does not require identification and certification of each issue to be raised on appeal. (People v. Hoffard, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1174.) For whatever reason, trial counsel did not prepare the notice of appeal or statement of grounds on his behalf. Moreover, appellate counsel undertook no action to correct or clarify them. (See People v. McEwan, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at pp. 178-179; People v. Earls, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 193.) The issues appellant now raises are cognizable following a guilty or no contest plea. Respondent’s opposition to our reviewing them on the merits proceeds from the erroneous premise that they constitute challenges to the validity of appellant’s pleas.
Under the circumstances, and even strictly construing the applicable requirements, we conclude the appeal is operative and should not be dismissed. Accordingly, we turn to the merits of appellant’s claims.
II
Violation of the Plea Agreement in Case No. 155465
During the February 28, 2006, change of plea proceedings in case No. 155465, the trial court informed appellant: “And I’ve indicated to your counsel upon a plea, what will happen is probation will be denied, you’ll be ordered to do a prison term of 32 months, plus attended [sic] fines.” At the outset of the August 28, 2006, change of plea proceedings in case Nos. 162457 and 162657, the court stated that it had before it three cases involving appellant: In case No. 155465, there was an indicated sentence of 32 months, while the other two cases remained to be tried. In the course of explaining how the negotiated term of eight years four months would be computed, the court advised appellant that it would run the case in which appellant was facing 32 months, concurrently. Appellant then accepted the eight-year four-month offer and changed his pleas in case Nos. 162457 and 162657.
In the probation officer’s report originally submitted in case No. 155465, the probation officer recited that the indicated sentence was 32 months in prison and recommended imposition of that term. In the subsequent report submitted for purposes of sentencing on all three cases, however, the probation officer recited that the indicated sentence in case No. 155465 was included in the eight-year four-month negotiated term, and, for reasons that are unclear, recommended imposition of a four-year concurrent term on count 1 in that case. The trial court followed that recommendation in sentencing appellant. Appellant neither objected at sentencing nor sought to withdraw his plea.
Respondent now says the sentence imposed should stand despite the fact the indicated sentence in case No. 155465 was 32 months, because, after committing the offenses charged in case Nos. 162457 and 162657, appellant negotiated a new plea that replaced the initial plea bargain. The record does not support this claim. Instead, it is clear that the term to be imposed in case No. 155465 was always 32 months, and the trial court in fact referred to that term several times during the change of plea proceedings in the other two cases. The only issue in case No. 155465 that was subject to negotiation in conjunction with the later two cases was the effect the 32-month term would have on appellant’s aggregate sentence.
Appellant says the apparent confusion stems from the fact he pled to the same case twice, implicating the constitutional prohibition against being placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense. The record belies this claim as well: a close examination of the August 28, 2006, change of plea proceedings clearly establishes appellant pled guilty or no contest only in case Nos. 162457 and 162657. In fact, the trial court specified which case was before it as it took appellant’s pleas to the various counts in each. At no time did it purport to take pleas to counts contained in case No. 155465.
“When a guilty plea is entered in exchange for specified benefits such as the dismissal of other counts or an agreed maximum punishment, both parties, including the state, must abide by the terms of the agreement. The punishment may not significantly exceed that which the parties agreed upon.” (People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1024.) “A sentence that imposes a punishment more severe than that specified in the plea bargain … implicates due process concerns and raises a constitutional right to some remedy.” (People v. Brown, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 1221; Walker, at p. 1024.) That a breach of agreement was inadvertent “does not lessen its impact.” (Santobello v. New York (1971) 404 U.S. 257, 262.)
Here, the trial court clearly sentenced appellant to a term in excess of the agreed-upon punishment in case No. 155465, even though the breach of the bargain in that case did not ultimately affect the overall sentence to which appellant agreed and was sentenced. As noted, appellant did not object at the time of sentencing. Nevertheless, the lack of objection is not fatal to his claim. As the California Supreme Court determined in People v. Walker, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pages 1024-1025:
We recognize that a trial court has broad discretion to withdraw its prior approval of a negotiated plea, and it may do so if, after further consideration or upon becoming more fully informed about the case, it concludes the bargain is not in the best interests of society. (People v. Tung (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1607, 1610.) It is apparent from the record, however, that this is not what happened here.
“Whether or not a defendant waives an objection to punishment exceeding the terms of the bargain by the failure to raise the point in some fashion at sentencing depends upon whether the trial court followed the requirements of section 1192.5. That section provides in pertinent part that when a plea bargain is accepted by the parties and approved by the court, the defendant generally ‘cannot be sentenced on such plea to a punishment more severe than that specified in the plea and the court may not proceed as to such plea other than as specified in the plea.’ The court ‘shall inform the defendant prior to the making of the plea that (1) its approval is not binding, (2) it may, at the time set for the hearing on the application for probation or pronouncement of judgment, withdraw its approval in the light of further consideration of the matter, and (3) in such case, the defendant shall be permitted to withdraw his plea if he desires to do so.’ (§ 1192.5)
Nonsubstantive changes have since been made to the statute.
“Absent compliance with the section 1192.5 procedure, the defendant’s constitutional right to the benefit of his bargain is not waived by a mere failure to object at sentencing. ‘Of course, there can be no waiver of a constitutional right absent “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” [Citation.] No less should a court presume from mere silence that defendant is waiving implementation of the consideration that induced him to waive his constitutional rights.’ [Citation.]”
The trial court here did not give the section 1192.5 admonition during any of the change of plea proceedings. Accordingly, appellant’s claim was not forfeited by reason of his failure to object, and we turn to a determination of the appropriate remedy.
“The goal in providing a remedy for breach of the bargain is to redress the harm caused by the violation without prejudicing either party or curtailing the normal sentencing discretion of the trial judge.… [¶] The usual remedies for violation of a plea bargain are to allow defendant to withdraw the plea and go to trial on the original charges, or to specifically enforce the plea bargain. Courts find withdrawal of the plea to be the appropriate remedy when specifically enforcing the bargain would have limited the judge’s sentencing discretion in light of the development of additional information or changed circumstances between acceptance of the plea and sentencing. Specific enforcement is appropriate when it will implement the reasonable expectations of the parties without binding the trial judge to a disposition that he or she considers unsuitable under all the circumstances.” (People v. Mancheno (1982) 32 Cal.3d 855, 860-861.)
If the trial court had found the negotiated sentence in case No. 155465 unsuitable in light of appellant’s new offenses, the appropriate remedy might well be to afford appellant the opportunity to withdraw his plea. To do otherwise could improperly limit the court’s sentencing discretion. It is readily apparent, however, especially from the trial court’s references to the 32-month sentence during the change of plea proceedings in case Nos. 162457 and 162657, when it obviously had knowledge of appellant’s subsequent offenses, that the court had no intention of withdrawing its approval. Instead, imposition of the four-year term in case No. 155465 was merely an inadvertent breach of the plea bargain. Accordingly, we conclude specific enforcement is appropriate. It does not bind the trial court to a disposition it considered unsuitable; implements the reasonable – and bargained-for – expectations of the parties; and, since sentence in case No. 155465 was ordered to run concurrently to the eight-year four-month term imposed in case No. 162657, will not reduce appellant’s aggregate term and so does not deprive the prosecution of any of the benefits for which it bargained. (See People v. Enlow (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 850, 854.)
We will order the judgment modified accordingly.
III
Calculation of the Section 1465.8 Fines
In case No. 155465, the trial court imposed a court security fee of $80 pursuant to section 1465.8. In case No. 162457, the fee imposed was also $80. In case No. 162657, the fee imposed was $120. Appellant now contends the fee should be reduced by $20 in each case. He is wrong.
Section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) provides: “To ensure and maintain adequate funding for court security, a fee of twenty dollars ($20) shall be imposed on every conviction for a criminal offense, including a traffic offense, except parking offenses as defined in subdivision (i) of Section 1463, involving a violation of a section of the Vehicle Code or any local ordinance adopted pursuant to the Vehicle Code.” (Italics added.) Thus, the fee attaches to each count on which appellant was convicted pursuant to his guilty or no contest pleas, and not merely to each count upon which sentence was imposed. (See People v. Schoeb (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 861, 863, 865-866.) Accordingly, the fees were calculated correctly.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to provide that the concurrent term imposed on count 1 of case No. VCF155465 (violation of Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count 1C on the abstract of judgment) is the lower term of two years eight months. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment reflecting said modification, and to forward a certified copy thereof to the appropriate authorities.