Opinion
B160080.
7-29-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CARLOS RUDY MENDIAS, Defendant and Appellant.
Chase Law Group, P.C., and Tara Selver for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Margaret E. Maxwell, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Timothy M. Weiner, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Carlos Rudy Mendias was convicted of one count each of assault with a firearm, possession of a firearm by a felon, battery, and exhibiting a firearm, with allegations he had suffered a prior serious felony conviction found true. He was sentenced to state prison for a term of 11 years. Mendias appeals, claiming evidentiary error. We affirm.
FACTS
Mendias, Brenda Crenshaw (Mendiass girlfriend), Crenshaws three children, and Zachary Season (Crenshaws nephew) were living together in December 2001. After the three adults consumed a substantial amount of alcohol one evening, Mendias and Crenshaw had an argument in their bedroom. Season heard the argument, then heard a crash, went to investigate, and found Crenshaw lying on the bedroom floor. When Crenshaw stood up, Mendias grabbed her, threw her against Season, displayed a handgun, and pointed it at Season and Crenshaw.
At Crenshaws request, Season left the apartment, but then returned. Mendias opened the door, pushed Season against a wall, patted him down, then hit him on the back of his head with the gun. Crenshaw told Season to run, and he went to a friends house. When Season returned for his clothes the next morning, a passing police officer saw Season in front of the apartment building, noticed there was blood on his shirt, and stopped to question him. The police entered the apartment by force, arrested Mendias, and seized a loaded handgun.
Mendias was charged with assault with a firearm against Season, possession of a firearm by a felon, battery against Crenshaw, and exhibiting a firearm, with allegations he had suffered a prior serious felony conviction that qualified as a strike. A jury rejected Mendiass defense (Crenshaw said he didnt abuse anyone or exhibit a gun) and convicted him as charged.
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to Evidence Code section 1109, the trial court admitted evidence about Mendiass involvement in two prior domestic violence incidents. Mendias claims the evidence should have been excluded, and also claims that (as applied to him) section 1109 is unconstitutional. We reject both arguments.
A.
One prior incident occurred in March 1998, when Mendias was dating Jane Lee; they argued, and Mendias hit Lee in the face, breaking her nose. Mendias was convicted of felony battery.
The other incident occurred in September 1999, when Mendias was dating Charlene Rodriguez; they argued, and Mendias attacked Rodriguez, bruising her arms, legs, and face. Rodriguez testified that Mendias abused her "just about every day," and once chased her when she tried to run away.
This evidence was properly admitted because section 1109 permits evidence of other acts of domestic violence unless its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value. ( § 352.) Given Crenshaws refusal to testify against Mendias and the similarity between his past and present conduct, the evidence of the prior incidents was clearly probative. Conversely, there was nothing particularly prejudicial about the evidence of the earlier events; the testimony was brief and to the point. The evidence was properly admitted. (People v. Jennings (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1313-1316; People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638, 250 Cal. Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189; People v. Escobar (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1096.)
B.
Mendias contends section 1109 "violates equal protection guarantees when it is applied in certain `hybrid cases" such as this, by which he means a case "which includes a domestic violence count amongst other charges." He says the jury could not have ignored the evidence of the prior incidents in deciding the truth of the assault and firearm charges. But Mendias offers no relevant authority to support this contention, and we know of none.
More to the point, Mendiass premise is wrong. The jurors were specifically told that the evidence about the prior incidents was not to be considered for any purpose other than the battery against Crenshaw, and the court told the jurors that, "for example, you must not consider this evidence for purposes of inferring that the defendant had a disposition to commit the crimes alleged [in the other counts]." As always, we presume the jurors understood and followed the courts instructions (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 662, 937 P.2d 213; People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 17, 286 Cal. Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84), and that presumption disposes of the issue where, as here, there is nothing in the record to suggest otherwise.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: ORTEGA, Acting P.J., MALLANO, J. --------------- Notes: Subsequent section references are to the Evidence Code.