People v. Mendez

33 Citing cases

  1. In re Tahl

    1 Cal.3d 122 (Cal. 1969)   Cited 1,589 times
    In People v. Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 (Tahl), the California Supreme Court interpreted Boykin v. Alabama as requiring that "each of the three rights mentioned-self-incrimination, confrontation, and jury trial-must be specifically and expressly enumerated for the benefit of and waived by the accused prior to acceptance of his guilty plea."

    A review of these authorities convinces us that the guilty plea in the instant case was in conformity with then existing California law. The most recent definitive statement by this court is found in People v. Mendez (1945) 27 Cal.2d 20 [ 161 P.2d 929], in which we stated unequivocally that "There is no statutory requirement in this state that any special admonition be given by the court when accepting a plea of guilty." ( Id. at p. 22.)

  2. People v. Verdier

    96 Cal.App.2d 29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950)   Cited 8 times

    [1] Under Penal Code, section 1192, after a plea of guilty of a crime divided into degrees "the court must, before passing sentence, determine the degree." While a hearing to determine the degree of an offense held under this section is not a trial in its full technical sense and the court may consider matters not admissible on the issue of guilt or innocence ( People v. Williams, 14 Cal.2d 532 [ 95 P.2d 456]; In re Steve, 73 Cal.App.2d 697 [ 167 P.2d 243]), the burden of the decisions is that the court should take evidence in the presence of the defendant to determine the degree of the crime ( People v. Mendez, 27 Cal.2d 20 [ 161 P.2d 929]; People v. Bellon, 180 Cal. 706 [182 P. 420]; People v. Chew Lan Ong, 141 Cal. 550 [ 75 P. 186, 99 Am.St.Rep. 88]; People v. Stratton, 133 Cal.App. 309 [ 24 P.2d 174]; People v. O'Brien, 122 Cal.App. 147 [ 9 P.2d 902]; People v. Paraskevopolis, 42 Cal.App. 325 [ 183 P. 585]). In People v. Chew Lan Ong, supra, the claim was made that section 1192, Penal Code "is unconstitutional because it does not provide any manner, or mode, whereby the court is to reach its determination of the degree of the crime."

  3. People v. Morris

    46 Cal.3d 1 (Cal. 1988)   Cited 482 times
    Holding "additional cautionary instructions" negated any "likelihood the jury was misled" by an erroneous instruction

    The objection was overruled, and in holding there was no error this court stated: "[T]he information charged defendant with murder, and it was unnecessary for the information to state the method or the degree of the murder. ( People v. Golston, 58 Cal.2d 535, 539 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 83, 375 P.2d 51]; People v. Mendez, 27 Cal.2d 20, 23-24 [ 161 P.2d 929].) That the statute of limitations may have run on all crimes except the murder is immaterial here.

  4. People v. Thomas

    43 Cal.3d 818 (Cal. 1987)   Cited 195 times
    In Thomas, the court explained descriptive charging language can give sufficient notice, even if the statutory basis of a crime is not alleged.

    Neither is it necessary to specifically plead the charged murder was wilful, deliberate, and premeditated. ( People v. Mendez (1945) 27 Cal.2d 20, 23 [ 161 P.2d 929].) So long as the information adequately alleges murder, the evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing will adequately inform the defendant of the prosecution's theory regarding the manner and degree of killing.

  5. In re Williams

    1 Cal.3d 168 (Cal. 1969)   Cited 87 times

    Counsel should afford the defendant the assurance of reaching an informed decision. (See People v. Mendez (1945) 27 Cal.2d 20, 21-22 [ 161 P.2d 929]; People v. Loeber (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 730, 735-736 [ 323 P.2d 136].) In any event, the "benefit of the bargain," in view of Swann, must necessarily have been no more than an illusion.

  6. People v. Risenhoover

    70 Cal.2d 39 (Cal. 1968)   Cited 45 times
    Relying on Anderson

    However, the information charged defendant with murder, and it was unnecessary for the information to state the method or degree of the murder. ( People v. Golston, 58 Cal.2d 535, 539 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 83, 375 P.2d 51]; People v. Mendez, 27 Cal.2d 20, 23-24 [ 161 P.2d 929].) That the statute of limitations may have run on all crimes except the murder is immaterial here.

  7. People v. Golston

    58 Cal.2d 535 (Cal. 1962)   Cited 24 times

    This is the proper method of charging murder; it is not necessary to state the method or degree of the murder in the information. ( People v. Mendez, 27 Cal.2d 20, 23 [2] [ 161 P.2d 929]; People v. SuperiorCourt, 202 Cal. 165, 167 [1] [ 259 P. 943]; People v. Witt, 170 Cal. 104, 107 et seq. [ 148 P. 928]; People v. Coffman, 105 Cal.App.2d 164, 167 [4] [ 233 P.2d 117].) [4b] Defendant concedes that there was evidence that he entered the decedent's apartment to commit rape.

  8. People v. Purvis

    52 Cal.2d 871 (Cal. 1959)   Cited 36 times
    In People v. Purvis (1959) 52 Cal.2d 871 [ 346 P.2d 22] (hereafter sometimes Purvis), disapproved on another point by People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631, 648-649 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33, 12 A.L.R.3d 810], we held, albeit without mention of Jones, that, if evidence is inadmissible at the guilt phase, it is also inadmissible at the penalty phase; and that section 190.1 did not render evidence that was inadmissible at the guilt phase admissible at the penalty phase, but merely "broaden[ed] the scope of relevant evidence admissible on the issue of penalty...."

    We stated: "There arises the question of the character of the evidence to be received on the limited new trial for the determination of punishment. Where the question (together with the degree of the crime) is determined by the court on defendant's plea of guilty to a charge of murder, the hearing `is not a trial in the full technical sense, and is not governed by the same strict rules of procedure as a trial,' and the court in aggravation or mitigation of the offense may consider matters not admissible on the issue of guilt ( People v. Gilbert (1943), 22 Cal.2d 522, 528 [ 140 P.2d 9]; People v. Thomas (1951), supra, 37 Cal.2d 74, 76-77 [ 230 P.2d 351]), although the determination must be made upon `competent evidence' ( People v. Mendez (1945), 27 Cal.2d 20, 23 [ 161 P.2d 929]). Where the matter is to be determined by a jury, however, it would appear that the proceeding should be `a trial in the full technical sense, and . . . governed by the same . . . rules of procedure' as the trial of the issue of guilt.

  9. People v. Jones

    52 Cal.2d 636 (Cal. 1959)   Cited 108 times
    In People v. Jones (1959) 52 Cal.2d 636 [ 343 P.2d 577] (hereafter sometimes Jones), we stated in dictum that "[i]t would appear that" section 190.1 of the Penal Code under the 1957 law "embodies the broad, liberal rule on admission of evidence that has always existed where a defendant has pleaded guilty and the only issues being tried relate to the degree of the crime and the penalty to be imposed."

    "It [the degree of the offense] is a matter, together with the penalty to be imposed, which must be determined by the court on competent evidence before passing sentence under a plea of 'guilty' (Pen. Code, ยง 1192) . . ." ( People v. Mendez, 27 Cal.2d 20, 23-24 [ 161 P.2d 929].) Thus, under former practice, defendant did not have a right to a trial by jury on the issue of the degree and penalty after a plea of guilty.

  10. People v. Wein

    50 Cal.2d 383 (Cal. 1958)   Cited 268 times
    In People v. Wein (1958) 50 Cal.2d 383 [ 326 P.2d 457], we applied Chessman to uphold the defendant's convictions of kidnapping for robbery, with infliction of bodily harm, for which he also had received the death penalty.

    This was a "free and voluntary" choice made by defendant with full advice of counsel. (See People v. Mendez, 27 Cal.2d 20, 22 [ 161 P.2d 929].) Double Punishment