Summary
In People v. Medrano, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th 961, the Fourth District Court of Appeal found no basis to order remand given the availability of a motion pursuant to section 1203.01.
Summary of this case from The People v. Salazar-BaxterOpinion
E070042
10-04-2019
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michael Damion Jude MEDRANO, Defendant and Appellant.
Joanna McKim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel, Tami Falkenstein Hennick, and Lynn McGinnis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Certified for Partial Publication.
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts A-C and E of the DISCUSSION.
Joanna McKim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel, Tami Falkenstein Hennick, and Lynn McGinnis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
MENETREZ, J. A jury convicted Michael Damion Jude Medrano of one count of first degree murder ( Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a) ; count 1), two counts of second degree robbery (§ 211; counts 2 & 4), and one count of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 3). Medrano was 19 years old when he committed the offenses. He was sentenced to 25 years to life, plus seven years.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
Medrano was sentenced in December 2017, one and one-half years after the Supreme Court decided People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 496, 370 P.3d 1053 ( Franklin ), which held that when a juvenile offender receives an indeterminate life sentence, the offender must be "given adequate opportunity at sentencing to make a record of mitigating evidence tied to his youth." ( Id. at p. 269, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 496, 370 P.3d 1053.) The Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the juvenile offender had been given an adequate opportunity to make such a record. ( Id. at pp. 286-287, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 496, 370 P.3d 1053.)
Medrano asks us to give him the same relief that was granted in Franklin. But because Medrano was sentenced one and one-half years after Franklin , and because nothing in the record indicates that Medrano lacked an adequate opportunity at sentencing to make a record of mitigating youth-related evidence, we see no basis to order the same relief that the Supreme Court granted in Franklin. We note, however, that the Supreme Court has recently held that a juvenile offender whose conviction and sentence are final may file a motion under section 1203.01 for the purpose of making a record of mitigating youth-related evidence. ( In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 446-447, 247 Cal.Rptr.3d 669, 441 P.3d 912 ( Cook ).) We accordingly affirm without prejudice to Medrano's filing a motion "for a Franklin proceeding under the authority of section 1203.01" and Cook. ( Id. at p. 460, 247 Cal.Rptr.3d 669, 441 P.3d 912.)
BACKGROUND
A. Prosecution's Case
On the evening of March 21, 2016, three men were physically attacked outside of the Magnolia Tree Apartments (Magnolia Tree) complex in which Medrano lived. Two of the men were robbed, and one was stabbed to death.
All subsequent date references are to 2016 unless otherwise indicated.
We refer to the victims as Victims One, Two, and Three to protect their privacy. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)
Victim One testified that at 7:50 p.m. he was riding his bicycle past the Magnolia Tree complex on his way to a store when three young men ran toward him. Two approached from the front, and one was behind him. The men pushed Victim One off of his bicycle, forcing him to the ground where he landed on his back. More than one of the assailants started punching Victim One in the face. The men also kicked Victim One in the back and hit him in the back of the head with an unidentified object. One of the men said, "Take out the blade," but Victim One never saw a knife. Victim One did not have any idea why the men were hitting him. While Victim One was lying on the ground, he felt hands in his pants pocket. Both his cell phone and his wallet were taken.
Victim One went to the hospital, received stitches for the wound on his head, and spoke with police officers. Several days after the attack, Victim One identified Medrano in a photo lineup as one of the individuals who attacked him. Victim One was not able to identify Medrano in the courtroom, but Medrano looked different because he had longer hair and was wearing glasses, which he was not wearing in the lineup.
The other surviving victim, Victim Two, testified that he was attacked by three or four men on March 21 while he was across the street from the Magnolia Tree complex in front of an empty field. Victim Two did not know what time it was, but it was dark outside. The men approached Victim Two, who moved to the side to let them pass, but they did not. One of the men punched Victim Two in the face, and Victim Two fell to the ground, where all of the men punched and kicked him in the back, on his face, and on his head. Victim Two lost consciousness. He later awoke in the field and found that his pockets had been emptied of his money and his cell phone. Victim Two could not describe his attackers.
On March 21, Medrano, J.L. (a 16 year old), Eddie Bonilla, and others were hanging out at the apartment of R.R., another resident of the Magnolia Tree complex. According to R.R., who was interviewed by detectives in November 2016, on the night of March 21, Medrano, J.L., and Bonilla were hanging out at his apartment and left the apartment when it started getting dark outside, which was around 7:00 p.m. or 7:30 p.m. When Medrano and J.L. returned to R.R.'s apartment after having gone to the store, R.R. overheard Medrano and J.L. telling Medrano's sister that they had just beaten someone up or "jumped somebody." Bonilla returned five minutes later and said that someone was hit by a car in front of the Magnolia Tree complex. J.L. asked Medrano "Did you–stab him?" to which Medrano responded, "Yeah." J.L. seemed mad at Medrano and told Medrano that he "didn't have to do that." R.R. knew that Medrano had acquired a knife one month before March 21. The Riverside County Sheriff's Department responded to a 911 call that night about a body lying in the street out in front of the Magnolia Tree complex. By the time that law enforcement arrived at the scene, Victim Three was dead. Victim Three was stabbed in the back. There was a bloody shoe print next to the body and additional bloody shoe prints leading up to the front of the apartment complex.
An audio recording of the interview was played for the jury but not transcribed into the record. The jury was provided a transcript of the interview.
In attempting to locate eyewitnesses, Corporal Joshua Manjarrez and other deputies went door to door in the Magnolia Tree complex. Medrano was in his apartment with his mother, Bonilla, and others. Manjarrez questioned Medrano outside of the apartment, and Medrano asked to leave the complex with his girlfriend. Medrano agreed to sit in the back of a patrol car outside of the complex while Manjarrez relayed the request to his superior. Manjarrez also wanted investigators to analyze Medrano's shoes.
While Medrano was sitting in the back of the patrol car, Detective James Merrill examined Medrano's shoes to determine if they were similar to the shoes that left the bloody footprints around the body. There appeared to be blood on the sides of the shoes but not on the bottom. Merrill collected the shoes as evidence. Blood was also discovered on J.L.'s shoes. The blood on Medrano's and J.L.'s shoes was determined to be that of Victim Two.
Medrano waived his Miranda rights and was later interviewed by another detective. Although Medrano changed his story throughout the interview, he eventually admitted that he punched Victim Three after seeing J.L. and Victim Three in a fight. Medrano did not admit to having a knife or stabbing Victim Three.
B. Defendant's Case—Medrano's Testimony
Medrano testified on his own behalf. During the afternoon of March 21, Medrano was hanging out at R.R.'s apartment and at some point left the apartment to walk to the store to purchase diapers for Medrano's baby. While walking back from the store, Medrano saw two men fighting in front of the apartment complex. Medrano recognized one of the men as his friend J.L. but did not recognize the other combatant, Victim Three, whom he described as an older man. Victim Three appeared to be winning the fight and to have the "upper hand." Medrano approached the fight and hit Victim Three on the side of his face. Victim Three fell down immediately, and Medrano kicked him multiple times, including in the head. Medrano did not hit Victim Three hard but thought that Victim Three might have fallen so quickly because Victim Three seemed drunk based on the smell of alcohol "around the area." Medrano did not have a knife on him that night, did not own a knife at that time, did not stab Victim Three, and did not see J.L. with a knife. Medrano had been in a recent fight with the mother of his child about "pulling out a knife."
After Victim Three fell, Medrano heard someone say that they were going to call the police. Medrano thought about his daughter and walked away. Medrano looked back and saw Victim Three was standing up, arguing with J.L., and pushing J.L. Medrano went straight to his apartment and did not see J.L. or R.R. at any time after the fight.
Medrano denied robbing Victim One, Victim Two, or anyone else. Medrano admitted to getting into a fight with Victim Two earlier that night. Medrano kicked Victim Two in the face. Medrano did not know why he kicked Victim Two. Victim Two did not initiate the attack. Medrano also got into another fight that day, but it was not with Victim One.
DISCUSSION
See footnote *, ante .
D. Franklin Proceeding
Medrano was 19 years old when he committed the offenses. He received an indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life, so he will be entitled to a youth offender parole hearing during his 25th year of incarceration. (§ 3051, subd. (b)(3).) "A youth offender parole hearing is a hearing by the Board of Parole Hearings [the Board] for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who was 25 years of age or younger ... at the time of his or her controlling offense." (§ 3051, subd. (a)(1).) At the youth offender parole hearing, the Board "shall give great weight to the diminished culpability of juveniles as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the prisoner in accordance with relevant case law." (§ 4801, subd. (c).) In Franklin , supra , 63 Cal.4th 261, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 496, 370 P.3d 1053, the Supreme Court held that when a juvenile offender receives an indeterminate life sentence, the offender must be "given adequate opportunity at sentencing to make a record of mitigating evidence tied to his youth." ( Id. at p. 269, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 496, 370 P.3d 1053.) The case was remanded to the trial court "for the limited purpose of determining whether [the offender] was afforded an adequate opportunity to make a record of information" relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing. ( Id. at pp. 286-287, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 496, 370 P.3d 1053.)
Medrano argues that he is entitled to the same relief that the Supreme Court granted in Franklin. He notes that "defense counsel did not present evidence on [Medrano's] level of maturity, cognitive ability, [or] other youth[-]related factors or mitigating factors." He argues that "[b]ecause the record is undeveloped on the issue and it is unclear whether defense counsel understood the need and opportunity to develop the record type contemplated by the Court in [ Franklin ], the case should be remanded so the trial court can follow the procedures set forth in Franklin to ensure that such opportunity is afforded to appellant." The People agree, but we do not.
The record contains no indication that Medrano was not given an adequate opportunity to make a record of mitigating youth-related evidence as contemplated in Franklin. Section 3051 was amended effective January 1, 2016, to require youth offender parole hearings for offenders who were 25 years old or younger at the time of the controlling offense. (Stats. 2015, ch. 471, § 1.) The Supreme Court decided Franklin in May 2016. Medrano was sentenced in December 2017 for offenses he committed when he was 19 years old. Thus, the Supreme Court decision establishing Medrano's right to present mitigating youth-related evidence at sentencing was in place for one and one-half years before Medrano was sentenced. The record does not indicate that Medrano's opportunity to exercise that right was inadequate in any respect. Rather, it appears that he merely failed—whether by choice or by inadvertence—to exercise it.
Medrano cites People v. Jones (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 787, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 167 ( Jones ) for the proposition that a Franklin remand is appropriate if "it is unclear whether [the offender] understood both the need and the opportunity to develop the type of record contemplated by Franklin. " ( Id. at p. 820, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 167.) But in Jones , the offender had been sentenced before Franklin was decided, and that fact was central to the court's analysis. ( Id. at p. 819, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 167.) Because Medrano was sentenced one and one-half years after Franklin was decided, Jones is inapplicable. In addition, the Supreme Court recently held that a petition for writ of habeas corpus is an inappropriate procedural vehicle for obtaining a Franklin proceeding, at least in the first instance, because a juvenile offender whose conviction and sentence are final may file a motion under section 1203.01 (and the trial court's powers under Code of Civil Procedure section 187 ) for the purpose of making a record of mitigating youth-related evidence. ( Cook , supra , 7 Cal.5th at pp. 446-447, 247 Cal.Rptr.3d 669, 441 P.3d 912.) Cook is of course distinguishable because it is a habeas corpus case, and Medrano's case is before us on direct appeal. But given the availability of the motion hearing described in Cook , we see no basis to order the same relief that was granted in Franklin. Instead, we affirm without prejudice to Medrano's filing a motion "for a Franklin proceeding under the authority of section 1203.01" and Cook. ( Id. at p. 460, 247 Cal.Rptr.3d 669, 441 P.3d 912.) E. Actual Custody Credit
Briefing in this case was already complete when the Supreme Court decided Cook , so we asked the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing Cook 's impact, if any, on this appeal. Neither party's position changed in light of Cook —in their briefs, the parties continued to agree that Medrano should receive the same relief that was granted in Franklin. At oral argument, however, the Attorney General agreed with our conclusion that Medrano was not deprived of an adequate opportunity to make a record of mitigating youth-related evidence at sentencing.
People v. Carranza (2019) ––– Cal.App.5th ––––, 252 Cal.Rptr.3d 919, 2019 WL 4745461, which was filed the day before oral argument in the instant case, held that the right to a Franklin proceeding can be waived either orally or in writing but cannot be forfeited by inaction. We do not find the reasoning in Carranza persuasive, and we decline to follow it. In our view, Carranza fails to articulate a sound basis for declining to apply to the right to a Franklin proceeding the same forfeiture rules that apply to countless other rights in criminal proceedings. In addition, Carranza reasons that because (1) claims of ineffective assistance of counsel "typically fail" on direct appeal, and (2) under Cook a petition for writ of habeas corpus is not an appropriate vehicle for seeking a Franklin proceeding either, it follows that (3) the right to a Franklin proceeding should not be subject to forfeiture by inaction, because such inaction might be the result of ineffective assistance for which there appears to be no remedy. (Carranza , supra , at p. ––––, 252 Cal.Rptr.3d 919, 2019 WL 4745461, at p. *7.) We disagree. Cook held that a habeas petition is not an appropriate vehicle for seeking a Franklin proceeding because there is an adequate remedy at law, namely, a motion under section 1203.01. (Cook , supra , 7 Cal.5th at p. 447, 247 Cal.Rptr.3d 669, 441 P.3d 912.)
See footnote *, ante .
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed without prejudice to Medrano's filing a motion "for a Franklin proceeding under the authority of section 1203.01" and Cook . ( Cook , supra , 7 Cal.5th at p. 460, 247 Cal.Rptr.3d 669, 441 P.3d 912.) The trial court is directed to: (1) prepare an amended abstract of judgment, indicating 648 days of actual custody credit, and (2) forward a certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
We concur:
SLOUGH, Acting, P. J.
RAPHAEL, J.